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RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS 
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Defendant/Appellants. 
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Honorable Juneal C Kerrick, District Judge 
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1 
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A. Because I was in on a meeting with Carl 1 My question is: Was he still interested in 
Harder and them putting the agreement together. 2 selling the business to Drew? 
Q. Okay. When was that meeting? 3 A. I assumed he was. 
A. Oh, one or two months before the agreement. 4 Q. Why do you assume that? 
I mean, Carl was pretty good about getting things done. 5 A. If he agreed to it in the first place, I 
6 Q. Can you tell me about that meeting? 6 just figured if Drew could come up with another way of 
7 A. I didn't know Ron had agreed to what he had 7 getting the money or whatever, that he would. 
8 agreed to in the agreements that they were putting 8 Q. At any time during this particular time 
9 together. He was trying to clarify to me exactly what 9 period, after these documents were signed, did Ron ever 
10 property was going to go with the bUSiness, and how it 10 make a comment to you that I'm going to -- I'm going to 
11 was supposed to happen. That Drew had a year to put the 11 give the business to Drew? 
12 agreement into effect. And he had to come up with so 12 A. No, I've never heard him giving the business 
13 much money down, be approved by Chrysler, and basically 13 to Drew. 
14 if he did, then the business was his. 14 Q. Have you ever heard -- has anyone mentioned 
15 
16 
Q. And who else was present at that meeting? 15 to you that Ron said, why does Drew want to buy a 
A. Carl Harder, Ron, me. I don't remember 16 business if I'm just going to give it to him? 
17 whether Rob was there or not. 17 A. I don't recall anything like that. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you have any -- between the time 18 Q. Has Ron ever said anything to you that, you 
19 that you had that meeting and you received these signed 19 know, we're not going to go forward on this deal, I'm 
20 documents, did you have any more conversations with your 20 going to give the business to Drew anyway? 




A. No. 22 boys would have the business when Ron and Elaine died. 
Q. During that -- 23 Q. Why did you assume that? 
A. Not that I can remember. Not that I can 24 A. Most kids do. 
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Q. Okay. Now, during that year, September of 1 situation in this deal? 
2000 to September 2001, I think you testified that you 2 A. Sure. When they were gone, the boys would 
didn't have any more discussions with Ron regarding the 3 have the business. 
sale of the business; is that true? 4 Q. Did Ron make any statements regarding that? 
A. Not that I can remember any. 5 A. No. It was an assumption on my part. 
Q. When is the next time you had a conversation 6 Q. I asked you if you had heard that Ron said 
with Ron Thomas regarding these documents or the sale of 7 anything like that. And you said "not in those words." 
the business to Drew? 8 Do you remember that question? 
A. I was curious if Drew was doing anything to 9 A. Towards the sale of the --
get approved with Chrysler, or to come up with this 10 Q. Correct. 
money, or if he was going to go ahead and go through 11 I asked you if Ron had ever said anything 
with it. 12 like, I'm not going to go through with this deal. I'm 
The date, I don't know. I -- I just knew 13 not going to sell it to him. I mean, I'm just -- we're 
the year was going to be up, and was he going to 14 -- you know, I'm going to give the business to Drew. 
activate any of it. 15 A. No, I've never heard him say I'd give the 
Q. What did Ron tell you? 16 business to Drew. 
A. He hadn't heard anything. 17 Q. What have you heard him say? 
Q. Is that it? 18 A. That Drew was going to buy the business. 
A. Just that Drew hadn't -- to his knowledge; 19 Q. Did he--
he didn't know if Drew had done anything. 20 A. It was my assumption that when Ron and 
Q. Did he still want to sell the business to 21 Elaine were gone, that the boys would have the business. 
Drew? 22 Q. After September of 2001, did Ron ever tell 
A. I don't know. They'd have to redo whole new 23 you that he was going to sell the business to Drew? 
contracts, if they were going to. 24 A. No. 
Q. That's not my question, though. 2S Q. He never did? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Did you discuss it with him between 
3 September of 2001 and March of 2006? 
4 A. With Ron? 
5 Q. About Drew buying the business. 
6 A. No. I didn't ask, other than just asking 
7 about -- before this 2000 deadline was up -- or this 
8 2001 deadline was up, if he was going to do it anymore. 
9 I just assumed Drew was going to stay on then and manage 
10 and --
11 Q. Did Drew ever -- did you ever have any 
12 conversations with Drew about anything his father told 
13 him regarding the sale or the gift of the business? 
14 A. No, not Drew. 
15 Q. Were you surprised when Ron sold the 
16 business? 
17 A. I think I was more glad than anything, 
18 because I didn't know how we were going to keep up with 
19 the money thing. It was either that or bankruptcy. 
20 Q. Did he consult with you at all? 
21 A. No. I was in complete surprise. 
22 Q. You were? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. When did you find out? 
25 A. When he met with Bottles and Corbett and 
Page 150 
1 they come over to the office. 
2 Q. All right. And how did you find out? How 
3 did they tell you? 
4 A. They were just discussing it, and I 
5 overheard them talking about it. 
6 Q. Did they heavily market the business? 
7 A. Heavily market it? 
8 Q. Yeah. 
9 A. I thought so, yes. I know it was on the 
10 Internet. It was in advertiSing. There's -- they did a 
11 walkthrough over at the business. Took pictures. 
12 Q. Did Ron make any announcements to his 
13 employees that he was selling the business? 
14 A. I don't know. 
15 Q. Did he make an announcement to you? Did he 
16 let you know? 
17 A. Not until that day they were over there. 
18 Bottles and Corbett were there, and they were discussing 
19 how to mar~et it. 
20 Q. Did you tell any of the employees that Ron 
21 was selling the business? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. How much time elapsed between the time that 
24 they were meeting at the office, discussing it, and the 
25 business actually sold? 
1 A. I don't remember. There would be signed 
2 contracts. I don't remember. 
3 MR. WILKINSON: All right. Can we take just a 
4 one-minute break? 
5 
6 
(Break taken from 1:13 p.m. 1:17 p.m.) 
MR. WILKINSON: All right. We're back on the 
7 record. 
8 For the record, I'm going to reserve the 
9 right to reopen the deposition after we have the 
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10 opportunity to view the numerous documents that have not 
11 been produced in this case that Ms. Youngstrom has 
12 testified about and has personal knowledge of. 
13 And with that, we would conclude the 
14 deposition of Ms. Youngstrom, unless Mr. Bjorkman has 
15 questions. 
16 MR. BJORKMAN: No questions. 
17 MR. WILKINSON: All right. Thank you. 








STATE OF ) 
3 ) ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
4 
5 I, SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM, being first duly sworn on 
6 my oath, depose and say: 
7 That I am the witness named in the foregoing 
8 deposition taken the 17th day of August, 2007, 
9 consisting of pages numbered 1 to 151, inclusive; that I 
10 have read the said deposition and know the contents 
11 thereof; that the questions contained therein were 
12 propounded to me; that the answers to said questions 
13 were given by me, and that the answers as contained 
14 therein (or as corrected by me therein) are true and 
15 correct. 
16 










Subscribed and sworn to before me this __ day 
of _____ ~. 2007, at ____ ~, Idaho. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at . Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: __ _ 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
I, PAMELA J. LEATON, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness named in 
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to testify 
to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; 
That said deposition was taken down by me in 
shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, 
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true 
and verbatim record of said deposition. 
I further certify that I have no interest in the 
event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 27th day of August, 
2007. 
PAMELA J. LEATON 
CSR, RPR and Notary 
Public in and for the 
State of Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 2-10-2012 
Associated Reporting Inc. 
208.343.4004 
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\Villiam A. Morrow 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No.: 2451,6023 
wam@whitepeterson.com 
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-
VISUAL DEPOSITION OF 
SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4) 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION: Notice is hereby given that , pursuant to the applicJ.bJe 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. the undersigned will~ upon oral examination before a person 
~lUthorized by applicable la\vs to administer oaths. take the continuing audio-visual deposition of 
the Jeponent at the time, date and place follo\ving: 
NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO 







August 17, 2007 
Jury Room 
Gem County Courthouse 
415 E. Main Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Oral examination will continue from time to time until completed. You are respectfully 
requested to have said deponent present for the purpose of taking such deposition at the time and 
place indicated, and you are hereby notified to appear and take part in the examination. 
DATED this _J __ day of August, 2007. 
:HITE PETEQ: ~ 
Dennis P. rlk son 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30(b)(4) - 2 
00060 0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of August, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attomey at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, ID 83617-0188 
Associated Court Reporting 
1618 W. Jefferson 













Facsimile No. 208-343-4002 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
Imh/W:IWorklnThomas. R Drew 219711Thomas Motors. Inc.OOO\PleadingslNotice of Deposition.Shirley Youngstrom.doc 
NOTICE OF TAKING AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY YOUNGSTROM PURSUANT TO IDAHO 





\tH • UU jb~ 41~b 
tal,,:! 
~AGEMENTCONTRAct 
TInS MANAOBMBNT CONTRACT ("Contract'1 dated this 1st day of 
September 2000. is ontercdinto by and among RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAINE K. 
THOMAS, husband JUldwifc C'Sbareboldcnj, THOMAS MOTORS, INC •• an Idaho 
cotporation \Corporation,), ~d R. DREW mOMAS, a single person C'Gencral Manager'). 
In consideration of and in reliance upon the mutual covenants contained in this 
Contract, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
Section 1. Employmeat as General Manager. Corporatioll hereby empJoysGenera1 
Manager as the genetalllWiager of Corporatioo's business ofseUing and se1Vicing Chrysler, 
Dodge, Plymouth and J~ motor vehicles and related parts and accessories from premises 
located at 2121 Service Avenue, Emmett, Idaho 83617 (the "B1ISillesSj, effective immediately 
and to continue thereafter through August 31, 2001, unless or until terminated earlier by either 
party pursuant to the Section 8 of this Contract 
SceUon 2. RespoDslbWdes. General Manager shall have the responsibilities for any and all 
decisions about the eonduc:t of the Business, including. without limitation, (A) the expenditure of 
rcventltJS and other worlcing cap~ and (B) the employment, compensation and tetTni.nation of 
aJ I Corporation ctnployees; provided, however. that General Manager shall not have the authority 
to take any action on behalf of Corporation that would cause it to incur liabilities that could not 
be paid through (1) Corporation's existing flooring line of credit 'With First SeCurity Bank of 
Idaho, N.A. eBank" (2) Corporation's revenues., or (3) additionalworldng capital loan to be 
provided by Shareholders pursuant to Section 5 .. General Manager's responsibilities specifically 
shall include the financial reports to Shareholders described in Section 4. . 
SectioD 3. ColtlpensatloD. General Manager shall be compensated tho amount of Five 
Thousand and No/lOO Dollars ($S,OOO.OO)eacb month during the tenn of this Contra~ payable 
in aooordance with Corpotation's regular payron procedures, and shall receive other anployee 
benefits that Corporation provides its salaried employees during the term of this Contract. 
SectiOD 4. Fmandal Reports to Shareholders. During the term of this Contract, General 
Manager shall meet with Shareholders to provide them a financial review of Cotporation' s 
Businoss, including, without limitation, a review of the StatUs of (A) Cotporation' s flooring line 
of credit with Bank. (B) Corporation's revenues, (C) Corporation's monthly budget, (0) General 
Manager's projections about Cotporation's need to draw upon the working capital loan to be 
proVided by Sh~bo1d pursuant to Section S, and (E) such other mat1ers as Shareholders may 
require. S~wee1dt.. cial reporting meetings can be suspended once Corporation has 
demonstrat 1 ty, through General Manager's loaq~rshiP't1Q sustain its cash floW'withouf . 
the injection of any working capital loan for at least-siX(6) we~) In addition to such weekly 
/ .-
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financial reporting meetinp, General Manager sball provide Sbarebolder$ throughout the term of 
the Contract with file same financial reports and at the same times as is requked by Daimler-
Chr:Yslor Corporation. 
Seetlo1l5. Worldllg Cap .S\W!ehoIdcQ challIOa:=~ Tbree Blmdn:d 
Thousand and No/lOO Dol ($300,O?O.OO),..dunng the x. ~~the term of~s 
Contract as needed by C or the purposes of (A) , . rpotation i11to comphance 
with its flooring line ot credit with Bank, and (B) additional worldng capital. and as Shareholders 
are able. In order for Corporation to draw upon my portion of such loan for addltional working 
capital, General Manager shall give Shareholders at least fourteen (14) days written notice in 
advance of the date such funds are to be made available to Corporation. 
Section 6. Guaranty of Flooring Line or Credit Throughout the term 0 f this Contract, 
Shareholders shall continue to guaranty Cotporationts existing flooring line ofOl'editwith Bank. 
and Shareholders sball continue to have -use of such flooring line of credit for usc in 
Shareholders' separate used car sales business. 
Section 7. Interim Dlsbibutions. to the extent that Corporation·s net profit ill any month 
during the term of this Contract exceeds Pifty Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars (550.000.00). such 
excess shall be distnbuted to Shareholders as a dividend for that month and such amount shall 
tcduce the total purchase price that General Manager otbet'wisc would pay pursuant to Section 14 
of that certain Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets d1rted September 1, 2000 
betw~ Cotporation and General Manager (the "Agreeme1ltj. 
SectioD.' 8. Termination. The parties may tenninate this Contract by mutual agreement. 
Corporation and Sha.reholdets may terminate this Contract (A) upon its breach by Geneta1 
:Manager by his incwrlng liabilities for Corporation in excess of the limit set forth in Section 2, 
(B) tho determination, based upon inf'otll1afion supplied in the weekly financial reporting 
meetings described in Section 4, that Corporation-s operations under General Manager have not 
demonstrated and projectiOtlS for Corporation's futtu.-e ~QIJS do .not domonStnsto that 
ColpOlatiogl,.:MU..'be-alSle"fd'"Eusbdn itself 1i'om C8$h available ftom operations by at lcast the end 
o!J:lt~ month oftbe term octhls Contract, or (C) Corporation shall not be in compliance 
·~e:~itlf f'tc5Grltilr"lii; of credit with Bank. General Manager may termlnate this 
Cont.Tact at any time during its term upon fourteen (14) days' written notice to Shareholders and 
Coiporation. Any termination of this Contract automatically shall teoninate the Agreement and 
shall terminate General Manager's right aiil1 obligation to pw:chase the Purchased Real Property 
as defined in that certain Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement dated September 1. 2000 
among the parties. 
ill WITNESS WHBRBOF, the parties hereunto executed -this Management 
Contract the day and year first above Written.. 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT· 2 
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SHAlUBOLDERS: RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAlNB K.THOMAS 
~~~ onald O. Thomas ' 
~4~k:~ 
Elaine K. Thomas 
CORPORATION: THOMAS MOTORS, INC . 
... 
1. '. 
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THIS COMMERCIAL LEAS! AND PURCHASE AGRBBMENT rLease',), 
dated this 1st day ofScpUmber 2000, is entered into by and betWeen RONALD O. moMAS 
and BLAINE K.. THOMAS, husband and wife, of tho County of Gem, State ofld~o 
(collectively referred to herein as "Landlord'). THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho 
coIporation ('7enuf,). and R. DREW THOMAS, a single person., of the County of Gem. Statc 
ofIdaho {"General M.anager·~. 
Section 1. Real Property and Improvements. 
. 1.1 uase of Property. Landlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hereby 
leases from Landlord. those two (2) certain parcels of teal property located in Gem County, 
Idaho, and more particularly desaibed as Parcell and Parcel 2 on Exhibit A att8Ched to this 
Lease and incorporated by this reference as if set forth in full (coUectively the "Leased 
Property"'), Parcell of which teased Property conbPns an automotin sales and service facility 
(the "Premlsesj. and Parcel 2 of which Leased PrOperty contains an automotive sales lot. Tho 
Leased Property and the Premises are sometimes concctively refctred to as the "Property" in 
!his Lease. 
1.2 Substitution of Par eel 3. Parce13 o/rea1 property located in Gem 
County, Idaho and more partioularly described on Exln"bit A. which adjoins Parcell, shall be 
substituted for Parcel 2 under the terms of Section 1.1 at any time prior to September 1. 2005, 
which date of substitution sball be made by Tenant's assignee by giving Landlord at least ninety 
(90) days advance written notice. In the event ~ch notice has not been given at l~t ninety (90) 
days in advance of September 1,2003. the parties shall review the space and property utilization 
plans oftbe dealership and mutually determine exact1y when the substitution shall occur. In 
recognltion of the fact that Parcel 3 is undeveloped real property, Tenant's assignee shall have 
the right to begin construction of improvements to prepare Paroel 3 to be an automotive sales lot 
as soon as such notice has been given, subject to the provisions of Section 5. From and after the 
date of such notice. the Leased Property shall include a11 three (3) parcels until the time olthc 
effective date of that notice, and thereafter the Leased Property shall inclUde only Parcels t and 
3. 
1.3 Purchase of Assets. The parties acknOWledge that, concurrcmtly herewith., 
Tenant and General Manager a.cc entering into that certain Management Contract (the 
"CoDtracf), by which the General Manager first shall operate Tenant's automotive sales and 
service business (the '~uslnessj for a period of up to one (1) year from and after September 1 , 
~OOO. The parties further acknowledge that, concurrently herewith, the parties are entering into 
'bat certain Agreement for Purchase and Sa}o of Business Assets (the "Agreemenf,), by whicl1 __ 
General Manager thereafter shall acquire from Tenant all the asscts-u~ed oy Tenant iti connection 
with the operation of the BuSiness on Parcell of the Leased Property and Parce13. All thrce (3) 
CO~R~LEASEANDPURCHASEAGREEMENT·l 
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parcel6 of real property ItO sOmetimes co1tee.tive1yrefemd to as the (4Rcal Property") in this 
Leaso. Tho Mllcgal descriptions for all three (3) parow of real propcrt}' shall bo Inserted into 
Exhibit A within thirty (30) days after the date of this Lease. which legal descriptions shall 
reflect changes on the south boundary of Parcel 1 to straigbten the property line thereby affecting 
tho size oltho CUtTcnt bun pen. The commoncement of this Lease is conditioned upon the 
execution and delivory (If the CO~Qt qnd the Agre<;rm;nt. 
Section 2. Term. 
2.1 InItial Term. The initial term of this Lease (the "Initial Termj is seven 
(7) years, beginning onScptember ] , 2000 (the ~Commcnccmcnt Date'') and terminating on 
August 31. 2007. unless termlnated earlier pursuant to the provisions of this Lease. 
2.2 Tennination upon Purchase. The Initial Term shall tenninate 
concurrc;ntlywith the Gen.cral Manager's purmase of Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property 
pursuant to the tenns of Section 22.1 and Exhibit B of this Lease. 
Secdon 3. Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlo~ as tent for the Property, the following 
amounts, detem1ined and payable in the manner and at the times set forth below: 
3.1 Security Deposit. Initially. no security deposit snail be required of 
Tenant. However, should Tenant commit a material default undor the terms oirrus Lease, 
Landlord shall then have tho right to require Tenant 10 pay to Landlord a security deposit equal to 
two (2) months' rent. If a security deposit is paid. Landlord may usc all or any part of the 
security deposIt foe the payment of any loss or damage occasioned by Tenant's default If any 
portion of the security deposit is so used. Tenant shalL upon receipt of notice from Landlord. 
deposit cash with Landlord in an amouD! sufficiCt1t to restore the security deposit to il$ original 
amount. No interest shall be paid on the security deposit, and Landlord shall not be required to 
keep it separate from Landlord '$ genml funds. Upon full and tiInely performance of Tenant' s 
obligations under this Lease, the security deposit (orremalning balance thereof) shall be returned 
to Tenant at the expiration of the Initial Term t.J:u:ough the Gen¢ral Manager's purcbase of tho 
Business and Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, OT upon the tennination of the Con.tract 
3.2 Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord, as annual r without abatement or 
off-set unless expressly allowed by this Lease, the monthly ofTen Thousand and Noll 00 
DoUars ($10}OOO.OO) for Parcell (and Parcel 3 when it is added to the Leased Property) and the 
monthly amount of One Thousand Three H.undred Fifty Dollars ($1.350.00) for Parcel 2 as long 
as it is a part of the Leased Property (HBase Rent"), payable in a.dvance on the first (lst) day of 
each calendar month beginning on the Commencement Date. All rent shall be in lawful money 
of the United States of America Each monthly payment of Base Rent is due on the first (15t) 
calendar day of each month dwing the Lease tenn without the requirement of any notice: or other 
reminder from Landlord to Tenant. The Base Rent shall be the same regardless of whether and 
when Parcel 3 is substituted fOT Parcel 1. 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AN"D PURCHASE AGREEMENT - 2 
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3.3 Additional Rellt. All amount! In addition to Base Rent whic~ pursuant 
to this Lease are to be paid by Tenant to or on bt.thalfofLandlord. &h.al1 be considered 
"additional renf' for all purposes Ul'Ider this Lease. 
3.4 Late Fee. If a monthly Base Rent pa.yment is not received by Landlord by 
the tOnth (10th) calendar day olthe month. Tenant shall be charged a late fee of One Hundred 
and No/100 Dollars ($100,00) per day (but not to exceed One Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
[$1,000.00] per monthly payment) retroactive to the first (1st) day oftbe month for each 9eparate 
monthly Base Rent payrnont that is late, Late fees shall be additional rent due with the monthly 
Base Rent payment Tenant agrees that the late fee: (a) is a reasonable estimate of the costs that 
Landlord would incur by reason of a late payment, and (b) is in addition to all other rights of 
Landlord and shall not prevent Landlord from exercising any other right or remedy available to 
Landlord by reason of Ten ant's failure to pay rent when due. -
3.5 Application ofPllymenis. Payments made by Tenant to Landlord shall 
first be applied to late fees. if any. then to additional rent, if any. then to any othc:r amounts due 
ftom Tenant to Landlord. iran)', and last to Base Rent, as adjusted. 
3.6 Net Lease. The parties intend that this shall be a net lease and that an tent 
payable by Tenant to Landlord hereunder shall be net of all costs and expenses relating to the 
Property,. and that aU such eosts and dcpertses paid at lfiClII't'ed during the term of this Lease; 
including. but not limited to taxes. insurance. utilities. repairs and maintenance. shall be paid by 
Tenant, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Lease. 
Se<:tiOB 4. Use of the Property. 
4.1 Permitted Use. Initially. the sole permitted use of the Property under this 
Lease shall be the operaU.Ql1 of an automotive sales and service business (the "'Pt.rmitted Use). 
Any diff-erent use of the Property by Tenant shall require the prior written consent of Landlord. 
whioh consent shall Dot be lDU'CaSonably withheld, conditioned or delayed. . 
4.2 Limitations on Use. Except with the prior written consent of Landlord 
(whioh consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed). no industrial. 
manufacturing orprooessing activity (eXcept as is usual and incidental to the Pennitted Use) shall 
be conducted. on the Premises. Tenant sha.ll not: (a) use the Property in any manner that would 
constitute waste nor shall Tenant allow the same to be committed thereon; (b) abuse walls, 
ceilings, partitions, flool'St wood, stone, iron work, landscaping or other parts ofth.e Property; (c) 
use 'Plumbing, fire eontro~ fire sprinkler, electrical, security, telecommunications. heating, 
cooling, veotilatiQn, elevator or other Property services, syStems or facilities for any purpose 
other than that for which it was constructed; (d) make or permit any noise or odor objectionable 
to the public to emit from the Property; ( e) create, maintain or permit a nuisance in or about the 
Property; (t) permit or do anything tbatis contrary to any stat:utes, on:Iinanees, rules, r~gulations 
and laws of any federal, state, or local governmental body or agency; (g) permit or do anything 
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measures lot the purpose o£proteedng, safeguarding, dtfending, or poUcing persollS or property 
from any theft, vandalism or other loss or damage. Tenant may use or install fences. loeks~ 
alarms, doors or otber dmees to provide Security Services, and the instal1a1ion of any Security 
Services shall be (a) COJl8istcnt with,the overall deslp and use of the Premises and Real 
Proporty, and (b) subject to the tenns of this Lease regan:1ing "alterations. improvements and 
additions" ift SectionS below. 
Section S. Improvements by Tenant. Tenant shall not make any alteration, improvement 
or addition to the Property without the prior written consent of Landlord. which consent may not 
be unreasonably wi~cld, conditioned or delayed. All alterations, improvements, and additions: 
(a) shall be performed at the solo cost and expense ofTcmant in complianoe with all1aws and 
regulations of any federal. sta1~ or local governmental body, and (b) shall become and remain 
the property ofLaudlOl'd. In contracting for any alterations. improVClIl.ents or additions, Tcmant 
shall not act as the agent otLandlord. 
Section 6. ' Quiet Enjoyment. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying the rent and 
performing the terms oftbls Leas~ may quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property durhig the 
term hereof. 
Section 7. Taxes and Assessments. 
7.1 Payment ofT:a:es and Assessments. During the term oftbis Lease, 
Tenant shall pay when due and befare delinquency aU ad valorem real property taxes levied and 
assessed against the value of the Real Property and improvements ~ereon, and aU personal 
property taxes levied. and assessed against Tenant's trade fixtures and equipment and other 
personal prOperty placed upon. or owned by Tenant in, on or about the Premises or the Real 
Property. 
7.1. Right to Contest. Tenant, at Tenant's expense, shall have the right to 
contest the a.ttlOlll1t or validity of all or any part of the ad valorem real property taxes and 
a$Se$$rilents required tQ be paid by Tenant h~er; provid~ however. that Tenant shall 
indemnify Landlord aPinst any loss or liability by reason of suoh contest. Notwithstanding such 
a contest. all taxes otherwise due and payabJe to Landlord by Tenant shall be paid upon demand, 
but any refimd thercofby any taxing authority shall be the property ofTen81lt. . 
7.3 New Taxes. Tenant shall reimburse to Landlord promptly upon demand 
any and all taxes and other charges payable by Landlord to any governmental entity (other than 
net income, estate and inheritance taxes) whether or not now customarily paid or within the 
contemplation oithe parties, by reason of or mtaSured by the rent payable under this Lease, or 
a.tlocable to or measured by the area or value of the Premises andlorReal Property, or upon the 
usc and occupancy by Tenant oithe Premises and/or Real Property, or levied for services 
rendered by or on behalf of any publie, quasi-public or governmental entity. 
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Section 8. Maintenance of Property; tJtOltlCl. 
8.t Routine Malntenance and Repair. Tenant shall, at its sole cost and 
eX!pCDJ<!l, at all times be responsible for routine repairs and maintenance of the Property as shall 
be necessary to maintaJn the Propert)' in the condition not less than the condition oltho Property 
existing as of the eommcaccmcnt oftbis Lease, normal wcar and tear excepted. 
8.2 Structural alld Systems Maintenance. In addition to routine repairs and 
maintcnanoc: as provided in Section 8.1 above, Tenant shall be responsible £01' paying for the 
struetutal and systems maintenanoe of the Property and, in connection. thei'ewitb. shall (a) make 
the repairs and replacements necessary to maintain the struetural integrity or the Premises, 
inoluding repairs and maintenance olthc foundtltions and lo~-bea.ring walls, (b) repair and 
maintain in good working order the roof; paved parking ateu, and the heating, ventilating, air 
eondition.i.ng, plumbing. and electriCal systems, and (c) maintain the light hallam. 
8..3 Tenant's LiabOity fot Repairs and Maintenance. Notwi1hstanding any 
other provision. oftbis Lease. Tenant shall be liable for and shall promptly repair aU damage to 
the Premises or Real Property c::aused by Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, directors, 
employees. Invitees, au .. customers. otients or licensees. regatdless whether tfle damage is 
c.auscd by the negligence ofTcnant or such other pexsons. All repairs made by Tenant shall be at 
least equal to the original work in class and quality. If Tenant fails to so maintain orrepatl', (a) 
Landlord (or its agents) may, but is not required to, enter the Premises at any reasonable time to 
pc:rfonn. maintenance or make repairs., and (b) Tenant Shan pay to Landlord the cost of the 
maintenance or repairs performed by Landlord as additional rent due with the next monthly Base 
Rcni payment. 
8.4 Utilities. Tenant shall pay for all heat, alr conditioning. water, light, 
power and/or other utility service, including garbage and ttash removal and sewage disposa1~ 
including an hookup feeS or chaiges in connection therewi1h. used by Tenant in or about the 
Premises and Real Property durhtg the term of this Lease. Tenant shall not be Hable for any 
interruplion or failure in the supply of any utility or service to the Property . 
. Se~oD 9. Insurallce. 
9.1 Tenant's Obligations. Tenant shall purchase and keep in force the 
fol1o'Wing types of insurance in the am01ll1ts specified and in the fOIm hereafter provided: 
(a) Fire and Extended Coverage.. A policy or policies offire and 
extended coverage insu:ra.nce covering the Real Property and the Premises, in an amount not less 
than ninetY percent (90%) of the full replacement cost (exclusive of the cost of excavations, 
foundations and roofing), against any p<ml within the classification "fire and extended coverage" 
or, at Landlord's election, "all-risk coverage," lIt addHio~ Tenant shall purchase and keep in 
force rent msur<U1ce insuring Landlord against loss of rent during the period of repair or 
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replacement of all or any portion of the Premises in the event of loss or damage. Tho instb'lnco 
provided for in tbis Section 9.1 (a) may be brought within the coverage of a blBDkot polley or 
potioles of insurance camed and maintained by Tenant. 
.(b) PubUe LtabUlty ud Property Damal" A policy or polic(cs of 
comprehensive gcnera1liabiJity ins~ with b10ad fonn general liability endorsL':Men~ or 
equivalent, with limits Oillot less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per person and One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per occurrence ofbodily iIUury and property damage oombined. 
Tho policy Ot'polici~ shan also blSute against liability arlsingout oithe use, occupancy or 
maintenance ofthePrcmiscs and the Real Property. Said policy or l'olicies shall designate 
Landlord as an additional insured. and shall speclfieaJly insure the perfomumee by Teoant of the 
indemnity agreement(s) contained in Section 16.S of this Lease. 
(0) Tenant's Leasehold Improvements and Personal Property. 
Insurance covering an of the items comprising Tenanfs leasehold improvements. trade fixtures. 
equipment and persooal property from time 10 time, in, on or upon the Real Property and the 
Premises in an amount not less than ninety percent (90%) of their full replacement cost from time 
to time; providing protection against my peril included within the classification "fire and 
extended coverage, " together with insurance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious 
mischief and earthquakes. Any policy proceeds shall be used fur the repair or lq'lacemcnt of tho 
property damaged or destroyed. Landlord shall have no obligation to provide any insurance with 
respect to the Real Property or the Premises. Bxcept as provided herein. each of Landlord and 
Tenant (a.) is not obligated to obtain, (b) is not obligated. to be named in, (e) shall have no right to 
any proceeds ot: and (d) waives all claims on. insurance purchased by Qr for the benefit of the 
other party. 
. 9.2 Policy Form. All policies required to be provided by Tenant shall be 
issued in the names of Landlord and Tenant and evidence thereof shall be delivered to Landlord 
within ten (10) days after the date of this Lease and thereafter within thirty (30) days prior to the 
expiration of the term of each policy. All policies sball be with an insurer 'With a Best'$ rating of 
13+ ot' higher, and shall contain a provision that the insurer shall give Landlord twenty (20) days 
notice in writing in advance of any cancellation or bpsc or the effective date of any .reduction in 
the amounts oltho insurance. All public liability, property damage and other casualty policies 
required to be provided by Tenant shall be written as primary policies, not contributing with and 
not in excess of coverage wmch Landlord may carry. 
9..1 Adjustment of Coverage. Not more frequently than every five (5)'years 
during the tenn of this Lease it; in the opinion of Landlord based on industry and local standards 
and Tenant's use of the plemises, the amount of public liability and property damage insurance 
required to be provided by Tenant is at that time not adequate, Tenant shall increase the 
insurance coverage as reasonably determined by Landlord to be adequate. 
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9,4 Waiver of Subrogation. To tht extent permitted by their respective 
insurers, Landlord and Tcuant (and each person claiming an interest in the Property through 
Landlord or Tenant, including all subtenants ofTenmtt) release aad waive their entire right of 
recovery against the other for direct. incidental or consequential or other 10s1 or damage arising 
out o( or incident to, the perils covered by insurance carried by each party, whether due to the 
negligence olLandlord or Tenant Ifneccssary, all insurancepolieies shall be endorsed to 
evidence this waiver. 
9.5 Failure to Insure. lfTcnmt shall fail to pUJ'Chase and keep in force the 
insurance required by this Lease, (a) Tenant shal1 be in de1im1t hereunder, shall be deemed to be 
self .. insured and shall bear all risk of loss or damage, and (b) Landlord may, but shall not be 
requlred to, pmchase and keep in f~ the required insurance, or any portion thcroo~ in which 
event Tenant sbal1 reimburse Landlord the full amount of Landlord's cost with respect thereto 
within fi~ (S) days aftc:r~ demand therefor i$ delivered to Tenant. 
Section 10. Damage or Destruction. 
10.1 Terminatton or Repair. If aU or any portion of the Premises or Real 
Property are damaged or destroyed by tire or other casualty, Landlord shall deliver to Tenant 
written notice within thirty (30) days of the damage OT destruction stating wbether the Premises 
arui Real Property eaa be restored within one hundrOO and eighty (180) days of'thedamage or 
destruction. Landlonf shalt have no obligation to expend more in Tepairln" restoring or . 
rebuild:ing than the proceeds of insurance available for such purposes. If,.in Landlord's 
reasonable judgme~the insurance settlemen~ permit and construction worle for repairing and 
rebuilding the damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property can be completed 
within the 18()..day period with the available insuran~ proceeds, Landlord shall promptly 
proceed to repair or rebuild Chc damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property. 
It: in Landlord' $ reasonabJe judgment, the insurartee settlement, permit and oonstruetion work for 
repairing and rebuilding the damaged or destt'Oyed portion of the Premises or Real Prope:ty 
cannot be completed within the 180-day period with the available insurance proceeds, either 
Landlord or Teoant may temrlnate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the other 
party. 
. 10.2 Abatement or Apportionment of ReaL If the Lease is not terrninat~ 
and if the damage or destruction to the Premises or Real Property is not caused by the act or 
iailnre to act ofTenanl. its partners, officers, employees, agents; guests, oustomers, clients or 
invitees, then ajust portion of the rent shall abate as of the date of the damage or destruction until 
the Premises and Real Property are repaired or rebuUt lfthe Lease is tenninated. the rent shall 
be apportioned as of the date oftbe damage or destruction. 
10.3 A1terations, Improvements and Additions. With respect to any damage 
or destruction of Ten ant's alterationi, improvements or additions made to the Premises, (a) this 
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Section 10 shall be inapplicable, ('0) no abatement or rent sball occur, and (0) Landlord shalt not 
be obligated to repair or rebuild Tenant's alterations, improvements, or additions. 
Section 11. Coadcmnatioll. If aU of the Premises and/or Real Property are taken or 
eondcmncd by an authority for any usc or pmposc, 1h1s Lease shall terminate upon, and the rent 
shall be apportioned as o~ the date when actual possession of the Premises and/or Real Property 
is required for the eondcmned use or PlU'pOBe. lflcss.than aU of the Premises are taken or 
condemned by any authority !Or any use or purpose, then (a) if the remainder of the Property is 
not reasonably sufficient for Tcnmt's business purposes, then either Landlord or Tenant may 
tenninate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice of termination, or (b) the partl es may 
con1inue the Lease and a just portion of the rent will abate as of the date when actual possession 
of e(J11demned porti011 otthe Premises and/or Real Property is ~ for the eondemned use or 
purpose. All compensation and damages awarded for the taldng of all or any portion of the 
Property shall be apportioned. betwecn Landlord and Tenant on the following basis: (a) if 
awarded separately and not as part of the general award to Landlord, Tenant shall be entitled to 
rcocivc a sum equal to the excess rtf any) of the rental market value of the Property for the 
remainder of the Lease tetm over the present value (as of the date oftakins) of the rent which is 
then payable for the remainder of the Lease tetm, plus compensation for the loss ofTenantYs 
trade fixtures. removable personal property, loss ofbuslness and good will, and relocation 
expenses, and (b) Landlord sball be entitled to the balance of the award. 
Sectloll 12. Lalldlord's Entry 011 Property. 
12.1 Right orEntry. Landlord, and Landlord's authorized repreSentatives, 
shall have the right to enter the Property at all reasonable times at Landlord's discretion only for 
either of the following pu1pOses: 
(a) To determine whether the Property is in good condition and 
whether Tenant is complying with this Lease; 
(b) To serve, post and keep posted any notices required or allowed 
under the provisions of this Lease. 
12.2 No LlabDity. Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any 
inconvenience, disturbance, loss of business, nuismlce or other damage arising out of Landlord's 
ontI:y on the Property as set forth herein; provided, however, Landlord shall conduot its activities 
on the Property as allowed herein in a manner that will cause the least possible inconvenience, 
annoyance or disturbance to Tenant. 
Section 13. Covenant Against Liens. ' 
13.1 Liens Prohibited. Tcruult agrees not to suffer or permit any lien 
(mcluding, but Dot limited to, tax liens and liens of mechanics or materialmen) to be placed 
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against thePremlses or R.ea1 Property. if a lien is placed agamst tha Premises or Real Property 
that is directly or indirectly related to an act or failure to act of Tenant. Tenant agrees to payoff 
and remove suoh Jien within ten (10) days ofrecelpt by Tenant of1lOticc oftbc lien. regardless 
whether Tenant contests the validity of the lien. Tenant bas no authority or power to cause or 
pcm'1it any lien or other cncumbraDce created by act of Ten ant, operation onaws, or otherwise to 
aiUch to or be placed upon Landlord's title or intetest in die Premises or Real Property. Any lien 
or encumbrance shall attach only to Tcomt's leasehold interest in the Property. . 
13.2 'allure to Pay LicD.. If Tenant shall default in the paying of a prohibited 
lien and a suit to foreclose the same is .flIed, and if Tenant has not given Landlord acceptable 
security to pro1eCt Lan410rd against any loss. damage alJd expense with respect to such lien, 
Landlord may, but shall not be rcqnirc:d to, pay the liet1 and any related costs, and the amount so 
paid, together with reasonable attorneys' fees ineutted in connection therewith, shall be 
immediately paid by Tenant to Landlord, together with.intt:.rest thereon at the prime rate of 
interest as announced ftom time to time by Fit:st SeCurity Bank ofJdaho, N.A. 
SCCti()D 14. Dt:fa.ult. 
14.1 Defa.uIt by Tenant. Tenant shAll be in default under this Lease if any of 
the following shall occur (any one or more of the following herein eoristituting an ''Event of 
Default"): 
(a) Tenant fails to pay wh~ due any monthly rent or other pa.yment 
required to be paid by Tenant under this Lease within ten (10) days of its due date; provided. 
however. that before declaring any defuult in the making of any payment required under this 
Lease, LaJ1dlo.rd shall provide to Tenant a written notice specifyii1g that there has been a default 
in the making of a required payment, and Tenant shan have three (3) business days after receipt 
of that notice: within which to pay the delinquent amotmt arid prevent a default hereunder, or 
(b) Tenant shall default in the ObServ31lce ot' performance of allY of 
Tenant's other coverumts hereundez (other than the covenant to pay rent or any other sum berein 
specified to be paid by Tenant) and such default shall not have been eured within thirty (30) days 
after Landlord shall have given to Tenmt written notice specifying such default; provided, 
however, that if the deflmlt complained of shall be of such a nature that the same cannot be 
completely remedied or CUTed within such thirty.oday period, th¢T1 such default shall not be a 
default against Tenant for the purposes oftbis paca.graph so long as Tenant shall have promptly 
commenCed during such default and shall proceed with all due diligence and in good faith to 
remedy the default complained of; or 
(c.) Tenant shall (1) file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, or (2) be 
adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent, or (3) have a receiver or trustee appointed fur all or 
substantially all orits business or assets on the ground ofTenanfs insolvency, or (4) suffer an 
order to be entered approving a petition filed against Tenant seeking reorganization of Ten ant 
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under the fcdcra1 bsnlaup1cy laws or any other applicable law or statute afthe United states or 
any state thereof; or (5) Tenant sball make a gcncm1 assignment or general mangcmcnt for the 
boneflt oflts credito1'8. 01' (6) bankruptcy proceedings shall have been instituted against Tenant 
which arc not witbdrawn or dismissed within sixty (60) days after the institu.ti9n of said 
procced.ings;or 
(d) Tenant shall remove or attempt to remove, without the pri01' 
authorization oiLandlord, any of Tenant's fixtures, equipment, appliances or pcrsonail'roperty 
from. the Premises for any reason other than in the DOnna! and usual operation of Tenant' s 
business; or 
(e) Tenant shall abandon the Premises. 
14.2 Remedies of Landlord. . In the event that Tenant commits, or allows to 
occur, an Bvent ofDefau14 Landlord shall have the following remedies: 
(a) ~aI and Equitable Remedies. Landlord shall bavc all remedies 
available at law or in equity • 
. (b) Termination. Landlord shall have the immediaterigh~ but not the 
obUgatio~.to terminate Tenant's right of possession of the hoperty andlor, at Landlord's 
election, this Lease and all rights ofTcnan1 hereunder. by giving Tenant written notice of 
Landlord's election to tetminate. In the event that Landlord shall elect to so terminate this Lease, 
said election by Landlord shall. without being so expressly stated, be deemed an election by 
Landlord to accelerate all future rents payable Ulldcr this Lease for the Initial TertrI Ol' then~ 
applicable Renewal Tenn to be immediately due and payable. if such acceleration shall be 
required to permit Landlord to enforce any of the rights and remedies heteafter provided. In the 
cven.t of sueh termination (and acceleration), Tenant agrees to pay to Landlord and Landlord 
shall have the right to recover from Tenant the fbllowing: . 
(1) The worth at the time of award of any unpaid rent which 
has been earned at the time of SUt;h hmninatiQn; plus 
(2) The worth at the timo of award of the amount by which the 
unpaid rent which would have been earned after tennination until the time of award exceeds the 
amoUlIt of such rental loss Tenant proves could have been reasonably avoided; ~ 
(3) Thcworth at the time of award of the amount by which the 
unpaid rent for the balance ofllie Initial Term or Renewal Term (as appHcable)'after the time of 
award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that Tenant proves could be reasonably avoided; 
plus 
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(4) Any other amount necessaxy to compensat~ Landlord for all 
detriment, expense, JO$i 01' damage, including, but Dot Hmited to~ all costs and expenses to re-
lease or sublet the property, including 1he cost of alterations and remodeUns required by a new 
tenant, attorneys' fees and real estate eommiaiOlU paid or payable for this Lease or to re-lease or 
sublet the Property, proximately caused by Tenant's fidlure to perf'onn its obligations under this 
Leue;nlYi 
(5) Any other amount nec:essary to compensate Landlord for all 
other detriment, expense, loss or damage, proximately caused by tenant's failure to perform its 
obligations under this Lease (mcJuding, without limitation, the payment of taxes, insurance, and 
operatin,g costs to the extent provided by this Lease); lilim 
(6) Anyo1hcr amounts owed to Landlord by Tenant, including, 
. without limitation, any sums ofmoncyor damages provided in Sections 15.3, 15.4 Of 21 of this 
Lease. . 
As used in this Section 14.2(b), thotcrm "rent' shall be deemed to be and to mean the mont111y 
Base Rent and all other sums reqtrired to be paid by Tenant pursuant to the terms of this Lease . 
.A3 used in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this Section, the '~ortb at the time of award" is 
computed by allowing interest or discoun1ing. as 1hc ease may be, at 1bc rate cqll8l to the 
discount rate of the Federal R.eserve Bank of San Francisco at the time of award. All rental 
amounts received from any reletting of the Property during the balance of the then-applicable 
tenn of this Lease (had tetmina.tion not oeeUlTed) shan be the property of Landlord, and 'tenant 
shall have no right or claim to such rental Bttlounts. The rentaJamounts received by Landlord 
prior to the time of the award of damages as provided above shall constitute rcntBlloss avoided 
by Landlorll 
(e) Advances. lnthe'event of'Tcnant'1 breach heteof, Landlord may 
remedy the breach for the account and at the expense of Tenant. If Landlord at any time, by 
reason of suen bteac11, is compelled to pay, or elects to pay, any moneys or do any act which will 
rcqu1re the payment of any moneys, or is compelled to incur any expense, including reasonable 
attomeys- fees anel eo$ts, in instituting or prosecuting any action or proeeeding to enforce 
Landlord's rights under this Lease, the moneys so paid by Landlord, with interest from the date 
ofpaYD:lGnt, shall be addition rent and shall be due from Tenant to Landlord as provided in 
Section 3 hereof. 
14.3 Re-En.try on Termination •. In the event of the termination of Tenant's 
right of possession and/or this Lease by Landlord heretmder, Landlord shall have the right to re--
C1l.ter the Propc:rty and remove therefrom all persons and property. 
14.4 Re-Entry on Non-Termination. In addition to the other tights of 
Lan.dlord herein provided, Landlord shall have the right without terminating this Lease, to re-
enter and retake possession of the Property and collect rents from any subtemu1ts and/or sublet in 
the name of Land ford or Tenant the whole or any part otthe Property for the account of Ten ant, 
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upon any tems f1t conditions cfmmUnc4 by Landlord. In the overat of such tubleasing, Landlord 
sball havo tho right to collect any tcl1t which may become payable under any sublease. and apply 
the .mo 11rst to tho payment of expenses incurred. by laDdlord in dispossessing 1he Tenant and 
i.II sublctt1ng the Property, including attom~t fccs, real estate commissions and repairs andt 
thereafter, to the payment of the rent herein requinxl to be paid by Tenant. in mlfiJlment of 
Tenant's covenants hercu.ndcr, and Tenant shall be liable to Landlord for the rent herein required 
to be paid, less any amount actua.lly received by Landlord from a sublease and. after p&Yl11cnt of 
~enscs incUJ.'l'Cd, applied on acwunt of the ~t d.u.c hereunder. 11'1 the ~ent of $uoh election, 
Landlord sballnot be deemed to have terminated this Lease by taking possession of the Property 
unless notice ofterrnination, in writing, bas been giv~ by Landlord to Tenant. 
14.5 RIght of Entry-Lieu. ror Performance. In. addition to any other rights of 
Landlord as provided in this Section 14. upon thc default of Tenant, Landlord shall have the right 
10 enter the Property, change the locks on doors to the Premises and exclude Tenant therefrom 
and, in addition, take and rctai.a possession of any property on the Premises or Real Property 
owned by or in the possession of Tenant as and for seeurlty for Tenant's performance. Tenant 
hereby grants to Landlord a lien under applicable Idaho law on aU of said property, whieb lien 
shall sCCUtC the future performance by Tenant oftbis Lease. No property subjoct to said lien 
shall be removed by Tenant from the Property so lOllS 8$ T~ant is in default of any monetary 
obUgatiou under this !.esse. No action taken by Landlord in connection with the enforcement of 
its eights as provided in this Section 14 shall co.nsd.tutc a trespass or convorsion except as to 
per$0t1S holding prior security tntt;r"e$f:$ iT! md ~t and Tenant shall indemnify, $aVe and 
hold Landlord harmless from and agai.pst any such claim or demand on account thereof. 
14.6 Enrorcement. In the event of a defiw.lt by Tenant under this Lease, 
Landlord may &tany time, and from time 10 time, without terminating this Lease, enforce all of 
its rights and remedies under this ~ 01' allowed by law or equity. including the right to 
recover aU rent as it becomea due. The enforcement by Landlord of any rights or remedies 
Pt'ovid&i in this SeetiOfi 14, or allowed. by law or equity. shall not constitute the election by 
Landlord to terminate this Lease unless such election is in a writing signed by Landlord (or 
Landlord', autbcnized. agent) and delivmd to Tenant. , 
14.7 SeeurityDeposfts. If Landlord terminates this Lease because of the 
default of Tenant as provided in this Section 14,'or if Landlord exercises its tight ofpossession 
under Scction 14.4 above. without terminating this Lease, then Tenant shall immediately transfer 
to Umdlot'd aU security deposif.$ pteviously p~d to Tenant by subtenants having a right to 
bccupy the Property at the date of said tetmination: 
14.8 Additional Security. As additional security for Tenant's penonnance of 
this Lease, Tenant hereby assigns and sets over to Landlord as security for the performance of 
Tenant's obligations under this Lease, all subleases entered into by Tenant with respect to the 
Property, and all rents due or to become due under said subleases, subject to the right of Tenant, 
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by license granted to Tenant by Landlord, to collect and retain said rents, so long as Tenant i. not 
in default under this Lease. 
14.9 MItIgaUoR. Nothing h«ein contained shall relieve Landlord from the 
obligation to make reasonable eiiorts to mitigate the loss or damage oceasioned by a default of 
Tenant, provided that said obligation to mitigate shall not relieve Tenant of the burden of proof 
as required in this Section 14 or othetwise alfect the riihts and remedies available to Landlord in 
the cvcmt of a. default by TenUlt as provided in this Section, 01' otherwise allowed by law 01' 
equity. ' 
14.10 Default by Landlord. Landlord sball be in default under this Lease if 
Landlord fails to perform or observe any covenant, agreement or condition which Landlord is 
required to perform or observe and the failure shall not be cured within thirty (30) days after 
delivery of written. notice to Landlord by Tenant of the failure. 
14.11 ReMedIes ofTenot. In the event of Landlord's default as set forth in 
Seotion 14.10, Tenant shalt havo all rights pTOvided at law or in equity, except Tenant expressly 
waives any right to the abatement or withholding of rent payable to Landlord 1Ulder this Lease. 
Tenant's obligation to pay rent is ind~dent of all other rights, and Tenant may not withhold 
rent pa.yments to Landlotd or pay rent to other parties or into any escrow or holding account 
because oCthe deCau1t or alleged default of Landlord. 
SeetionlS. Termination. 
15.1 Events of Termination. This Lease shall terminal'e upon the occurrence 
of one or more of the following events: (a) by mutual written agreement oC Landlord, Tenant and 
General Manager; (b) by Landlord pursuant to this Lease; (e) by Tenant pursuant to this Lease; 
(d) upon lapse of the Initial Term., (e) by reason ofScctiollS 10 or 11 relating to destruction or 
oo11dcmnatiol1 oithe Ptoperty, or (l) upon. General Manager's purehase (lfPateel$ 1 and 3 ofthe 
Real Property pursuant to SectiOl122.1 and Bxhibit B oltbis Lease. 
15.2 SUlTender ofPossessi{jD. Upon tenninatiol1 of this Lease. other than a 
termination b~e the General Manager shall have purchased Parcels 1 and 3 oCtbe Real 
Property as provided inBxbibit B attached to this Lease" and il1corporated as if set forth in full, 
Tenant wilJ immediately StDTender possession oftbe Property to Landlord. Upon. termination of 
this Lease for My reason, Tenant will immediately surrender possession ofPareel2 t(l Landlord. 
If possession is not immediately surrendered, Landlord may re-enter and repossess the Property 
and rtmovc aU persons or property using such force as may be necessary without being deemed 
guilty of, or liable for. any trespass, forctolc entry, doWner, breach of the peace, or damage to 
per$on$ or properly. 
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15.3 Condition of Property Upon TerminafloG or Abandonment. Tenant, 
upon termina1ion or aban4omneot of this Lease or tennination ofTcnamt 8 right of possession, 
agrees as fbllows: 
(a) Remove Alteradons. Tenant shall not remove any alterations, 
improvements or additions mAde to the Property by Tenant or others without the prior written 
consent of Landlord. which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tecant shall 
immediately remove, in a good and workmanlike manner (a) all personal property of'Tcnant, and 
(b) the alterations, improvements IU1d additions made to the Property by Tenant as Landlord may 
request in writing to be removed. All damage occasioned by fhe removal shall be promptly 
repaired. by Tenant in a. good and worlonanlikc man1let. If Tenant falls to remove any Pl'Operty. 
Landlord may (a).accept the title to the property without credit or compensation to Tenant, or (b) 
remove and store the property, at Tcns.nf S ClC.pense. in any reasonable manner that Landlord may 
choose. 
(b) Restore Premises.. Tenant shall restore tho Property to tho 
condition existing on the commencement of this Lease. with the exception of (a) ordinuy wear 
and tear, and (b) alterations, improvements and additions which Landlord has 110t directed to 
Tenant in writing to remove. lfTenant fails to properly restore the Property, Landlord. at 
Tettafit·s expense, may restore the Property in. any reasonable manner that Landlord may ehoose. 
15.4 Holding Over. Should Tenant continue to occupy the Property. or any 
part thereof; after the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease, whether with or agahlst the 
consent of Landlord, suoh tenancy shall be from month to month. In the everst of such a bolding 
over" the obligations of Tenant shall be the same as were in effect at the date of said expiration or 
termination and the monthly rent to be paid by Tenant to Landlord shall be equal to one hundred 
twenty-five percent (12S%) oftlie monthly rent in force and effect for the last month of the tcnn 
expired or terminateci 
Section 16. Oalms and Disputes. 
16.1 Rights and Remedies Cllmulative. Except as expressly provided in this 
Lease. each party's rights and remedies described in this Lease are cumulative and not alternative 
remedies. 
16.2 Nonwaiver ofRcmcdics. A waiver of any condition stated in this Lease 
shall not be implied by the neglect of e. party to enforce any remedy available by reason oithe 
failu:re to observe or perform the condition. A Waiver by a party shall not affect any condition 
other than the one specified in the waiver and a'waiver shall waive a specified condition only for 
the time and in the manner specifically stated in the waiver. The acceptance by Landlord of rent 
or other money from Tenant after tennination of the Lease, after tennination of Tenant' s right of 
possession. after the occurrence of a default., or after institution of any remedy by Landlord shall 
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not alter, diminish,aft'ect or waiver the Lease termination, termination of possession" default or 
remedy. 
l6.3 Walv~r ofNotlce. Bxeept as provided in Section 14.1(a), Tenatrt 
expressly waives the service of any demand for payment of rent or for possession. 
16.4 W Blver of Claims. Exclusive of direct damages caused by the negligence 
or wi11fu1 misconduct of Landlord, Landlord and Laridlordt s p~ directors, officers, agents, 
setVan~ and employees sha.ll not be liablo for any direct or consequential damages (including 
damages claimed for actual or constructive eviction) either to the person or property sustmned by 
TCI.l811t or Tenant's partnCl'St officers, dircctorBt emplo~ invitees, guests, customers, clients or 
licensees due to (a) any part of the 'Premises 01' Real Property not being inrcpair, or (b) the 
happeriing of any incident on the Prcmlscs or Real Property. This waivc:r shall include, but not 
be limited to. damage caused by col~ heat, water, snow, frost, sewage, ps, or the malf\mcliOl1. of 
any plumbing, fire control, fire detectiol1t fire sprlnkler, electrical, electronic, computer, security. 
telecommunication, heating, cooling or ventilation systems, facilities or installations on the 
Premises or Real Property. 
1605 lndemnJfJeatioD.. To the extent caused by an lOt or fidlure to act of 
Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, employees, invitees, guests, customers, clients or licensees, 
and regardless whether the act or failure to act is negligent Tenant sbal1 defend, indemnify and 
hold haimless Landlord and Land1ord's partners, officers, directors, agents and eJlltl10yccs from 
any liabilities, damages and expenses (mcluding attorneys' fees and costs) arising out of or 
relating to (a) the PremIses or Real Property, or (b) Tenant's use or occupancy of the Property. 
16.6 Huardous Material Indemnificatioll. Tenant shall indemnify. defend 
and hold Landlord harmless "from any and all claims, ,illdgmcnts, damages, 'penalties, fines-. costs, 
liabili1ies or losses (including, without limitation, dimlnutIon in value of the Premises or Rea] 
Property, damages for the loss or .restriction on use of rcc.table or useable space or any amenity of 
the Ptemtses or Real Property, damages arising nom any adverse impact on marketing of space, 
8nd sums paid in settlement of claims. attorneys' fees. consultant fees and expert fees) which 
arise during or after the Term as a result ofTenai'lt's breaeh of the obligations stated it) this Lease 
tegard.ing Hazardous Mtteiial. This indemnification of LandlOrd by Tenant includes, without 
JimitatiOl1t costs incu:rred in connection with any investigation of site conditions or any cleanup, 
remedial. removal, or restoration 'Work required by any federal. state~ or local governmental 
agoney ot po1itioal subdivision because of Hazardous Matodal ititroduccd during the Lease term 
into the soil or ground water on 01' 1.U1der the Premises or Real Property. Withollt limiting the 
preceding. if the presence of any liazardous Material on the Premises or Real Property caused or 
permitted by Tenant results in any eontamination of the Premises or Real Property, Tenant shan 
promptly take all actions at Tenant's sole expense as are necessary to return the Premises or Real 
Property to the condition existing prior to the introduction of any Hazardous Material to the 
Premises or Real Property. 
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(a) Notwithstanding any other provislon of this Lease or BlIY contrary 
provision of law, the obliptions ofTerumt pursuant to this Section 16.6 ~rcmain in full force 
and eftect until the expiration of the latest period stated in any applicable statute oflimitadons 
durin, which a claim, cause of action or prosecution rola.tinv to the matters dcscn'bcd herein may 
be brought, and until payment in full or satisfaction ofany and aU losses, claims, causes of 
aotion. datnapst liabilities, charges, costs and expenses tor which Tenant is liable hereunder 
shall have been accomplished. 
(b) If any claim, demand, action orprocceding is brought against 
Landlord which is or may be subject to Tenant's obligation to indemnify Landlord as set fbrth 
u.a.dcr this Section 16.6, Landlord shall provide to Tenant immediate notice of that claimy 
demand, actian orproeeeding, and Tenant thereafter shall derend Landlord at Tenant's expenso 
using attorneys and other counsel selected by Tenant and reasonably acceptable to Landlord. 
16.7 Effect of Landlord Insurnee OD Tenant ObUgatlonSo From me to 
time and without obligation to do so, Landlord may purchase insuran~ against damage or 
liability arising out ot or related to thePremisos or Real Property. The purchase or failure to 
purchase insurance snaJl notretease or waiver the obligation ofTenan1 set f'Orth in this Lease. 
TCD8l1t waives aU claims 011 insurance purchased. by Landlord. 
16..8 Disputes. This Lease shall be SO"erneci by the laws oftbe State of Idaho, 
without regard to conflicts oflaws principles. The Idaho courts have exclusive jurisdiction and 
Gem County is the proper venue. 
16..9 Tenant's RespOBSibftity for Prior COlltaminatioll by Hazardous 
Substances. Tenant agrees to indenmify, defen~ protect and hold bannless Landlord from and 
against any and all mminat and cjvil claims and causes of action (including, but not limited to, 
c1a1ms resulting fro~ or causes of action incuacd in connection with. the death of or injury to 
any PetSOtlt or damage to any property), HabiHties Qncludfng, not Umited to, UabUities atising by 
reason of actions taken by any govcm.mcntal agency), penaltics, forfci~ prosecutions, losses 
and expenses (including reasonable attorneys'· fees) which directly or indirectly arise ftom or are 
caused by the presence, prior to and/or alter the comme:neemcmt of the Lease, in. on, under or 
about the Real Property or the Premises, of any Hazardous Materials. Tenant's obligations under 
this Section 16.9 shall include, but not be limited to, the obligation to bear the expense of any 
and aU costs, whether foreseeable oc unforeseeable;ofany necessary (as required by the Laws) 
repair. cleanup. detoxitlcation or decontamination of all or my portion oftbe Property (or any 
improvemcnts located thercon), and the preparation and implementation of any closure, remedial 
action or other required plan or plans in connection therewith. 
Section 17. Assignment and Subletting. 
17.1 Restrictions on Assignment and Subletting. Except as expressly 
provided in Section 17.2 below, Tenant shall not transfer, assign, subJet, enter into license or 
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concession agreements. change owncabip Of hypothecate this Lease 
to the Real Proporty or the Premises (hereinafter "trawter'') withoUi 
consent of Landlord, 'Which consent may not be ~ly witbhc 
Any transfer oftbis Lease, the leasehold estate created hereby,. tho RI 
any portion therco~ eithervo1untarily or involuntarily, whether by 01 
without the prior written consent ofLmdlord, sball be null an..d void, 
Landlord. constitute a material detault under this Lease. Tenant agre 
reasonable attorneys' fees and oth« necessary costs incurred in connl 
and documentation of any such requested transfer of this Lease or Te 
Property. The:: transfer ofa maJority of the issued and. outstan.ding Cat 
however, accomplished, shall be deemed ~ assignment oftbis Lease, 
17.2 Permitted Assignment Notwithstan<Jing the 1 
above, Tenant may and shall assign this Lease to the General Manage 
directly or indirectly controned by the GCliertl Uanager concurrently 
Agreement; and the term "controlH ('mcluding the term. "controlled. b, 
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the dir~tion of tI 
policies ofa business entity, whethcrtlu:ough 1110 ownership of'voting 
J 7.3 Consent to Modifications. The assiglttllentof 
the consent ofLandlOtd ~ without being specifically so stated or 8.j 
exprt!':ss agreement by Tenant that sub~t mod1.fications of this ~ 
assignee shall not (a) rcqulre any prior consent 01' approval ofTcnant (; 
reliavc Tenant (assignor) from liability hereunder, providcd~ liowever. 1 
increase the tent or other obligations of Tenant bereunder, Tenant's (as 
limited'to the tenns of this Lease as the same existed on the date of asS 
Section 18. Waiver. Tho waiver by Landlord of any breach of any' 
eonditions oftbis Lease shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any'past 
of the same OT any other tenn, cov~ or condition of this Lease. Th 
Landlord hereunder shall not be conStrued. to be a waiver of any tcnn 0 
by Tenant of a lesser amQunt than shall be due according to the terms c 
deemed or construed to be other than a part payment on account of the 
shall any endorsement or statement on any cheek or letter accompanyil 
to create an accord (II'Id satisfaction. 
Secdon 19. Relationship of Parties. Nothing contained in this ~l 
creating the relationship ofprlncipal or agent, partnership or joint vent 
Tenant. Neither the method of COtllputation afrent nor any other prov 
act of the parties, shall be deemed to create any relationsmp other than 
Tenant 
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Soetloa %0. Notlees. Any notiee or demand given under the tet'm4 oftbis Lease shall be in 
wtitinS and shall be dccm.cd to be delivered on the date ot delivery if delivered in person or by 
facsimile, or on the date of receipt it delivered by U.S. Postal Servieo or express courier. Pf()of 
ofd.eJivery shall be by affidavit ofpenonaJ delivery, maoJililc.gcnerated confirmation of 
facsimile transmission, or return receipt issued by the U.S. Postal Service or express courier. 
Untll changed by notice in writing, notices, demands and communioationi shall be addressed as 
follows: 
LANDLORD: 
Ronald O. Thomas 
Blaine K.. Thomas 
1550 S. Washington 
Emmett. Idaho 83617 
TENANT: 
Thomas Motors, Inc. 
2121 Service Avenue 
Emmett, l&ho 83611 
Attn: Drew Thcmias 
GENBRALMANAGBR 
R. Drew Thomas 
2121 Service Avenue 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Any party shall have th~ right to change its above address by n~tice in writing deUvered to the 
other party in accordance withtb.e provisions of this Section 20. 
Seetion 21. AttomCYJ' Fees and Costs. 
21.1 General Default. If either party shall default in the payment to the other 
party of any sum of money specified in this Lease to be paid, or if ei1her party shall default with 
respect to tJrrf other obligations in this Lease, all attorneys' fees incurred by the other party shall 
be paid by the defaulting party, and if said sum is collected or the default is cured before the 
Co.mttlencement of a suitihereon, asa part of coring said default, reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred by the o1hcr party shall be added to the balance due and payabJe or, in the case of a non-
monr:tary defis.ult. shall be reimbursed to the other party upon demand. 
11.2 Litigation. In the event either party to this Lease shall interpret or enforce 
any ottho provisions heteOfby any action at law or in equity, the non-prevailing party to such 
litigation agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs and expenses, includini reasonable 
attomcYs~. accountants' and appraisers' fees incw:red therein by tho prevailing party ,including 
all such costs and expenses incurred with respect to an appeal and such may be included in the 
judgment entered in such action. 
Scctlon 12. Miscenaneous. 
22.1 Sale and Purchase of PlU'eels 1 and 3. General Manager shall purchase 
Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, including aU improvements located on those parcels, on the 
terms and conditions set forth on Exhibit B attached to this Lease and incoporated by this 
n::ference as if set forth in full. 
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22.2 Estoppel Certificate. .Bitb~ party shan, at any time, upon not less than 
ten (10) days' prior written notice :from the other party (lhc "requesdna party"), execute, 
acla\owlqe and deliver to the other party a statement in writing (a) certifying that this Lease is 
unmodified and in full force and effect (01', if modified, stating the nature of such modification 
and certifyinl that this Lease, as so modilicd, is in Ml force and effect) and the date to which the 
rent and other charges arc paid in adYa1lcc. (b) aekl'lowledgmg that there arc not. to the other 
party1s knowledge. any uncured defaults on the part of the requestins party hereunder, or 
spe~ such defaults iithey are claimed, and (c) containing any other certifications, 
acknowledgments and representadons as may be reasonably requested by the requesting party or 
the party for whose benefit such cs10ppel ecrtiticatc is requested. Any such statemetU may be 
coneluslvely relied upon by any prospective purchase: or encumbrances of1he Ilroperty or 
Tenant's leasehold estate therein.. A party's failure to deliver suell statement within said timc 
shall be conclusive upon the said party (a) that this Lease is in full force and effect, without 
modificatio.n. except as may be represented by the requesting party. (b) that there are no uncured 
defaults in the requesting p3J:'1Ys performance. (e) that not morc: than an amount equal to one (1) 
month's rent has been paid in advance. and (d) that such additional certifications, 
acknowledgments and representations as are requested under elause (c) of the p~ng sentence 
arc valid, trUe and correct as shaJl be represented by the requesting party. Ift.andlord desires to 
finance or refinance the Property. Tenant hereby agrees to deliver to any lender designated by 
Landlord such financial statements of Tenant as may be reasonably required by such lender, and 
all such financial statemoots shall be received by Landlord in confidence and shall be used only 
for the purpose herein set forth. 
22.3 Transfer of Landlord '5 Interest. In the event of a sale or conveyailce by 
Landlord of the Property, other than a transfer:for seeurity purposes only, Laltdlord shall be 
relieved from all obligations and liabilities accruing thereafter 011 the part of Landlord (with the 
e:c:eeption of the obligations imposed on Landlord under Section 16.9, whi,cb. shall be 
coIrtinuing). provided that any funds in the hands of Landlord at the thno oftrallsfer in which 
Tenant has an interest sbaJl be dclivc:red to the successor of Landlord. This Lease shall not be 
affected by any such sale and Tenant agrees to attorn to the purchaser or assignee, provided all 
Landlord obligations hereunder arc assumed in writing by Landlord successor. 
22.4 . SeverabUity. Ifanyteml or provision'oftbis Lease shall be determined 
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder oC this Uasc 
shall 'DDt be affected thereby and each term and provision ofthis Lease shall be valid and be 
enforCeable to the fullest extent pc::r:tilittcd by law; and it is the intention of the parties that if any 
provision of this Lease is capable of tw'o (2) constructionSt one of which would render the 
provision void and the other of which would render the provision valid, then'the provision shall 
be i11terprctcd to have the meaning which renders it valid. 
22.5 Fo~o Majeure. Any prevention, d.eJay or stoppage due to'strikes, 
lockouts, labor disputes, court orders, acts of God. inability to obtain labor or mnterials or 
reasonable substitutes therefor, governmental restrictions, governmental regulations, government 
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controls, enemy or hostile govcmment action. civil commotion, tire or other casualty and other 
causes beyond che roasonable control of the party obHptcd to pcrf'orm shall cxCUSO the 
performance by sUch party for a period equal to any such prevention, delay or stoppaae, provided 
that tbls Section 22.5 shall not be applicable to the obligations imposed with regard to rent and 
other ehargos to be paid by Tenant 'Pursuant to this Lcaso. 
22:6····CpDStruction. All parties hereto have either (a) been represented by 
--.J!C?P.aratc lep'!.£9)mS~ (b) have had the opportunity to be so represented. Thus, in all cases, 
_--"no-l~cIit this Lease shalt be construed simply and in IlCCQrdanee with its fair mca.ning and 
not strictly for or against Ii party, regardless of which party prepared or caused the pr~atation of 
this Lease. 
22.7 SuccessIon. This Lease and all obligations contained herein shall be 
binding upon and shalt inure to the benefit of the respective hclrs, personal ceprc:sentatives, 
successors and assigns ofthcpartics hereto; provided, however. that any assignment of this 
Lease or. any part hereof shall be subj.ect to the provisions of Section 17, above'. 
%1.8 Recording. Landlord shal~ promptly upon request by Tenaot, execute a 
memorandum of lease which may be recorded by Tcn~t in Oem County, Idaho. 
ll.9 General. The defined tenD ('LandJonf' as used in this Lease, shall include 
the plural. as well as the singular. Words used in the neuter gender include the mascUline and 
feminine, and words in the masculine or feminine gender include the neuter. The term 
"Landlord" shall mean only the owner or owners at the time in question of the fee title to the 
Property (exCept for purposes of Section 16.9, which applies to those persons initially executing 
this Lease as Landlord). With the exoeption of the obligations impo$ed under Seetil)n 16.9 
(which shall continue to be binding on the perSons initially executing this Lease as 
Landlord). the obligations t:antained in this Lease to be perfmmed by Landlord shall be binding 
only during Landlord's respective period of ownership. 
22.10 Section Headings. The Section headings, titles and captions used in this 
Lease are for conveDienoe only an4 are not part of this Lease. 
! 
22.11 Entire Agreement. This Lease, including the Exhibits attached hereto, 
and the Contract of even date herewith, contain the entire agreement between the parties as of 
this date concerning the subject matter hereof and supersede any and all prior agreements, oral or 
·written. between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof. Tho execution hercofhas not 
been induced by either party, or any agent of either party, by representations, promises or 
undertakings Dot expressed herein or in the Contract and., further. there are no conateral 
agreements, stipulations. covenants, promises, inducements or undertaking$ whauoever between 
the respective parties coneeming the subject matter of this Lease or the Property which are not 
expressly contained herein or in the Contract. 
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22.lZ Time Is oIthe Essence. Time is oltho ossencc with respect to the 
obligations to be perfotmed under this Lease. 
P.OOl/016 
IN WITNBSS WHERBOP, the parties hereunto executed this Commercial Lease 
Agreement the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAINE K. THOMAS 
TENANT: THOMAS MOTORS, INC. 
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SALE AND PURCHASE OF PARCELS 1 AND 3 
IN CONSIDERATION ofthe asreement by Tenant to lease from Landlord the 
Property covered by the foregoing Leaso, and for other good and val'Uable oonsideration. THE . j 
PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 7 v 
(:) \ 
1. Right and Ohligadon to Purchase. Landlord and General~ ? ~~ 
borcby agree that Landlord shallsel1, and General Manager shall purchase Paroels 1 d 0 .-~'J " I 
Real Property (the «PUrchased Real Property"). including all improvements 10 on those ~ :;:> 
parcels, pllmWlt to the tenns set fortt in this Bxhibit B. 
2. Exercise of RIght and ObUgatlon to Purchase. At any time effCdive no 
earlier than September 1. 2005 and no later than Sq>tember 1,2007, upon at least mnety (90) 
days ad'?U1ce notice to Landlord, and provided thai Tenant is not in default under the Lease, 
Oenera1 Manager shall exercise his rigbt and obligation to purcbase the Purchased.1teaJ Property. 
but r;dthcr parcel alone. by delivering to Landlord a written notice to that effect (the "Notlce of 
Purchase"). 
3. Purchase Price. Genetal Mana.get shall pa.y Landlord the total putehase 
price of Nine Hundred Thousand and Nolloo Dollars ($900,000.00) for the Purchased Real 
Property. 
4. Commitment for Title Insurance. Within ten (10) business days after 
Gcnoral Manager delivers to Landlord tho Notice ofPurcbase pursuant to Paragraph 2, Landlord 
shall obtain, at Landlord's cost and expense. and deliver to General Manager a current 
commitment for title insurance ("Commitment') issued by a title company selected by Landlord 
doing business in Gem CoWity, Idaho (tho 'Tide Company"). Such Commibnent shall 
evidence that the Purchased Real Property is free and clear of alllieIis, encumbrances or 
exoeptions. excepting CUlTeD.t general taxes. asSessments, cascmonts ofrceord, covenants and 
restrictions of record, zoning reguIations, and such other exceptions to title as ~ usual and 
nonnal on property of the type and in the vicinity of the Purchased Real Property and whioh have 
beet) speeifieally approved by General Manager in writing. No exception that shall have been 
created by Tenant through the aaion or omission of the General Manager or that shall have been 
created by General Manager during the t¢11ll of the Contract shan be the basis for objection by 
Gene:ra1 Manager to the condition or title of the Purchased Real Property. Said Commitment 
may also evidenoe an encumbnmce or encumbrances which will be paid in. fuJ I by Landlord at 
the closing of the purchase. 
S. ConditioD of Property. The parties acknowledge that General Manager, 
having been responsible for the actions of Tenant as a party in possession of the property 
pursuant to the Lease, is fully famiHarwith and knowledgeable of the physical condition of the 
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land and improvements comprising the Purchased Real Property and sba1l purchase same in an 
"AS IS" condition, with aU faults and without representation or warranty ormy kind from 
Landlord conccming condition, suitability or otherwise. 
6. ao~iaa of dJc Purchase. 
(a) The closing of the purchase by General Manager shall occur not 
earli er than and not later than the dates speclfled in Paragraph 2 above. 
(b) At the closing, which shall be conducted by the Title Compan.y 
issuing the Commitment described in Paragraph 4 above, Landlord shall denver a good and 
sufficient. executed and acknowledged Warranty Deed in favor of General Manager, and General 
Manager shall deliver to the TItle Company as escrow/olosing agent the purchase price, plus all 
rent and other amounts payable by Tenant or General Manager. Each party shall pay one-half 
(112) ofthc fcc charged by the Title Company tot closing the transaction. 
(c) Real estate taxes and 8.S$CSSD1cnts fur the then current year shall be 
paid by Tenant (as required under 111a Lease) and Landlord shall pW"Chase 8lld provide to General 
Manaser a Standard Coverage Owner's Policy ofTrtle Insurance (the "Title Poliey"). which 
shall be in an amount equal to the purchase price, insuring General Manager's title to the 
Purchased Real Property, subject only to usual printed exoepti.ons. and the exceptions to title as 
set forth in the Commitment (excluding any encumbrance which is to be paid by Landlord at 
closing), which exceptions have been specifically approved by General Manager in writing, and 
any encumbrance or other exception cansed by or attributable to Tenant through the action or 
omission of the General Manager Ot' caused Or attll'butable to Gene:ral Manager. In tho event the 
Title Policy as provided by this Paragraph 6(0) cannot, following the closing, be issued by the 
Title Company in the funn required in this Exhibit D, the right and obligation to purchase and 
any subsequent agreement between landlord and General Manager obligating Landlord to sell 
and General Manager to putCbase the Purchased Real Property shall be null and void, at Genetal 
Manager's option. 
(d) lfthe transaction falls to c10so because of the default ofa party. in 
addition to any other remedies at law Ot in equity available to the other party~ the dGfimlting party 
shall relmburse the other party for all costs and expenses incurred by the other party in 
connection with the transaction, including. but not limited to, reasonable at1omeys' fees, 
appraisal fees and Title Company charges, and the Lease shall continue in full force and effect 
for the remainder ofits tet'IIl, if any. 
7. Termination ofRigbt and Obligation to Purchase. The right and 
obligation to sell and purchase the Purchased Real Property shall tenninate and be of no further 
force or effect upon the' occurrence of the following: 
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(a) The tcrminanon of the Lease between Landlord and Tenant, as 
desenDed above. COl' any reason. incJuding, but not limtted to, the default of Ten ant thereunder. 
(b) The early termfnation oftbe Contract by Tenant. 
Upon such termit1atlon, the right 8I)d obligation to sell and purchase the Purchased Real Property 
shall end and the rights and obllgations of tho parties bcrcundcr shall terminate and be orno 
furtherforee and cffcot. In the event the right and obligation to purehasc the Purehase Real 
Property terminates as provided in this Bxb1"bit B, the ri,ght to purchase the Purchased Real 
Property shall no longer be available to General Manager. and Landlord shalt have no obligation 
to sell or convey the Purchased Real Property to General Manager. In the event the tight and 
obligation to purchase the Purchased Real Property terminates as provided herein, Landlord may 
teonillate this U:MO. which tcmninaUon shall be efi"ecti~ six (6) months following delivery of 
Landlord"s written notice to Tenant and General Manager of such termination. unless this Lease 
otherwise terminates earlier by the expiration of the Initial Term, 
8. Notices. Any notice required to be given hereunder shall be in writing and 
shalJ be mailed OT deJivered in the manner provid~ in Section 20 of the Lease. 
9. Asslgbmebt. Generat Manager shall not have the right to assign the right 
and obligation to purchase the Purchased Real Property or any interest herein. except as provided 
in Section 17.2 oftbis Lease, without the prior written consent ofLand1ord, which consent may 
not be UllI'eaSOIlably withheld. 
10. Time. Time is of the essence of the righ1 and obligation to purchase the 
Purchased Real Property granted by Landlord to General Manager hereunder. 
11. Certificate OCNoD-Foreign Status. Landlord Is not a foreign person, 
nonresident alien., foreign corporation, .fon::ign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate, as 
those terms are defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the '·Codej and the 
Income Tax Regulations promulgated thcrcander. At the close of escrow, Landlord shall deliver 
to Genoral Manager a'certificate ot DOn-f'oteign status in a fonn satisfactory to General Manager 
{"Non-Forelp CcrtiflcatJoaj. lnthe event Landlord shall not deliver such NOll-Foreign 
Certiiieation to Genetal Manager at the close of escrow, General Manager may witbho Id ten 
perCent (10%) of the purchase prlce and pay such ~tbholding to the Internal Revenue Service 
PUrsuant to Section 1445 of the Code •. 
12. Escrow. On or before the date ofllie closing (as above provided), the 
parties shall deposit the funds and documents hereafter descn"bed into escrow: 
(a) Landlor<l LandJOl'd shaH deposit the following; 
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(1) The duly executed and acknowledged Landlord's Warranty 
Deed; 
(2) The Non·Foreign C~cation d.uly executed y Landlord 
U11dcr penalty of perjury; 
(3) Evidence reasonably satisfactory to General Manager that 
all necessary action 0.11 the part of Landlord has been 18kcn. with respect to the execution and 
delivery of the Wamnty Deed and the other ancllJatj' documents and instruments $0 that all of 
sald documents are or will be validly executed and dellvered and will be binding on Landlord; 
and 
(4) Such other inst:ruments andlor documents as may be 
required to effect the agreement herein made. 
(b) General Manager. General Manager shall deposit the following: 
(1) The pu:rohase price of the Ptmihased Real Property; unless 
the parties otherwise mutually agree upon the tcnns by which l.atJ.dlord shall receive instead 
General Manager's promissory note for SOme portion of the purchase price. which promissory 
note soall include a mutu3l1yagreed in,1erest rate and amortization schedule. and which 
promissory note shall be secured by a thst deed of trust on the Purchased Real Property; 
(2) Additional cash in the smount necessary to pay all amounts 
c:luc and payable under the Lease and General Manager's share of the closing costs and pro-
rations.., as above set forth; and 
(3) Such other instruments and/or doeument$ as may be 
req~ to effectthe agreement herein made. 
13. Oose of;Esuow. When the Title Company is in a position to issue the 
Title PoliCYt and all documents and funds have been deposited with the Title Company as escrow 
holder, the Title Company shaD immediately 'close the escrow as provided fcrr hereafter. the 
failure of Landlord or General Manager to be in a position to close the escrow by the time set for 
closing shall constitute a default bereundtt. The Title Company as escrow holder. and closing 
agent shall close the escrow as follows: 
(a) Record Landlord's Warranty Deed with instructions for the Gem 
County Recorder to deliver such' Deed to General Manager; 
(b) Pay the purchase price to be paid at the close of escrow. plus any 
amounts due and payable under the Lease, to Landlord (reduced by any amount paid to release 
all monetary encumbrances on the Property and by Landlord's share of the closing costs): 
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(0) Deliver the Titlo Polley to General Manager; 
(d) Deliver the Non-Foreign Certiflcation to General Mana.ger; and 
(~) Forward to Landlord and General Manager, in duplicate. a separate 
accounting of all funds reeeivc::d and disbut$ed for each party and copies of all executed and 
recorded or filed documents deposited into escrow, with sueh recording and file date endorsed 
thereon. 
14. Section 1031 Exchange. General Manager agrees to cooperate with 
Landlord, if so requested by Landlord, to faclllta.tc tho close of tho Purchase Real Property in a 
m.anner that will pennit Landlord to comply with the provisions of Section 1031 of the Internal 
..Rcvenue Code of ~9S6. as amended; provided, howevl;e1', that such facilitation by General 
Manager shall be at no additional cost to General Manager. 
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AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
THIS AGREEMENT POR PURCHASB AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSBTS 
(uAlJ"eement'') dated this 1st de.y of September 2000, is entered into by and among THOMAS 
MOTORS, INC., an Idaho cOrporation ("SeUer"), R. DREW THOMAS, a single person 
r'Buycrj, and. RONALD O. THOMAS md ELAINE K. THOMAS. husband and wife 
("Sharebolders"). 
In consideration of and in reliance upon the mutual covenants contained ;n this 
Agreement the parties hereby agree as follows. 
Section 1. Premises. This Agreement is made and entered into bytbe parties in part upon 
the representations and warranties eontaine4. in this Section 1, wbioh representations and 
warranties arc not mere recitals, but fundamental premises upon which the transaction descn'bed 
in this Agreement is based. 
1.1 Seller is an Idaho business corporntion engaged in the business of selling 
and servicing Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep ~otor vehicles and related parts and 
acCessories from premises located at 2121 Service AVemlc, Emmett. Idaho 83617 (the "Busln~s 
Real 'Property''). under franchises issued by Daimler-Chrysler Corporation. 
1.2 Buyer wishes to purchase from Seller, and Seller is willing to sell to 
Buyer, all assets relating to SeUer·s Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep franchise for Bmmet~ 
Idaho. conditioned upon the granting to Buyer of an exclusive franchise for the sale of new 
Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same geographical area as· Seller's 
franchise. 
1.3 Buyer (or a business entity that Buyer shall own) also wishes to lease two 
(2) of the three (3) parcels of the real property and ·improvements which constitute the Business 
Real PropertY, and wishes eventually to purehase one (1) of those parcels and another adjoining 
~- parcel of real property. Consequently, the purchase of Sener's business assets shall be 
conditioned upon the execution and delivery oftbe Commetcl8I Lease and· Purehase Agreement 
among the parties and Ronald 0: Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas. husband and wife. dated 
September 1, 2000 (the "Lease). 
! I 
S~tiOD. 2. Definitions. In this Agreement, the following words shall have the indicated 
meanings: 
2.1 "Closing" shall refer to the consummation of the transaction contemplated 
under this Agreement in accordance with the timns hereof; and "Closing Date" shaH refer to-
September 1,2001. 
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2.2 ~etler'. Business" shall refer to any and aU activities conducted by Seller 
in Emmett, Idaho, relatini to the marketing and salc of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep 
motor vehicles Illd aslOCiated parts and accessodca, and the repair and servicing of new or used 
Chrysler. Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles. 
2.3 "Purcltased Assets" sha1l refer to those assets which are identified in 
Section 3 as being purchased and sold by the parties under this A.grccment. The Purchased 
Assets specifically shall not include Sellets accounts receivable and Franchisor holdbaelcs, 
which shall be retained by Seller. 
2.4 SeRer's "Equipment" shall rcfcrto aU non .. inventory items oftangJble 
personal p1')pcrty presently owned or used by Sener in oormection with Seller's Business, 
including all ofSeUer's machinery. tools, signs, office equipment. computer equipment. 
c:cnnputer programs, microfich~ parts lists, repair m8Ilua1~ sates CJt'servlce brochures, furniture 
and fixtures. and all of Seller's leasehold improvements to the Business Real Property. Within 
twenty (20) days after the Date oftrus Agreement, Scller shall provide to Buyer a list of the 
"'Certain Excluded Equipment" being retained by Seller. which list shall be attached to this 
Agreement as Bxluoit "A" and which list $haJl include, without limitation, a grinder and a brake 
lathe. The parties recogtrl2c and agree that Seller's Bquipm.ent does NOT include any assets of 
Thomas Auto Parts. Inc.. which also operates on the Business Real Property and whoso assets 
include its lixturcs, equipment and inventozy of motor vehicle parts and aceessorles. 
2.S SeDer's "Intangible Assets" shall refer to Scllcr's telc:phonc and fax 
numbers.. serviCe oustomedists. sales oostomer tistst vehicle sales records, vehicle service 
records, all rights of SeDer under contracts assigned to and assumed by Buyer pursuant to this 
.Agreement, all goodwill associated with Sener~s Business, and all other intangible rights and 
interests of any value relating toSeUer' s Business; provided. however. that Seller's Business 
name ("Thomas Motors) is included within the Intangible Assets being sold by Seller 
hereunder. 
2.6' 4c:8usblcsS Reat Property" shall refer to all of Seiter's rights under the 
LeUe, including, without limitation, the rights'1o lease certain of the: parcels descn'bed in the: 
Lease and the rights and obligation to purchase certain of the parcels described in the Lease 
pursuant to the terms ofExhtoit B to the Lease. ' 
2.7 "Fl'1lnchfsorttshall refer to Daimler-Chrysler Corporation.. 
2.8 "New Vehicle" shall refer to a Chrysler. Dodge. Plymouth and Jeep motor 
vehicle which: (A) is unregistered and unused, (8) is frQm the 1999,2000 or 2001 model year, 
(C) has been driven for tess than tiVo hundred (200) odometer Iniles, and (D) may be represented 
or warranted 10 cotlSUmCl'S as "new" under Idaho law. ItRoDback Vehicle" shall mean an 
unregistered vehicle from the 1999~ 2000 or 2001 mode! year which has been sold to a customer 
by Sener but returned because of the customer's inability to obtain financing for the pttrchas~. 
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HDemoadrator Vehicle" shall mean an U11tfJgistcrod 1ebicle £rom ~c 1999,2000 or ZOO 1 model 
year which bas been used and operated by ~eUer on dealer plates for salOl demonstration 
purpoSeI. .cu.cd Vehlde" .hall mean any vebiele which is not a New V chicle, a Demonstrator 
Vehicle or a Rollback V chicle u defined in the three preceding sentences. 
2.9 "Date of this Agrccmcnf' shan refer to the 1irst date upon which this 
Agreement has been signed by all ofthc parties. 
SeedoD. 3. Purcbued Assets. Sener agrees to sell to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to plU"Chase 
from Sellet, those assets of Corporadon specifically identified in Sections 4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10,11, 
12 and 13 of this Agreement (the "Purchased Assets"). Corporation's accounts receivable and 
Franchisor holdback! specifically arc excluded from this 1ransact1cm. 
SeetiOD. 4.. IllVeJltory of New Vehicles, Demonstrator V chicles and Rollback VekicJes. 
Buyer shall pun;ha$e Seller's tJtltire inventory of new Chrysler. Plymouth, Dodge and Jeep motor 
vehicles, as that mvemory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer also shall purchase Seller·s entire 
inventoty ofDernott$ttator Vehicles and Rollback Vehic1cs. Immediately prior to ClosiD& 
Buyer and Sener shaJ1 jointly review Seller's outstanding purchase orders for New Vehicles 
ordered.1fom Seller by customers but I10t delivered prior to Closing..· At Closing, Seller shan 
assign. to Buyer, and Buyer shall assume fiom SeDer, alI of Seller's rights (UlCludlng customer 
deposits) and obligations (meluding sales commissions) under such purcnase orders. At ClosfnSt 
Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all deposits made to Seller with respect to ordered but 
undelivered New V chicles. 
SectfOll S. Inventory of Used VehJcles. Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire inventory of 
Used VehicJt;~ u that inventety exis1$ at Closing, including Seller's parts frocks, service 
vehicles and courtesy vehicles. Those Used Vebicles that are not financed through Seller's 
flooring line of credit with F'ttst Security Bank: ofIdaho, N.A, however, sha.llnot be part of the 
Fixed Purchase Price. but Buyer instead shall pay for those Used Vehicles pursuant to 
Section 14.2. . 
Sdo" 6. Inventory of New Parts and Accessories. Buyer shall purchase Sellers entire 
inventory ofvchicle parts and accc:ssorics manu:filctur.ed. by FtanehisO't atld/or third party 
suppUm, as that inventory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer shall pm:t:hase that entire inventory 
':" AS IS" as of the Closing Date. Prior to Closing, Seller shall maintain Sener's inventory of parts 
and accessories at a level oonsistent with good business. practices and Seller's normal and regular 
course ofbusincss. 
Section 7. Equipmont. Buyer shall purchase Seller's Equipment. Buyer acknowledges tnat 
Seller is retai:oing, and is not selling to Buyer those excluded items ofScller's Equipment, as 
contemplated in Section 2.4. 
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Scotian 8. Supplies. :Suyer shall purchase all of the PSt oil. nuts, bolts, lUld other 
automotive and office supplies which arc held for use in Seller's Business. 
Scetloll 9. Contractu,1 Rigbts and Obligations. At Closing, Buyer shall assume all rights 
and obUgations of Seller under all equipment leases and other contracts. Soller Wattants that all 
of Seller's obligations under those contracts are current as of the Date ofthls'Agreement. Buyer 
agrees to indemnify Seller against all obligations under those contracts, whether they relate \0 
periods bofore or a.1ler Closing. 
Section 10. Repair Work In Progress. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's vehicle repair 
work-in-pTOgress (In-hO\1$C and subc:ontracted). 
Seetion 11. Intangible Assets. Buy~ shall pUrchase a.U ofSelJer's Intangible Assets. 
Seetlon 12. Seller's Cash, Bank AeeOUDUt atid Notes Reteivable. Buyer shall purchase aU 
ofSener's cash, banking acco1JJlU and deposits. and notes receivable. BuyCf shalltakc such 
actions as Buyer deems appropriate to oollect those notes rceclvablc, and Seller shall not be 
liable to Buyet" to the extent that any of Seller's notes receivable are not collected. by B~. 
Buyer shall retain for Buyer's own account any payment with respect to Seller's notes recclvable 
wing out of the operation of Sellers Business pnorto Closing. 
Section 13. . Franchisor Credits. Buyer shall purchase all ofSellcr's credits, deposits or other 
amounts due it by FnmcrnsOl' as of the Date of this Agreement, except for Franchisor holdbacks 
that shall be retained by Seller. 
Section 14. Purchase Price and Payment. 
14.1 Fixed Purchase Price. Buyer shaH pay Seller, as the total purchase price 
for the Purchased Assets (other than those Used Vehicles described in Sections Sand 14.2) the 
amount ofEpt Hundred FHty Thousand and No/tOO Dollars ($850,000.00), as such amount 
may be reduced by distributions made to Shareholders prior to the Closing Date pursuant to the 
terms oftbat certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000 between the parties ('4Jl'ixed 
Parehase PrIce"); Buyer shall pay Seller the Fixed Purchase Price in monthly installments 
amortized over a period of twenty (20) years from and after the Closing, in~luding interest at the 
prime rate of interest charged by First SecurltyBank ofIdaho. NA. plus two hundred (200) basis 
points. with the amorti.zationto be adjusted concurrently with each adjustment ofsucb prime rate 
ofinteresl; provid~ however, that the interest in no event shall be less than ten percent (10%). 
Notwithstanding such amortization schedule, Buyer shall pay Seller the entire unpaid balance of 
the Fixed Purchase Price and all accrued interest on September I, 2008. 
142 Additional Pnrchase Price. In addition to the fixed Purchase Price 
provided In Section 14.1, Buyer shall pay Seller, as the purchase pdce for each Used Vehicle that 
is not financed through Seller's flooring line of credit with First Security Bank ofTdaho, N.A .• 
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Seller' 8 cost as reflected on its books and records for such Used Vebicle at the time Buyer sells 
each such Used V chicle. 
SecUOD 15. Assamed Llabnltles. In addition to the purchase oftb.c Purchased Assets, Buyer 
.1$0 sball, in eonjunction with such purchase, assamo and take responsibility for any and'all 
llabiliti~ debts or obligations of Seller (including Seller's trade payables. account payables, 
notes payable to Shareholders and obligations to employees), ofclusive of any meome tax 
liabilities of Shareholders. 
Seet1oD16. Warranties of Seller. Seller and Shareholders make the foUowingwarranties to 
~uyor, with the intent that Buyer rely thereon: 
16.1 CorponteOrganlzation. Seller is a corporation organizedt validly 
c::xistin& and in good standing U11der the laws of the State of Idaho. SeUer is qualified to do 
business in the State ofIdabo. and has full power and authority to own, use, and sell its assetS. 
16.2 Corporate Authority. Sellet s Board ofDireotors and Sharebolders have 
authorized the execution and delivery of this Agreement to Buyer and the caaying out ofits 
provisioas. This Agreement will not violate any judi~ governmental or administratiYe decree, 
order. writ. injunction. or judgment, and will not conflict with or constitute a defi1ult under 
Seller's bylaws, or any contract, agreement, or other instrument to which Seller is a party or by 
which it may be bound. 
16.3 Employee Issues. No employees of Seller are members of any union. 
Within teD. (10) days aftcrtbc Date of this Agreement, Sener sball provide to Buyer the 
following: (A) a census ofSeller·s employees, (8) a wrlttendisclosure ofall benefits made 
available 10 Seller7 s employees (mcluding qualitiedand non-qualified retirement plans), and (C) 
acceSs to a11 pc;:rsonncl files for Seller's tmployees. All employee benefit plans maintained by 
Sener for ita employees sba11 be fully funded prior to Closing. Seller shall pay aU wages. 
oommissions, accrued vaeation pay and other aecrued compensation earned by Sellers 
i:mplo~ prior to Closing (together with all accrued FICA and withholding tnes). Seller shall 
terminato the employment of aU of Sener's emploYees cff'ecti:vc as of the close of business on the 
Closing Date. At Buyer's sole discretion, Buyetmay (but shan not be obligated to) hire any of 
SeUer's employees. 
16.4 Undisclosed Liabilities and Contractual Commitments. Except as 
otherwise disclosed in this Agreement, the folloWing statements are true as of the Date of this 
Agreement and shall be true at Closing! (A) Seller does not have any liabilities which might have 
a material impact on Buyer's 1.LSe of the Putch~ Assets, (B) Seller is not a party to any 
contracts or commitments'which might have a material impact on Buyer's use of tho Purchased 
Assets, (C) no law suit or actiOllt administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding, 
governmental investigation, or other legal or equitable proceeding of any kind is pending or 
threatened against SGller whlch might adversely affect the value oftbe Purehased Assets, and (D) 
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Se11cr has all licenses, pem:rlts and authorlza1ions required by any federal. state or local 
sovemmentaJ or regulatory 8ica.cy in order to operate Scll~. Business, and knows of DO n::ason 
why any such license or pennit might be subject to revocation. It any claim is asserted apinJt 
Bilyet after Closi:n& withrcspect to any obllgation of Sener which Sener has failed to disclose to 
Buyer in wtiting, or which Soner has disclosed but failed to pay, 1hen Buyer shall give prompt 
written notice of that claim to Seller. Seller sball indemnify Buyer with respect to all such 
obligatiot1$. 
16.5 Condition of Equipment. Bach item ofSeller·s Equipment shall be sold 
u AS IS" as of the Closing Date. SeUer will continue to perform routine maintenance and repairs 
with respect to Sener~s Equipment prior to Closing. 
16.6 Good Title. Sener has, and shall transfer to Buyer at Closing, good and 
marketable title to all of the PUrchased Assets, free and clear of all security interests, Uens, 
equitable interests, leases, assessments, restrictions, reservations. or other burdens of any kind. 
other than those existing in favor ofFim Seeurity Bank ofIdaho, N.A. and assumed by Buyer. 
All eamnt and a.eerued taxes whiob. may beoome a lien against any of the Purchased Assets shall 
have been paid by Seller prior to Closing (moluding property taxes, sales taxes and excise taxes). 
16.7 FraudUsor's' Consent Seller sball1ake all actions whicb are reasonably 
neee$S3ry on' Seller's part to obtain the consent of the Fr.mchisor to the issu.ance 10 Buyer of an 
exclusive franchise for the sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in tho 
same geograpbical area as Seller's CUl'I'eIlt franchise in Emmett, Idaho. 
Section 17~ Conduct of Business Pending Oosing. Seller warrants that during the period 
beginning on the Date ofthls Agreement and ending at Closing: (A) Seller'shan eontinue to 
operate Sener's Business in the usual and ordinary course, and in substantial conformity with all 
applicable laws, ordinances, regulatiOrtS, rules or orders; (B) Seller shall not allow any Hens to be 
placed against any ofthePurchascd Assets unless those liens Ire discharged prlorto Closing; (e) 
Seller shall not take any actiOTl which may cause a material adverse change in the operatiotl$ of 
Sellet"s Business; (1) Sel1ec shall not conduct any sale which shall use the words or phrases 
'4Qoin, Out of Business Sale" or other words or phrases having similar meanings; and (E) Seller 
shall usc if.s best eff'orts to preserve the value of the Chtysicr, Dodge, Plymotrtb, and Jeep 
fi:a:nehise in Emmett, Idaho. Notwidlstanding the warranties made by Seller in this Section 17, 
Buyer acknowledges and agrees that Buyer shall be responsible for the performance of those 
warranties pursuant to the ten:ns of that certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000, 
Section 18. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer hereby makes the following 
representations and warranties to Sel1er, with the intent fuat Sener rely thereon: This Agreement 
will not violate the proVision of any judicial, govemniental or administrative decree, order, writ, 
injunction. or judgment, or conflict with or constitute a default under, any contract, agreement. or 
other instrument to wlrleb Buyer is a party. 
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SectlO1l 19. Addltioual COlldltiOIlJ Proeodont to BaYllt'. ObUgadou. The obligation of 
Buyer to close this transaction is subject to each of the following conditions (each ofwhtch Is for 
th. benefit otBuycr and may be waived by Buyor). and Buyer shall have the npt to rescind this 
Agrccm.cnt if any of tho (otlowing conditiOt1G is uot satisfied in accordance with its terms: 
19.1 Buyer shall have obtained 1hml Franchisor. prior to the Closing Date, an 
exclusive franchise to sell new Chrysler, Dodge. PJymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same 
geographical area as SoUet'S CUIl'CD.t franchise in Emmett, Idaho (as evidenCed by the issuance to 
Buyer by Franchisor of an appropriate Dealership Sales and Service Agreement, and the approval 
of Buyer as the pubUcly-owned Dea1er-Opemor of the fi'anohise). and Buyer agrees to usc its 
best reasonable: efforts to obtain that fnme1Use. . 
19.2 Buyer shall ~ reasonably satisfied with any facility improvement 
requirements which are imposed by Franchisor. 
19.3 ,All of Seller's agrcom.cnts and wmanties set forth in this Agreement shall 
be true, eom:ct, complete and not misleading at Closing; provided that Buya's dccisi9n to close 
this tm1$action shall not release Sener .&om Habillty to Buyer for any VIamUlty which is 
subsequently determined to be incorrect. incomplete or misleading. 
Section 20. Closing. The parties 'shall make all reaoonable efforts to close the purchase and 
sale under this A.grcemcnt at or before 5:00 p.m., Mountain Da.ylight rune, (In or before the 
Closing Date. at the offices ofSelJer, or at sucb other location as shall be selected by mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
20.1 If this transaction closes as provided in this Agreement, then actual 
possession and. all risk oftoss, damage or destruction. with respect to the Purchased Assets,. shall 
be deemed to have been delivered to Buyer at 11:59 p.m .. Motmtaln Daylight Time, ott the ' 
Clo$mg Date. 
20.2 'At Closing. and coincidentally with the perfonnanec of the obligatiOl1$ to 
be performed by Buyer at Closing, SeDer shall deliver to Buyer the following: (A) all bills of 
sale, assignmcms and other instruments of transfer, in fonn and substance reasonably satisfactory 
to BUyer, which shaJJ be necessary to convey the Purchased Assets to Buyer; and (B) all other 
documents required under this Agreement. 
20.3 At Closing. and coincidentally with the performance of all obligations 
required of Seller at Closing, Buyer sball deliver to ,Seller the following: (A) payment for the 
PUrohased Assets; and (B)' all other'payments and documents ~uired under this Agreement. 
Buyer shall be responsible for all sales tmccs payable in connection with the transaction, 
20.4 If Closing does not take place on or before the Closing Date because there 
has been a failure of any condition precedent set forth in Section 19, then: (A) all rights and 
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obHptions of both parties under this Agreement .ball terminate, and (B) this Agreement and all 
predecessor agreements shall thereafter be void and oCno oft'ect. 
20.S Both parties agree to make a good taith eftbrt to execute and deliver aU 
documents and complete all actions necessary to consummato this transaction. 
Seeti01l 21.· Sun1va1 olRepresoutatioas. All representations, wmantics, indemnification 
obligations and ~venants made in this Apcment shall survive the ClOsing, and shall remain in 
ettcet mill the expiration oltho latest period allowable in any applicable statute oftimttations; 
Sudoa 22.. Asslgnmeat by Buyer. Buyer shall have 1he right to assign all of its rights and J 
obHsadons under this Agreement to a. business entity owned exclusively by Buyer. 
Seetlo1l13. Lease p,dlor PlU'dlase of Buslaess Real Property. As a condition to the 
Closing of the ~Ol1 contemp1ated undef this Agreement, SCllcr shall assign to Buyer (or a 
related entity) the Lcasc.. including, without 1imitatio~ its terms regarding the lease of Parcels 1 
and 2 of tho Business Rea1~, the filtUtc substitution ofPucel3 for Parcel 2 dwingtile 
term otthe Lease, and the purcbase ofP81'Cels t and 3 of'the Business Real Property. 
Scctioll24. Miseellaneous. 
24.1 There arc no oral agreements or representations between tho parties which 
affect this Cransaction, and tbis Agreement supersedes all previous negotiations. warranties. 
representations and understandings between the parties. Truc-eopies of all doewnen.ts referenced. 
in this Agreement are attached to this Agreement. If any provision oftbis Agreement shall be 
det:cmlin.ed to be void by any court of competent jurisdiction, then that determination shall not 
affect any other provision of this Agreement, and au other proVisions shall remain in tUn foree 
and effect. If any provision of this Agreement is capable of two (2) constructions, only one (1) 
of which would render the provision valid, thcnthe provision shall have tho meaning which 
renders it valid. The section beadings in this Agreement arc for convenience purposes only. and 
do not in any way define or constrUe the conk:nts of this Agreement. -' 
24.2 This Agreement shall be governed and perfbImed in accordance with the 
laws of the State ofIdsho. Bach of the parties hereby hTevocably submits to the jUrisd.iction of 
the courts of Gem County, Idaho, and agrees that any legal proceedings with respect to this 
Agreement shan be filed and heard in the appropclate court in Gem County, Idaho. 
24.3 This .Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each ofwhioh 
shall be an original. and all ofwbich shall constitute a single instrument, when signed by both of 
the parties. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall bc bi.nd1ng upon the successors 
and assigns of the respective parties. 
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24.4 Waiver by either party of strict porf'ormanee of any provision oftbis 
Agreement sban not be a waiver o( and shall not prejudice the partyfs right to subsequently 
require strict perfonnance ot the same provision or any other provisio.D. Th4; consent or approval 
of either party to any act by the other party of a nature requhin, CODSeftt or approval shall not 
render unneoeasary the consent to or approval of any subsequent similar act. 
24.S All notices provided for berein shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
be duly given when maned. by United States certified mail, postage prepaid, to the last known 
address of tho party entitled to receive the notice, or when personally delivered to tl1a.t party. 
24.6 Time is of the essence of this Agreement 
24.7 Should any party hereto institute any action or proceedings to enforce or 
interpret any provision hereof: or for damages by reason of any alleged b~h of any provision 
of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party or 
parties sllCh amount as tho court may adjudge to be reasonable attomey fees for services rendered 
to the prevailing party in sw::h action or proceeding. The term "prevailing· party" as usod in this 
$eeticn shall include, without limitatiOl1, any party who is made a defendaDt in litigation in which 
damages and/or other reHefmay besought against such party and a. final judgment or dismissal 
or decree is c:nteredin such litigation in favor of such party defendant 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the parties have executed this Agreement on the dates 
indicated below. 
SELLER: 
THOMAS MOTORS. INC. 
Dated: 0¥r~1rA 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONL\LD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2006-492 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND 







* * * * * 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RON THOMAS - 1 
000661 
(I R , (; I ~,! ;\ I. 
The plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas. There 
are several brief points to make in response to this Motion, each of which serve to establish the 
Motion is without merit and should be denied. 
1. As a matter of substance, the plaintiff repeatedly argues that only business or 
property evaluation experts can address questions of valuation. It is on that legal basis the plaintiff 
argues the Second Affidavit of the defendant Mr. Thomas should be stricken since it addresses 
subjects that at least relate to questions of business or property valuation. There are two points to 
make in response to this legal argument. 
First, most of the statements made in the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas are pure 
statements of fact. That is to say, Mr. Thomas simply explains what actually happened, and what 
was actually sold. Almost all of the Affidavit, in other words, boils down to statements of 
undisputed fact, not opinion type testimony. 
Second, and more to the substantive legal point, the plaintiffs Motion is based upon 
a faulty misstatement or misunderstanding of Idaho law. The repeated theme of the plaintiffs 
Motion, as stated on behalf of the plaintiff, is: "Clearly, the questions of business and property 
valuation must be left to the experts ... " See Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Second Affidavit of Ron 
Thomas at p. 3, N 1. There is no citation of any authority to what the plaintiff otherwise indicates 
is "clearly" the rule of law in Idaho. On this basis, the plaintiff argues the defendant Ron Thomas, 
who was the undisputed owner of the Thomas Motors business and the real property that was sold 
to the investment group, is not legally permitted to address issues of valuation for his own property 
or business. This is simply wrong, and directly contradicted by long-standing Idaho law. As the 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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OOOGG;:" 
Idaho Supreme Court has point-blank stated: 
For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that 
the owner of property is a competent witness concerning its value. 
An owner is competent to testify to the value of a going business 
without further qualification. 
Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 43. 896 P.2d 949 (l995}{citations 
omitted). It has basically always been the evidentiary rule of law in Idaho that an owner of property 
or a business is per se qualified to testify regarding the valuation of either. The plaintiff's entire 
Motion is thus based upon asserting a rule oflaw that is squarely contradicted by almost a century's 
worth oflegal precedent in Idaho that has repeatedly, consistently, and without exception held to be 
not the rule of law in Idaho. 
2. It is also worth noting the primary reason the Second Affidavit of Ron Thomas 
as filed to begin with, was to clarify a misstatement of fact made by the plaintiff in opposing the 
deiense Motion for Summary Judgment. In opposing the defense Motion, plaintiffs counsel 
represented that the defendant "sold Thomas Motors to an investment group ... for nearly $3 million 
dollars." See, e.g .. Plaintiff's Opposition Brief at pp. 10-11. In so doing, the plaintiff also cited the 
Court to a number of Affidavits, thereby advising or at least suggesting to the Court there are a 
number of witness/affiants supporting the proposition that the Thomas Motors business alone 
generated a sales price of close to $3 million dollars. Id While the question of how much money 
was received by the defendants for the sale of the Thomas Motors business has little or nothing to 
ith the issues presented on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff made a point of 
presenting this to the Court as a facf. when in reality it was so far removed from the indisputable 
truth that it deserved to be corrected. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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As the defendants' Reply Brief addressed, the Affidavits cited by the plaintiff as 
supposedly supporting the factual proposition offered, did not even address the question of the sale 
price received for the sale of the Thomas Motors business. As the Reply Brief also addressed, and 
more importantly, the representation that the Thomas Motors business alone commanded a sales 
price of close to $3 million dollars was not even close to being correct. See Defendants' Reply Brief 
at pp. 19-21. The defendants' Reply Brief also explained the primary purpose of the Second 
Affidavit of Ron Thomas was to explain some of the actual facts regarding what was sold to the 
investment group. Id. This included the undisputed fact that the sale to the investment group 
included a substantial amount of surrounding or adjacent real property that had very significant value 
all by itself, which real property was completely aside from the "business" of Thomas Motors. Since 
the plaintiff has otherwise made it clear in this case that his claim is based only on alleged 
agreements to sell the business alone, not any real property, this is a point of some potential 
significance. See, Defendants' Opposition Brief at p. 16. In any event, the Second Affidavit of Ron 
Thomas simply attempted to shed some light on this and established the otherwise undisputed fact 
th?ll the Thomas Motors business was not sold for anything that even remotely resembled "nearly $3 
million dollars," contrary to the statements made by or on behalf of the plaintiff. 
In short, the defendants respectfully submit it was entirely fair for them to submit this 
second affidavit establishing that the plaintiffs representation that the Thomas Motors business sold 
for nearly $3 million dollars was undeniably incorrect, and that the Court should be aware of that. 
There is certainly nothing in the applicable rules of procedure precluding an affidavit being 
submitted for this purpose. There are also no legitimate timing issues involved here - in fact, with 
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the Court having moved the hearing to September 24th, the Affidavit in question was filed more than 
a month in advance of the actual hearing date. 
The defendants respectfully submit that the plaintiff s Motion to Strike the Second 
Affidavit of Mr. Thomas should be summarily denied. 
it:. 
DATED this E day of September, 2007. 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rules 56 and 7(b)(3) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby files his Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
ARGUMENT & ANALYSIS 
The Defendants have moved to strike certain portions of the Plaintiffs affidavit in 
opposition to summary judgment, Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas In Opposition to Summary 
0006G'~' 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
• 
Judgment ("Drew Affidavit"), under the judicially created rule known in both Idaho and the 9th 
Circuit as the "sham affidavit rule." 
The sham affidavit rule permits a court to disregard an affidavit filed in opposition to 
summary judgment when the affidavit directly contradicts prior sworn testimony. See Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298,882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994); Kennedy v. Allied Afutual, 952 
F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding the sham affidavit rule does not automatically dispose 
of every case in which a contradictory affidavit is introduced to explain portions of earlier 
deposition testimony, but applies to affidavit testimony that flatly contradicts earlier testimony in 
an attempt to create an issue of fact and avoid summary judgment). Thus, the threshold question 
is whether the affidavit testimony at issue directly contradicts earlier sworn testimony. If not, 
then the sham affidavit rule is inapplicable. See for e.g. Frazier v. Simpiot, 136 Idaho 100, 103-
04, 29 P.3d 936, 939-40 (2001) (holding the court must determine whether an affidavit 
contradicts prior deposition testimony by assessing the allegedly contradicted deposition 
testimony in context of all related testimony given during the deposition, the specific questions 
to which the witness was responding when providing the testimony, and the way in which the 
witness may have interpreted the question). 
Furthermore, under 9th Circuit authority, even when an affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment contains testimony which contradicts the affiant's prior sworn testimony, the 
court must consider whether the affiant's statements were the result of an "honest discrepancy," 
a "mistake," or "newly discovered evidence." See Kennedy, supra. For this reason, when the 
court determines affidavit testimony directly contradicts prior sworn testimony, the trial court 
must make a factual determination that the contradiction(s) in the affidavit is actually a sham. 
See Kennedy, supra; Fraizer, supra. 
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The Defendants assert the court should strike the Plaintiffs statements that his and the 
Defendant Ron Thomas's agreement whereby Thomas Motors, Inc. would be transferred to the 
Plaintiff upon Ron Thomas's retirement did not involve any term for a purchase price. The 
Defendants also ask the court to strike portions of the Plaintiff s affidavit in which he states "he 
was supposed to get the business pursuant to the alleged oral agreement oL'1er than the specific 
time when his father turned 63 years old." The Defendants argue these portions of the Plaintiffs 
affidavit "are squarely contradicted by his prior deposition testimony and the Plaintiffs Verified 
Complaint" and have been submitted for no purpose other than to create an issue of fact in order 
to avoid an adverse decision on summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, however, 
the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony is not subject to being stricken under the sham affidavit rule. 
A. The Plaintiff's Affidavit Testimony Concerning Defendant Ron Thomas's 
Retirement Does Not Contradict His Prior Deposition Testimony 
In Paragraph 8 of the Drew Affidavit, the Plaintiff states: "During our conversations, 
which occurred before Ron bought Johannesen Motors and throughout the years until Ron sold 
Thomas Motors in March of 2006, he repeatedly stated to me, or in my presence, that Thomas 
Motors would be mine whenever he retired." In Paragraph 9, the Plaintiff testifies concerning 
his assumption Thomas Motors, Inc. would belong to him "whenever Ron retired." Finally, in 
Paragraph 10 the Plaintiff states the age of sixty-three was just Ron Thomas's estimated time for 
retirement. As the following deposition excerpts demonstrate, these statements are not at all 
contradictory to, or in any way inconsistent with, the Plaintiffs prior deposition testimony: 
Q: Okay. So before you made the commitment to come over, 
can you remember anything else about the discussion you 
had with your dad ... 
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A: Other than that he [Ron Thomas] said - he told me if I 
would commit to coming over, that upon his retirement, it 
would be my dealership ... 
Q: Was there any discussion along the lines of when it would 
be that he would anticipate retiring? 
A: The time frames he talked to me about was when he turned 
63. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 38,11. 12-p. 39,1. 1 (emphasis added). 
Q: So you were anticipating that he would be retiring seven or 
eight years from the time youjoined? 
A: Per him, yes. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 39, 11.6-8 (emphasis added). 
Q: By my question I was trying to get at earlier when we got 
offthis subject is from the time you joined Thomas Motors, 
did the deal change? Was there new agreements reached? 
Or was it the same agreement you felt like was already in 
place? 
A: ... I mean, as far as I knew, throughout the duration of the 
time, that however he - and it was his verbiage and his 
terminology and his wording, that when he retired, that the 
dealership business would be mine. And then if 1 wanted to 
pass it down to my kids, I could. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 63, 11.4-16 (emphasis added)~ 
A: Monte, Jan, Penny, yes, all the ones I spoke to. I didn't 
speak to every single one of them, but they did confirm 
they had a meeting in the showroom on that day, which 
again, was to resell to me to believe in the dream again that 
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at the end of - when he retired, that the place would be 
mine, that I would have the dealership and then I would 
take it on. And if I wanted to pass it on to my kids and so 
forth. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 86, ll. 7-14 (emphasis added). 
A: But when he retired, I took it as I would have the dealership 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 88, ll. 6-7 (emphasis added). 
A: Before this got started, when he initially brought me over to 
[sic] Lanny Berg ... He always said he had it worked out, 
that it would be mine when he retired. 
Q: And that was going to happen at 63, you understood? 
A: That was the number he always told me. 
AjJidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 180, II. 16- 23 (emphasis added). 
In Paragraph 8 of his Verified Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
Defendant Ronald O. Thomas was inexperienced in operating a 
new car operation and sought the advice and assistance of Plaintiff, 
proposing that if Plaintiff would leave Lanny Berg Chevrolet and 
manage and operate the new dealership, at a greatly reduced salary, 
he would give the proposed dealership to Plaintiff when he turned 
age 62 or 63. 
The above-cited excerpts from the Plaintiffs deposition and Verified Complaint, show the 
Plaintiff has consistently maintained his father, Defendant Ron Thomas, promised to give the 
Plainuif Thomas Motors, Inc. when Ron Thomas retired and that age 63 was simply the time 
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Ron Thomas stated he anticipated retiring. In other words, in both the Plaintiffs affidavit and 
deposition he has testified his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. would occur upon the event of his 
father's retirement, not specifically upon his father's turning age 63. Clearly, the Plaintiffs 
affidavit testimony concerning the time at which his father had agreed to give him Thomas 
Motors, Inc. does not directly contradict his prior deposition testimony and allegations in the 
verified complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony is not subject to being stricken 
under the sham affidavit rule. 
B. The Plaintiff's Affidavit Testimony Concerning the Parties' Agreement as to 
Payment for Thomas Motors, Inc. Does Not Contradict His Prior Deposition 
Testimony 
In the Drew Affidavit, the Plaintiff explains the parties' agreement was that in exchange 
for the Plaintiffs leaving his position with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and providing his efforts and 
experience in operating Thomas Motors, Ron Thomas would give the Plaintiff Thomas Motors, 
Inc. when he retired. In Paragraph 12, the Plaintiff further states that throughout the nearly nine 
and a half year period, from 1997, when Ron Thomas proposed the Plaintiff leave his 
employment and come work to establish Thomas Motors, Inc., up until March 2006, when Ron 
Thomas sold the business, Ron Thomas did not tell the Plaintiff he would have to pay a purchase 
price for the business. The Plaintiff then clarifies his deposition testimony concerning a monthly 
retirement payment in the amount of $3,000 to $5,000, which he agreed to provide to his parents 
after he had received the business from his father. As the Plaintiff explains, his receiving 
Thomas Motors, Inc. upon his father's retirement was not contingent upon his paying his parents 
the retirement income. 
The Defendants argue that in his deposition, the Plaintiff clearly and an un-equivocally 
testified his agreement with his father concerning the transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. included a 
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term whereby the Plaintiff would pay a purchase price for the business. However, a reading of 
all relevant portions of the deposition transcript establishes the Plaintiff s testimony concerning 
monthly payments to his parents after taking over Thomas Motors, Inc. is, at most, ambiguous as 
to whether the monthly retirement payments were actually a term of the parties' agreement for 
transferring the business. See Estate of Keeven, supra (holding because the plaintiffs deposition 
responses to questions regarding when he and the decedent began living together were vague and 
expressed uncertainty, the plaintiffs deposition statements were not directly contradicted by his 
subsequent specific affidavit statements and, therefore, could not properly be disregarded under 
the sham affidavit rule). 
In his deposition, the Plaintiff provided the following testimony with respect to the 
parties' agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. and with respect to the parties' 
discussions concerning retirement payments after the Plaintiff had obtained Thomas Motors, Inc. 
from his father: 
Q: So somewhere in the July or August time frame of 1997 is 
when you made the commitment; and sometime in the end 
of August, early September, or even August time frame is 
when you actually joined; is that fair to say? 
A: Correct. Yeah. I would think that's fair to say. 
Q: Okay. So before you made the commitment to come over, 
can you remember anything else about the discussions you 
had with your dad, again, that we haven't talked about so 
far? 
A: Other than that he said - he told me if I would commit to 
coming over, that upon his retirement, it would be my 
dealership. But that he would not- he was not going to 
buy it unless I committed that I was coming over ... 
Q: So you were anticipating that he would be retiring seven or 
eight years from the time you joined? 
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A: Per him, yes. 
Q: And at that point, you were anticipating that if you would 
commit to go there, that the dealership would be yours? 
A: Yes, per Ron. 
Q: I'm sorry? 
A: PerRon. 
Q: What do you mean "per Ron"? 
A: That is correct, yes. He said that is how it would happen .. 
Q: Now, you have filed a lawsuit here against your mom and 
dad alleging, in essence, that he had made a promise to you 
to give you the dealership, right? 
A: He had made a promise to me that upon his retirement, that 
the dealership would Be mine ... 
Q: ... What I'm hearing you say is your dad, you can 
specifically recall words to the Effect of, "Drew, if you 
come over, when I retire, the business will be yours," right? 
A: The dealership will be yours ... 
A: I believe we've talked about anything he has said through 
the years up to the date he sold it, that hang in there, stay in 
there, it's your place. I don't want the place. It's your 
place. 
Q: Okay. That's after you joined? 
A: Right. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drcl1 Thomas, p. 38, n. 6-20, p. 39, II. 6-17, p. 41, II. 11-15, p. 43, n. 1-5 (emphasis added). 
Q: By my question I was trying to get at earlier when we got 
off this subject is from the time you joined Thomas Motors, 
did the deal change? Was there new agreements reached? 
Or was it the same agreement you felt like was already in 
place? 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 8 
A: ... I mean, as far as I knew, throughout the duration of the 
time, that however he - and it was his verbiage and his 
terminology and his wording, that when he retired, that the 
dealership business would be mine. And then if I wanted to 
pass it down to my kids, I could. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 63,11.4-16 (emphasis added). 
A: Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I 
was going to get this place for free. That never crossed my 
mind that I'd ever get it for free. This place was - we came 
in together, him and I. He had the money. I had the - I 
believe the talent and the time and the tenacity to get in 
there and do whatever it took to make this place work. 
When and up to the time that he retires, I expected to cut 
him and her a check - and we talked about that too, that all 
I want is a modest check out of the place when mom and I 
retire. It don't take me much to live. I don't have to have a 
lot to live on, but I do want something out of the business. 
I had no problem with that. I expected to cut them f! 
retirement check. In fact, I would have been proud of and 
they could go do the traveling that she always talked about. 
I had no problem with that. 
Q: Any discussion relative to what the modest check would 
consist of, how much? 
A: The conversations I had - and it never was with my mom, 
but Ron and I - was between 3 and 5,000 bucks a month. It 
was never written in stone; it wasn't written down. But he 
said it doesn't take me much to live. 
Q: For how long? 
A: Until he died, and then until mom passed away. 
Q: So your expectation was that you would take over the 
dealership at or about the time he retired at 63, and you 
would in turn write a check for somewhere in the 
neighborhood of three to five a month for as log as they 
lived? 
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A: Yes. And again, when I say or someone says that oh, yeah 
when he retires he's going to give it to me, all I took that 
was it that's when I took all the reins, the financials, the 
checkbook, hiring and firing of people, the payroll, who 
gets paid what, how much, full control, and transferring the 
dealership to me. Not that they're, like, out of the picture 
gone, see you later, don't ever come by, don't stop by, 
don't call, don't write, no. That day would come when 
they both passed away. And then it would be completely 
done. But when he retired, I took it as I would have the 
dealership. I would cut them a retirement check, I would 
support my family, my brothers, and then move it on to the 
next generation in a logical manner. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p.86, l. 15 - p. 88,1. 9 (emphasis added). 
A: Before this got started, when he initially brought me over 
from Lanny Berg, we never discussed buying. But I never 
assumed I was going to get it for free. He always said he 
had it worked out, that it would be mine when he retired. 
Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of R. 
Drew Thomas, p. 180,11. 16-20 (emphasis added). 
The above-cited deposition excerpts clearly establish at the time the parties formed their 
agreement in 1997, the terms of the agreement were that the Plaintiff would leave his position 
with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and devote his time and efforts to operating Thomas Motors, Inc. 
and, in exchange, the Plaintiff would be given Thomas Motors, Inc. when Ron Thomas retired. 
No where in his deposition does the Plaintiff specifically testifY that the parties' agreement for 
transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. included a term whereby the Plaintiff would contribute his time 
and efforts to operate Thomas Motors, Inc. and pay a purchase price in exchange for receiving 
the business when Ron Thomas retired. Instead, the deposition testimony clearly establishes Ron 
Thomas offered to give the Plaintiff Thomas Motors, Inc. upon his retirement in exchange for the 
Plaintiff leaving his position at Lanny Berg and devoting his time and efforts to operating 
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Thomas Motors, Inc., and that was the offer the Plaintiff accepted. Therefore, for these reasons 
alone, the Plaintiff s deposition and affidavit testimony are consistent with respect to his 
statements that the parties' agreement did not include a term whereby the Plaintiff would be 
required to pay a purchase price for Thomas Motors, Inc. 
In the excerpts from page 86 at lines 15-21, the Plaintiff testified he never expected to get 
Thomas Motors, Inc. "for free" and then goes on to reiterate that when he and his father "came in 
together" the Plaintiff had "the talent and the time and the tenacity to get in there and do 
whatever it took to make this place work .. " This testimony was not given in response to a 
specific question asking the Plaintiff to list the terms of the parties' agreement or whether those 
terms included the Plaintiff s paying a purchase price. Thus, the Plaintiff s statement that he did 
not expect to get Thomas Motors, Inc. for free does not clearly refer to a purchase price. The 
statement could reasonably be read to mean pursuant to the parties' agreement, he expected to 
contribute his time and efforts in exchange for receiving the business, rather than simply 
expecting to receive the business as a gift. Furthermore, in the excerpts on page 87, line 21 -
page 88, line 1 and page 88, lines 6-7, of his deposition, the Plaintiff re-iterates his understanding 
that he would receive Thomas Motors, Inc. upon the event of his father's retirement. 
In the excerpts on page 86 at lines 22-24, the Plaintiff testifies that after his father retired, 
he expected to cut his parents a retirement check and that the subject he and Ron Thomas had 
discussed the payment of a retirement check "too." Notably, during the discussion concerning 
the retirement check, the Plaintiff does not refer to the check as a purchase price, but simply as a 
means to support his family. Moreover. on page 88 at lines 7-8, the Plaintiff speaks of the 
payment of the retirement as something occurring separate from and subsequent to the events 
upon which his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. would be contingent. Therefore, when read in the 
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context of all the Plaintiffs deposition testimony concerning fonnation of the parties' agreement 
and the entire discussion involving the retirement check on pages 86-88, the Plaintiffs 
statements concerning payment of the retirement check can reasonably be understood to mean 
the parties' discussions relating to the check were subsequent and unrelated to the discussions in 
which the parties fonned their oral agreement whereby the Plaintiff was to receive Thomas 
Motors, Inc. after Ron Thomas retired. At most, the Plaintiff s deposition testimony is 
ambiguous as to whether he considered the parties' agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors, 
Inc. to include his agreement to pay his parents a monthly retirement check. 
For these reasons, the Plaintiffs affidavit testimony stating the parties' agreement did not 
include a purchase price and his receiving Thomas Motors, Inc. was not contingent upon his 
agreeing to pay his parents a retirement check is consistent with his prior deposition testimony 
and, therefore, Paragraph 12 of the Plaintiffs affidavit does not directly contradict his deposition 
testimony and is not subject to being stricken under the sham affidavit rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of R. 
Drew Thomas In Opposition to Summary Judgment should be denied. 
DA TED this 0< I:J day of September, 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
BY:~ tfI·~ 
Sarah H. Arnett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
REPLY RE: PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. 
56(1) MOTION 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby files his Reply Re: Plaintiff's IR.CP. 56(/) Motion. 
000680 
REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S LR.C.P. 56(t) MOTION - I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this case on July 19,2007, and 
the hearing on the motion was originally set for September 27, 2007. On August 13, 2007, the 
Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) asking the court to continue the hearing on 
Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment for ninety days in order to pennit the Plaintiff 
additional time to complete discovery as to matters which relate directly to issues raised by the 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On August 20, 2007, the Defendants filed 
Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's J.R.C.P. 56(/) Motion. 
The hearing on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment has been continued twice, 
once by the court and a second time pursuant to the parties' stipulation, and is presently set for 
October 11, 2007. Continuation of the hearing on summary judgment has allowed the Plaintiff 
additional time to take the deposition of Shirley Youngstrom and to submit excerpts of 
Mrs. Youngstrom's deposition to the court in response to the motion. Consequently, the 
opportunity to take Mrs. Youngstrom's deposition is no longer being offered as one of the basis 
for the Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion. As discussed below, however, the Plaintiff continues to 
seek a continuance of the summary judgment hearing on other basis cited in the Plaintiff s Rule 
56(f) Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant Ron Thomas and 
Acquisition of Requested Documents from the Defendants 
The Plaintiff has asked the court for additional time to respond to summary judgment in 
order to obtain and review documents sought in the Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Deposition of 
Ronald 0. Thomas--Duces Tecum Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) and, if 
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necessary, to continue the deposition of Defendant Ron Thomas with respect to documents 
obtained. The Defendants object to the court's granting an extension on this basis for two 
reasons: 1) the Defendants objected to providing the documents sought in the notice of 
deposition duces tecum, and 2) the documents sought are not relevant to the issues addressed on 
summary judgment. Both of the Defendants' reasons should be disregarded. 
First, the Defendants' objections to the notice of deposition duces tecum are not well 
founded. Contrary to the Defendants' assertions the Plaintiff had not previously requested many 
of the documents requested in the notice duces tecum, and, under the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Plaintiff was entitled to obtain the requested documents from Defendant Ronald 
O. Thomas pursuant to a notice of deposition duces tecum. Moreover, the Defendants failed to 
state specifically their objections to each of the items requested. Instead, they simply stated 
generally that all of the documents requested were "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not 
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See Defendants} Memorandum In 
Opposition to Plaintiff's [R.CP. 56(/) Motion, Exhibit A. 
Secondly, the Defendants argue "at least most" of the documents sought by the Plaintiff 
from the Defendants are unrelated to the issues being addressed in the summary judgment 
proceedings. That determination is, however, for the Plaintiff to make after he has had an 
opportunity to review the requested documents and, if necessary, to depose Defendant Ron 
Thomas concerning the documents. Additionally, the documents requested are necessary to the 
Plaintiffs retained expert's evaluations of the Plaintiffs economic damages under his breach of 
cuntract claims and of the equitable relief the Plaintiff is requesting under his quasi contract 
claim. The Defendants have argued they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs 
claim for equitable relief because the Plaintiff has not established he conferred a benefit upon the 
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Defendants. See Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. 
Therefore, any documents pertaining to the valuation of benefit(s) conferred upon the 
Defendants, including the value of the Plaintiff s services and the value of Thomas Motors, Inc, 
itself, are unquestionably relevant to the issues being addressed on summary judgment. 
Recognizing there are an exceptionally large number of documents in the Defendants'· 
possession pertaining to the issues in this case, the Plaintiff is attempting to narrow the scope of 
their document requests in order to make production less cumbersome for the Defendants and to 
ensure the Plaintiff will be able to obtain and review the documents more efficiently. See Notice 
of Service ------, which has been filed contemporaneously herewith. Nevertheless, even 
assuming the parties are able to resolve their disputes regarding the Defendants' production of 
documents without court involvement, the Plaintiff and his expert will still require sufficient time 
to receive the documents pursuant to the Plaintiff s discovery requests, review the documents, 
and, if necessary, continue Ron Thomas's deposition in order to question him concerning the 
documents. 
2. The Plaintiff Should be Permitted An Opportunity to Submit An Expert 
Report In Opposition to Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiff has asked the court for additional time to respond to summary judgment in 
order to obtain and file a report to be provided by his retained expert from the GEC Group. The 
GEC Group has assigned Mr. Craig Clarke, CPA, CFE Consultant, to this case, and the Plaintiff 
has now formally disclosed Mr. Clarke as an expert. The Defendants object to the court's 
granting an extension to allow filing of an expert report based upon "lack of timeliness or 
diligence" and their assertion the analysis the Plaintiff s expert is expected to perform will "have 
absolutely nothing to do with any issue presented on summary judgment." Once again, the court 
should disregard the Defendants' objections. 
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As explained in the Plaintiffs expert disclosure, Mr. Clarke's analysis will address both 
the amount of the Plaintiff s breach of contract damages and the amount of equitable relief the 
Plaintiff is seeking for his quasi contract claim, including the market value of services provided 
by the Plaintiff while he was operating Thomas Motors, Inc. compared to the amount of 
compensation received and a valuation of the business the Plaintiff worked to establish. In their 
summary judgment motion, the Defendants are seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's quasi contract 
claim based upon an argument the Plaintiff did not confer any benefit upon the Defendants for 
which he was not compensated. Therefore, it is unclear why the Defendants are now attempting 
to assert the Plaintiff's expert's analysis will not be relevant to the issues being addressed on 
summary judgment. Clearly, Mr. Clarke's analysis will be relevant to the issues being addressed 
on summary judgment. 
The Defendants' assertion as to "lack of timeliness and diligence" is unwarranted. A trial 
date has not been set in this case and, therefore, the court has not set discovery cut-off and expert 
;~lsclosures deadlines. Thus, there will be absolutely no prejudice, or "sanction," imposed upon 
the Defendants by allowing the Plaintiff additional time to respond to summary judgment so that 
his expert can complete a report. The Defendants' assertion as to lack of diligence is also unfair 
because this case has not progressed at an unusually slow pace for a case of this nature. 
3. Testing of the Written Contract Documents 
As the court is well aware, the legal effect of documents containing written contracts 
between the parties has been a hotly contested issue in this case. Primarily, the parties dispute 
whether the Defendants executed the contracts in September of 2000~ when the documents were 
presented to both parties for signature, and if so, whether the Plaintiff knew the documents had 
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been signed by the Defendants, or whether the Defendants actually signed the documents after 
the Plaintiff filed suit in this case. 
The Defendants have been arguing vigorously that there was no contract between the 
parties or, alternatively, if the written contracts were in effect as of September 2000, the Plaintiff 
cannot possibly sustain a breach of contract claim based upon those written agreements because 
he himself took no steps to perform under the agreements. In their response to the Plaintiffs 
Rule 56(f) motion, the Defendants for the first time clearly announce they concede there is an 
issue of fact as to when the Defendants executed the written contracts (contrary to the 
Defendants' accusation, up to this point, they have not clearly articulated their concession that a 
factual issue exists). 
The Defendants persist, however, in arguing that the question as to whether or not the 
Defendants signed the written agreements in September of 2000 is irrelevant to any of the issues 
raised on summary judgment. In response to this argument, the Plaintiff now asserts the 
Defendants are missing the point. Given the Defendants have presented evidence that they did in 
fact sign the written agreements during September of 2000, as consistently claimed by Ron 
Thomas, and the Plaintiffs have presented evidence the Defendants informed the Plaintiff they 
declined to sign the contract, there are material questions as to whether the written contracts 
constitute the agreement between the parties and as to whether the Defendants prevented the 
Plaintiff s performance by leading him to believe they had declined to enter the written 
agreements and then breached those agreements by selling Thomas Motors, Inc. without giving 
the Plaintiff a chance to perform. 
Obviously, for these reasons, and contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the question as 
to whether the Plaintiff s alternative claim for breach of contract should be dismissed does not 
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turn solely upon whether the Plaintiff took steps to perfonn tenns contained in the written 
agreements, which his father led him to believe had been rejected and left unsigned by the 
Defendants. Therefore, the question as to when the Defendants executed the written contracts is 
relevant to the issues being addressed on summary judgment, and the Plaintiff should be 
pennitted to obtain forensic test results concerning the Defendants' signatures before the court 
decides the Defendants' motion as to the Plaintiffs claim for breach of written contract. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously set forth in the Plaintiff's IR.CP. 56(/) Motion, and those set 
forth herein, the Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion should be granted. 
DATEDthis~ day of September, 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By: ~ d1-~rJ 
Sa'rah H. Arnett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S I.R.c.P. 56(f) MOTION - 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of September, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 








Facsimile No. 208-365-4196 
WifITEPETERSON, P.A. 
lmhlW:\Work\T\Thomas, R Drew 2197l\Thomas Motors, Inc.()OO\Pleadings\Reply to 56(t) Mot. DOC 
REPL Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S LR.C.P. 56(f) MOTION - 8 
OOOGSi 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
Sarah H. Amett 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 




Attorneys for Plaintiff 
p.e: 
~ I~" ~ lL ~ [D)_PM 
SEP 2 1 2007 
.
/ ,(h. ., sHEUt ~N~ elf. RK 
:x!o.l~~cPEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
SlATE OF IDAHO ) 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
J. ROBIN WILDE IN OPPOSITION 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
J. ROBIN WILDE, being duly swom upon oath, deposes and says: 
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1. I make this affidavit based upon personal knowledge of the matters sd Limh 
herein. 
2. I have reviewed the Second Ajjidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas, which was filed in the 
above-entitled matter, and the exhibits thereto. 
3. As I explained in my first affidavit filed in the above-entitled matter in opposition 
to summary judgment, from about 1994 until 2004, I performed accounting and 
tax services for the above-named Defendant, Ron Thomas and all of his business 
entities including Lot-of-Cars, Inc. and Thomas Motors, Inc. These two 
businesses were separate at their inception but were subsequently consolidated 
under Thomas Motors, Inc. 
4. In his second affidavit, Ron Thomas states he made "loans" to Thomas Motors, 
Inc. totaling $469,778.92, and that the checks attached as Exhibit "E" to the 
second affidavit are "examples" of said loans. The checks contained in Exhibit E 
arc dated from 2001 through 2006. While these checks were notated "loans" by 
Thomas, they were never fOlmaHzed with promissory notes nor were they treated 
as loans [or accounting purposes. In order to account for a loan to a corporation 
there must be a promissory note evidencing the loan and specifically setting fonh 
the principal amount of the loan, the interest rate, and the terms for repayment. I 
was never provided with any promissory notes for loans made to Thomas Motors, 
Inc. by Ron Thomas. Absent the required documents, they were treated as capitar 
transactions. While the total of these capital infusions are substantial, the LOtal 
capital extracted over the same time period would, in all likelihood, offset that 
amount. From my observation, monies Ron Thomas placed into the businc~s's 
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account f)'om his personal checking account, or from the Ronald O. Thomas 
Renials checking account, were monies he had previously taken out of Thomas 
Motors, [nco as "rent" and "profit distributions." Ron Thomas regularly paid 
himself $12,000 to $15,000 per month from the business which generally was 
split equally between "rent" and "profit distribution." These monies were used 
for a variety of purposes unrelated to the operational needs of Thomas Motors, 
Inc. Mr. Thomas rarely put money back into Thomas Motors unless forced to do 
so in order to satisfy banking requirements. 
5. Throughout the years I performed accounting services for Thomas Motors, Inc., 
the business had sufficient monthly income to cover its expenses. The reason 
Thomas Motors, Inc. fell behind on paying its flooring lines and experienced 
"cash flow" problems was because Ron Thomas insisted on taking money from 
the business even when payments needed to be made. 
6. With regard to the Defendants' sale of real properties and the Thomas Motors, 
Inc. business to the Bill Buckner investment group, the allocations of the portions 
of the total purchase price attributable to the real properties and to the business 
should be reflected in the tux returns and related documents prepared for 2006. 
The sales price is required to be allocated between business assets including real 
property, fixed assets, and intangibles. There are a variety of methods used to 
accomplish this but it typically involves negotiation between the buyer 2nd seller 
so as to maximize tax benefits to each party. TIle seller would typically want a 
sales price allocation skewed in favor of real and intangible property in order to 
receive preferential "capital gain" tax treatment while the buyer would prefer an 




allocation weighted in favor of fixed assets so as to maximize depreciation 
deductions. Both of these considerations operate within the bounds oj' "fair 
value" which is a subjective in nature but required by the IRS. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED this __ day of September, 2007. 
J. Robin Wilde 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by J. Robin Wilde this .!.Lei day of 
September, 2007. 
(SEAL) 
IEVERl Y J. HANEY 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
t 
p. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this,?() Y day of September, 2007, I caused Lo be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Second Affidavit of J. Rob Wilde In Opposition to Summary 
Judgment by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attomey at Law 
109 N.llays 
P.O. Box 188 
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RONALD O. mOMAs. ELAINE K. ) 
mOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC •• an ) 
Idaho Corporation. } 
Defendants. 
-----------------------------
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss.. 
County of Canyon ) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 1006-492 
AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH H. 
ARNETT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOnON TO COMPEL 
SARAH H. ARNElT, being first duly swom, deposes and says as follows: 
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1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and make 
this affidavit based upon personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. The Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to obtain the following original documents 
from the Defendants without court involvement: 1) Agreement for Purchase and Sale of 
Business Assets. 2) Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement, and 3) Management 
Contract. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A'" and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct 
copy of my letter to Defendants' counsel, which is dated September 20. 2007~ and in 
which I request the Defendants provide the original documents referenced in paragraph 2 
above. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "8" and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct 
copy of the Defendants' counsel's response to my September 20, 2001 letter, which is 
dated September 21.2001. 
S. The Plaintiff bas provided the Defendants with the name and business address of the 
Plaintiff's document expert, Mr. Speckin, who is a preeminent expert in his field. See 
Exhibit A attached hereto. What tests and analysis will be conducted by Mr. Speckin is a 
matter for him. to decide. He and his staff will need to examine the documents before he 
determines what tests he will pcrfo~ and he may decide to perfonn additional tests after 
analyzing the results of initial tests. The Plaintiff can, however. assure the Defendants 
and the court that the testing will be strictly non-destructive and Mr. Specking will use 
the utmost care to preserve the documents. Obviously) testing of the original documents 
will have to be conducted at Mr. Specldn's laboratory facilities. 
FURTIIER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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DAlED this ~}\.day of September, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Sarah H. Arnett this .1:1 day of 
September,2oo7. 
actUAL- rh ,t+~D 
(SEAL) Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 0/- iq.., J.oI? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of September, 2007. I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following; 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &, JANIS 
537 W . .Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, 10 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
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J!MJJL: sameu@whitopel<:r.!On.COOI 
September 20, 2007 
VIA FA.CSIMILE TRANSMISSION (2'8) 342-2'11. 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWOaTIJ, LEZAMIZ &. JANIS, CHID. 
537 W_ Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Re: ThollUlS v. Thomas 
Dear Mr. Janis: 
( ....... 
~ i 
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The purpose of this letter is to renew our request that your client provide us with the 
original Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets. Commercial Lease and Purchase 
Agreement, and Management Contract so those documents can be submitted to OUT document 
expert. Speckin Forensic Laboratories, in Okemos~ Micbi~ for non-destructive forensic testing 
and/or examination. 
Rules 26(b) and 34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide a party may obtain 
from another party for purposes of testing a tangible things~ which constitute or contain 
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b). In the context of Rule 34(a). "any tangible things" 
obviously includes docwnents. Thus, when the. time at which a document w~ created or at 
which text, handwriting. or a signature was placed on a document is relevant to a claim or 
defense involved in a pending action, a party may test the document in order to discover when 
the document was created. or when a signature was placed on the document. etc. I.R.C.P.26(b), 
34(a); see Clark v. Vega Wholesale. 181 F.R.O. 470, 471-72 (1998) (citing SA C. Wright & A. 
Aliller Federal Practice and Procedure § 2202); (" 'The purpose of Rule 34 [F.R.C.P.) is to 
make relevant and nonprivileged documents and objects in the posSession of one party available 
to the otherh'); Diepenhorsl v. City of Battle Creek, F. Supp_ 2d. 2006 WL 1851243 *1-*2 
(W.O. Mich. 2006) (applying Rules 26 and 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
allowing defendant in an employment discrimination case to obtain plaintiffs original joumals, 
notes. calendars. and other documents for non-destructive forensic testing without requiring the 
plaintiff's expert be allowed to be present during resting); Rom v. RON, 118 Idaho 689,692.800 
Exhibit "A" 
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P.2d 85, 88 (1990) ("It is well established that our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure is presumably with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by the federal courtsj; Johnson v. Toler, 485 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. 1986) 
(applying Rules 26{a),(b) and 34(a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Proced~ which are identical 
to Rules 26(a),(b) and 34(a} of the Idaho Rules of Civil ~ and holding plaintiff was 
entitled to obtain an original medical record from defendant physician for examination by 
plaintitrs documents expert to det.enniJle the date on which an entry critical to the physician's 
defense was written in the record). 
F1.Ilthennore, the purpose of discovery procedures provided under the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure is to ensure a trial is an exercise in ascertaining the truth, a "~fair contest with the 
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent.'" See Johnson, sup1'a (citing u.s. v. 
Procter and Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 6n. 78 8. Ct.. 983 (1958) and Hickman v. Taylor. 329 U.S. 
495> 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947»; &Be aUo 23 Am. Jur. Depositions and Discovery § 1 C'The purpose of 
discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation and enable the parties to obtain evidence 
necessaJY to evaluate and resolve their dispute"). 
Throughout the proceedinp in our client's lawsuit, a critical issue bas been whether the 
Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets, Commercial Lease and Purchase 
Agreemeot" and Management Conttact were ill fact the controlling agreements between the 
parties, which superseded any of the parties' print oral agreements. As the reoord now before the 
court on your clients' pending motion for sum.mary judgment clearly establishes, the question as 
to the effect of the written agreements exists because there is a material issue of fact as to 
wbether your clients executed the agreements in September of 2000, at the time Drew Thomas 
sigMd the agreements.. or whether your clients' signatures were written sometime long after 
September of 2000. In other wordss the date on which your clients executed the written 
agn:ements is critical in this lawsuit. (It is also im.pottant: to consider that because factual issues 
exist as to when the Defendants executed the agreements and whether they misled the Plaintiff 
into believing they had declined to sign the ~ the Defendants are not entitled to 
su.nmuu:y judgment on the Plaintiff's breoach of contract claim concerning the written 
agreements). Therefore, the results from ink datin& or other forensic tests perfonned to 
determine the date of the Defendants' signatures are undeniably relevant to the issues in this 
case. Non-destruetive forensic testing will be the most effective means, and maybe the only 
means, of determining when the Defendants signed the written documents. 
Mr. Speckin of Speckin Forensic Laboratories is a pre-eminent document expert in the 
nation which I am sure you will be able to veritY through your own inquiries. White Peterson 
has employed Mr. Specldn to perfonn non-dest:ructive document testing in other cases, and our 
attorneys have visited his facilities. In this case, we can assure you. wben Mr. S~kin examines 
the original written agreements he will apply strictly non-destructive testing methods and will 
ca.refuUy preserve the integrity of the documents. 
Of. course. we are willing to work with you and your clients in order to resolve any 
reasonable concerns regarding transmitting the original documents to our expert. However, aside 
from any minor logistical concerns, which the parties can easily resolve, there is simpJy no 
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reason which would warrant the court's precluding our client from conducting full discovery 
with respect to the written agreements. Your clients ate simply IlDt entitled to preclude discovery 
of the truth concerning the effect of the written agreements. 
If the parties are unable to reach a stipulation concerning testing of the original written 
agreements by Wednesday. September 27. 2007~ we ~ill tile a second. motion to compel to 
compel production of the original documents. which will be heard and decided in conjunction 
with the Plaintiff's Rule 56(1) motion and your clients' summary judgment motion. 
I look forward to discussing this matter with you in order to arrive at a satisfactory 
resolution without court involvement. 
DPWIImh 
c: H. Ronald Bjorkman (via facsimile) 
R Drew Thomas 
Best regards. 
ImbIW:\Woa'k\1\ThoanlIIl, R Om¥ 2197l\Thomas Motors, 1JIc.~/IRi$.1tr09-204l.doc 
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Sarah H. Amett 
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Re: Thom.as v. Thomas 
HL&J File No. 06-2-023 
Dear Ms. Arnett: 
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TWIN FALLS OFFICE 
(208) 734·7510 
Toll Free: (877) 343·7510 
Fax: (208) 734·4115 
133 Shoshone Street North 
P. O. Box 389 
Twin Falls, IP 8330;H1389 
John C. H~pwor[h 
John T. J.<:zamiz 
Robyn M. Brody 
Benjamin r Cluff 
Jocl A. Beck 
We are in receipt of your letter dated September 20,2007. In your letter, you indicate 
you want Mr. Speckin to test the document, and ensure us that the testing win be non-destructive. 
I appreciate that you have now identified who the expert will be, but J think I am understandably 
concerned what the testin& will entail. Please explain, with specificity, what testing Mr. Speckin 
intends to conduct on this original document. 
Your letter also seems to presume that the document will have to be delivered to Mr. 
Speckin. We have previously invjted you to inspect the document at Ron Bjorkman's office, and 
have invited you to brin& an expert to inspect the document at Mr. Bjorkman's office. As long as 
you identify the testing which will be conducted, and agree if the document's condition is altered in 
any way the expert's opinion will be excluded, we continue to extend that open invitation to have 
your expel1 inspect and test the document at !vir. Bjorkman's oft ice. You have not explained why 
the document must be delivered to Mr. Speckin, wherever he may be. Please explain, in detail, why 
you believe this original document must leave our control. 
Last, you assert that this document and the day it was signed has a bearing on the 
summary judgment motion. J disagree. Your client claims the document was never signed and was 
not in full force and affect. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, and the arguments 
made in the summary judgment motion, we accept your client's position to be true. Therefore, I do 
not have any idea how testing of the document has a bearing on the summary judgment motion. 
Please explain this thought process. 
Reply to Boise office Exhbit "B"O 0 0 G 9 'oJ 
Sarah H. Arnett 
WHITE PETERSON 
September 21. 2007 
Page 2 
FAX: 
Thank you tor your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &. JANIS 
JWKJb~ 
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William A. Morrow 
Sarah 11. Arnett 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
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5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
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Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 




Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 





CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR 
TESTING 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, pursuant to Rules 26, 
34, and 37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby Jiles Plainl(f}"s Renewed MoJion 10 
('om pel Original Documenl.\· .fiJr In:;peclion. This motion is suppurted by the A.ffidavil (?i Sarah 
H. Arnell In Support of Molion 10 Compel ("Arnett Ate'), th~ record befor~ th~ court on the-
Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment, and the arguments submitted by the 
ttJjAM 
PI.AINTlFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - I 000701 
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Plaintiff in support of Plaintitl"s pending Plaintiff's IRC.P. 56(/) Motion and in the Reply Re: 
Plaintiff's I. R. c.P. 56(j) Molion. 
MOTION 
INTRODUCTION 
In this case, the Plainlitr has brought two breach of contract claims against the 
Defendants. The first breach of contract claim concerns an oral agreement betweon the Plaintiff 
and the Defendants whereby the Defendants agreed to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to the 
Plainlilr upon Ron Thomas's retirement in exchange tbr the PlaintitT leaving a sales manager 
position with Lanny Berg Chevrolet and devoting his time, otiorts, and experience to building 
and operating Thomas Motors, Inc. 
The Plaintiff has also brought an alternative breach of contract claim based upon three 
written agreements involving the Defendants' transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc business and 
property to the Plaintiff. These written agreements, which were prepared sometime during the 
period from late August to early September of 2000, are entitled "Agreement for Purchase and 
Sale of Business Assets," "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and "Management 
Contract." See Affidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas In Support (~f Defendant's Motion lor Summary 
Judgment, Exhibits A, S, C. As the record on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
clearly establishes, the legal effect of these documents is a material issue with respect to the 
Plaintitl"s breach of contract claims. 
The principal question is whether the written agreements were executed by both parties 
during September of 2000 and, as the Defendants have continuously asserted, thereafter be.came 
the controlling agreements between the parties concerning transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the 
Plaintiff. It is undisputed that the documents were presented to and signed by the Plaintiff on 
PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOnON TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING· 2 
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September 19, 2000. However, the record on summary judgment clearly shows there are 
material factual disputes as to 1) whether the Defendants executed the agreements in September 
of 2000, at the time the documents were presented to both parties for signature, and 2) if so, 
whether the PlajntitI was unaware the Defendants had signed the agreements in September 2000 
because the Defendants mislead the Plaintiff into believing (hey had declined to enter the written 
agreements, thereby preventing the Plaintiff's performance of the agreements, or 3) whether the 
Defendants actually signed the documents after the Plaintiff filed suit in this case in an attempt to 
strengthen their position in this litigation. Therefore, evidence concerning when the Defendants 
signed the contracts is clearly relevant to the Plaintiffs breac.:h of contract claims. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff has also brought a fraud claim in this case. Evidence showing 
the Defendants signed the written agreements in September of 2000 and then led the Plaintiff to 
helieve they had declined to do so because they were going to proceed with honoring the oral 
agreement for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. is certainly relevant t() the Plaintiff's fraud claim. 
Such evidence is circumstantial evidence that the Defendants intentjonally induced the Plaintiff 
to continue expending time and efforts in operating Thomas Motors, Inc. by re-assuring him they 
would honor their oral promises to give him Thomas Motors, Inc. upon Ron Thomas's 
retirement, when, in fact, they did not intend to honor their oral promises and intended to use the 
written contract against the Plaintiff if he ever attempted tu recover on the oral contract. On the 
other hand, evidence showing the Defendants did not in fact sign the agreement until at or near 
the time the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit would undeniably be relevant to the question of the 
Defendants' credibility in this case. 
For these reasons, the results of non-destructive torensic testing of the original contract 
documents conducted in order to determine the date of the Defendants' signalllfes will be 
PLAINTiff'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS fOR TESTING· 3 
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relevant evidence in this lawsuit. Tn fact, non-destructive torensic testing is likely the only 
independent evidence which can corroborate the testimony of the parties and non-party witnesses 
concerning when the Detendants signed the documents. Therefore, as discussed below, under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff is clearly entitled to obtain the original contract 
documents for such testing. 
The Plaintiff has renewed his efforts to obtain the original contract documents from the 
Defendants in order to submit the documents to a document expert fbr non-destructive forensic 
testing and analysis to determine the date of the Defendants' signatures. See Arnett All, Exhibit 
A. The Defendants, however, continue to insist that 1) the Plaintiff provides details as to what 
tests his document expert will conduct and 2) the testing be conducted in the Emmet, Idaho, 
offices of the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Bjorkman. See Arnett Atl, Exhibit B. For the reasons 
discussed below, however. there is no basis whatsoever either to preclude the Plaintiff from 
conducting non-destructive forensic testing on the original contract documents or to dictate what 
non-destructive testing can be performed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Tbe Plaintiff'is Entitled to Obtain the Original Agreements for Non-Destructive 
Forensic Testing 
It is important to remember that the purpose of discovery procedures provided under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure litigation is an exercise in ascertaining the truth, a 
'" tair contest with the basic issues and Jacts disclosed to the fullest possible extent. '" See US, v. 
f'iocler and Gamb/e Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S. Ct. 983 (1958) and Hickman v. Tay/or, 329 
U.s. 495. S07 67 S. C't. 38S (t 947); see also 23 Am. JUT. Depositions and Discovery § 1 ("The 
purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation and enable the parties to obtain 
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evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute").} To further this purpose, Rule 
26(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides parties "may obtain discovery on W 
matter, not privileged. which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other party ... " I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) (emphasis 
added). Under Rule 34(a) a party may test "any tangible things ... which constitute matters 
within the scope of Rule 26(b)" and which are in possession or control of another party. I.R.C.P. 
34(a). As used in Rule 34(a) the unqualified teml '>any tangible things" clearly includes 
documents. 
Thus, when the time at which a document was created nr at which text. handwriting, or a 
signature was placed on a document is relevant to a claim or defense involved in a pending 
lawsuit, a party may test the document in order to discover when the document was created, or 
when a sjgnature was placed on the document, etc. I.R.C.P. 26(b), 34(a); see C'!ark v. Vega 
Wholesale, 181 F.R.D. 470,471-72 (1998) (citing 8A C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2202); (" 'The purpose of Rule 34 IF.R.C.P.] is to make relevant and non-
privileged documents and objects in the possession of one party available to the other"'); 
Diepenhorst v. City t?f Bailie Creek, F. Supp. 2d, 2006 WI, 1851243 * 1-*2 (W.O.Mich. 2006) 
(applying Rules 26 and 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and allowing defendant in 
an employment discrimination case to obtain plaintiff's original journals, notes, calendars, and 
other documents for non-destructive forensic testing without requiring the plaintiffs expert be 
I As the U.S. Supreme Court explained concerning the discovery process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and state discovery rules modeled upon the Federal Rules: 
. . . the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the 
time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying 
his opponent's case. Mytual knowledge of all the relevant facts gAthered by both PaDies is essential to 
pmp@r litigation. To that end, ~iJher party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he: has in his 
possession. 
Hickman. supra at 392 (emphasis added). 
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allowed to be present during testing); Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 P.2d 85, 88 (1990) 
("It is well established that our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is presumably 
with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by 
thtdederal courts"); Johnson v. Toler. 485 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. J 986) (applying Rules 26(a),(b) and 
34{a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which are identical to Rules 26(a),(b) and 34(a) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and holding plaintiff was entitled to obtain an original 
medical record from detendant physician for examination by plaintiff's documents expert to 
determine the date on which an entry critical to the physician's defense was written in the 
record). 
As discussed above in the Introduction. the atlidavits submitted in support of and in 
opposition to the Defendants' motion tor summary judgment clearJy establish there is a material 
factual dispute as to whether the Defendants executed the written agreements at issue in this case 
during September 2000 or whether they executed the documents after the PlaintitT HIed suit in 
order to advance fraudulently the Defendants' position in this litigation. Therefore, any evidence 
tending (0 establish the date of the Defendants' signatures is relevant to the Plaintiff's breach of 
contract and fraud claims and to the question of the Defendants' credibility generally. 
For these reasons, under Rules 26(b) and 34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
PlaintiJT is entitled to obtain the original documents containing the "Agreement for Purchase and 
Sale of Business Assets," the "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and the 
"Management Contract" from the Defendants for purposes of conducting non-destructive 
forensic testing and expert analysis of the documents in order to determine the date of 
Detendants' signatures. 
PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOT10N 'f0 COMPEL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - 6 
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B. There is No Basis Upon Which to Preclude the Plaintiff From Obtaining the 
Original Doeuments 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may limit discovery by one party 
only when the party opposing the discovery establishes the party conducting discovery is either 
1) attempting to obtain intbnnation not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence or 2) the infonnation sought is privileged or 3) there is good cause to limit 
discovery in order to protect the opposing party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4),26(c). 
In this case, the Defendants have neither asserted any of the three bases for precluding the 
Plaintiff from conducting tull discovery concerning the original contract documents nor will they 
be able to establish the Plaintiff must be precluded from obtaining the documents for testing. See 
Arnett Aff., Exhibit B. The Defendants are simply unreasonably resisting turning over the 
original documents and attempting to complicate the issues in order to avoid discovery of the 
truth (unfortUnately, "embarrassment" as it is used in Rule 26(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not apply to instances where a party is simply afraid of being exposed as a 
fraud). This is exactly the kind of obstructive conduct during discovery which the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure are intended to prohibit. For these reasons, there is no reason warranting the 
court's denying the Plaintiff an opportunity to have the original contract documents tested and 
analyzed. 
C. The Defendants Cannot Dictate the Plaintiff's Methods of Discovery 
As discussed above, Rule 34(a) of the Idaho Ruks of Civil Procedure permits a party 
conducting discovery to test documents. Under the rules governing discovery and authority 
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interpreting those rules, the party's discovery may proceed unfettered by the court unless a basis 
for limiting discovery is established under Rule 26. 
In this case, the Plaintiff wants to submit the original contract documents to his document 
expert for testing and analysis to determine the date of the Defendants' signatures. The Plaintiff 
has provided the name and address of the expert to the De1tmdants. &e Arnett Aft', The Plaintiff 
can assure the Defendants and the court that the testing will be non-destructive. See Arnett AfT. 
Otherwise, the manner in which the tests and analysis will be conducted is a matter for the 
Plaintiffs expert to decide. The expert will need to examine the documents before he detern1ines 
whal tests he will perform, and he may decide to perform additional tests after analyzing the 
results of initial tests. See Arnett Aff There is simply no basis under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure for requiring the Plaintiff to detail the exact methods of testing which wiU be 
conducted on the documents or lO limit the non-destructive testing in any way. 
Another point which should be obvious to the Defendants, despite their attempts to feign 
ignorance, is that forensic testing in the twenty-tirst century generally takes place in laboratories 
at experts' facilities, where the tosting equipment is located and necessary environmental 
conditions for testing can be created. This case is no exception. Testing of the original 
documents will have to be conducted at the Plaintitl"s expert's laboratory facilities. Again, there 
is simply no basis under the Rules of Civil Procedure which would warrant the court's 
prohibiting the Plaintiff from placing the original documents in the custody of his expert witness. 
CONCLUSION 
for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffrespcctfully requests the court enter an order. 
compelling the Defendants to provide the original documents entitled "Agreement for Purchase 
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and Sale of Business Assets," "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," and "Management 
Contract" to the Plaintiff for non-destructive forensic testing. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
DATED thi~i- day of September, 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
BY:~J~ 
~ett 
Attorneys faT Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on thi~ day of September, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
SECOND MEMORANDUM OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY &, 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintift: R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
~.--.--~- -- --
attorneys of record, the Jaw tirm of White Peterson, and hereoy f()dgeslilsSeco~Memorandum 
of Supplemental AUThority & Argument in Support o/Opposition /0 Summary Judgment. 
SECOND MEMORANDUM Of' SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT Of 
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A. Clarification Concerning the Party's Agreement as to TraBsfe:r of Real Propertt 
In their Defendants' Reply Brief on Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants take 
the position the Plaintiff has conceded the parties did not have an agreement for transfer of the 
real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located. This interpretation of the Plaintiffs 
position is inaccurate and, theretore, it is necessary to clarify the Plaintiff's position with respect 
to the parties' agreement for transfer of the real property. The Plaintiff also submits additional 
authority in support of his position that the statute of frauds does not bar the parties' oral contract 
for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff'. 
• There is a Material Issue of Fact As to Whether the Parties Had an 
Agreement Whereby the Defendants Would Transfer the Thomas Motors, 
Inc. Premises to the Plaintiff 
The record before the court on summary judgment clearly establishes there is an issue of 
material fact as to whether the parties reached an oral agreement whereby the Defendants would 
give the Plaintiff the Thomas Motors Inc. premises in addition to the Thomas Motors. Inc. 
business upon Ron Thomas's retirement. 
Throughout the time the parties began discussing and ultimately agreed to Ron Thomas's 
proposal that he would purchase an existing auto dealership, Johanessen Motors, and convert the 
dealership to a family business, Thomas Motors, Inc.. if the Plaintiff would lea.ve his 
employment to operate the dealership, the parties mutually understood their agreement included 
the premises upon which the business was located. Indeed, Ron Thomas was not going to 
purchase either Johannesen Motors or the property on which it was located unless the Plaintiff 
agl<.:ed to operate an auto dealership on the premises, which would become the Plaintiff's. 
dealership upon Ron Thomas's retirement. The parties' understanding that the Plaintiff would 
receive the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises as well as the business is further demonstrated by the 
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fact they continuously discussed Thomas Motors, Inc. in tenus of its being a family business, 
which would be passed on to future generations. See Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas In Opposition 
/0 Summary Judgment ("Drew Aff. "). ~ 3, g, 9; Affidavit of Monte Thomas In Opposition 10 
Summary Judgment ("Monte Aff."), " 3, 4. 5; Affidavit of Rick Thomas In Opposition to 
Summary JudgmenT ("Rick AfC'). " 3, 4. 5; Affidavit of 1 Robin Wilde In Opposilion to 
Summary Judgment, 14; Affidavit of Janis Flowers In Opposition to Summary Judgment. ~ , 9, 
10; Affidavit of Sarah H Arnett In Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Arnett Aff.") Exhibit A. 
June 26, 2007, Video Taped Deposition of R. Drew Thomas, p. 106.1. 23 ~ p. 108,1. 21. The fact 
that a written agreement for sale of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises was drafted during August 
of 2000, at the parties' direction. is aJso circumstantial evidence of the parties' understanding the 
Plaintiff would receive the real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located in addition 
to the business itself. See Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas In Support of Deftndants . MOlion for 
Summary Judgment ("Ron Afr. ") Exhibits A, B, and C. 
Furthermore, throughout the period from 1997. when the Plaintiff began operating and 
managing Thomas Motors, Inc., until 2006, when the Defendants soJd the business and the 
premises, Thomas Motors, Inc. paid the Defendants $12,000 to $15,000 each month for "rent." 
Detendant Ron Thomas represented he was applying the rent payments to mortgages on the 
Thomas Motors, Inc. premises in order to ensure the Plaintiff would own the premises free of 
liens when Ron Thomas retired. See Amett Aff., Exhibit A, June 26, 2007, Video Taped 
Deposition of R. Drew Thomas, p. 184, 11. 7-18; Arnett Aff., Exhibit B. June 20, 2007, Video 
t:/ped Deposition of Ronald 0. Thomas. p. 131, I. 20· p. 132,1. 20; Second Affidavit of J Robin 
Wilde In Opposilion to Summary Judgment, , 4. In other words, Thomas Motors, Inc. revenues 
generated as a result of the Plaintiffs operation and management were to be used to pay off the 
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mortgage for the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises. which would ultimately be transferred to the 
Plaintiff. This is additional evidence of the parties' understanding that the Defendants would 
transfer the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises to the Plaintiff in addition to giving him the business. 
Finally, the fact the parties eventually drafted a written agreement whereby the Plaintiff 
would acquire the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises in conjunction with acquiring the business is 
circumstantial evidence that the parties had always intended and understood their ora) agreement 
to include a transfer of the premises in addition to the business itself. See AffidaVit of Ronald 0. 
Thomas In Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ron Aff. "), Exhibits A, B, 
andC. 
For these reasons, there are clearly factual issues as to whether the parties' oral 
agreement included transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises to the Plaintiff upon Ron 
Thomas's retirement. 
• The Parties' Agreement Whereby the Plaintiff was to Receive the Thomas 
Motors~ Ine. Business Is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds Provisions 
Pertaining to Agreements to Transfer Interests In Real Property 
The Defendants have argued they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's 
breach of oral contract claim because that claim is barred by the statue of frauds provisions 
pertaining to agreements for the transfer of interests in real property and to agreements which 
cannot be perfonned within one year. In thls case, however, the parties' agreement whereby the 
Plaintiff was to receive the Thomas Motors, Inc. business is not barred by either of those 
provisions. 
As the Plaintiff has argued at length in the Plaintiffs Response inOppositiontD 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmenr ("Memo In Opposition"), the parties' oral agreement 
transfer of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business to the Plaintiff upon Ron Thomas's retirement is 
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not barred by the statute of frauds provisions barring oral agreements which cannot be performed 
within one year. For the reasons discussed below, the oral agreement for transfer of Thomas 
Motors, Inc. is likewise not rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds provisions barring 
oral agreements for the transfer of real property. 
First, as previously explained in the Memo In Opposition (though perhaps not as clearly 
as it ought to have been), the agreement to transfer property in this case was incidental to, not 
essential to, the parties' agreement for transfer of the Thomas Motors. Inc. business, Secondly, 
the parties' agreements for transfer of the business and for transfer of the real property are 
divisible and, consequently, the agreement for transfer of the business cannot be rendered 
unenforceable because the parties' agreement for transfer of the premises was not in writing. 
In Idaho, whether a contract is entire or divisible depends principally upon the intention 
of the parties. See Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 347-48. 399 P.2d 635, 641 (1965). 
Thus, if it appears the parties' purpose when forming the contract "was to take the whole or 
none," then the contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable. See id. C·We think that perhaps the 
best test is whether aU of the things, as a whole, are of the essence of the contract.") The 
divisibility of a contract's subject matter and the apportionment of the consideration may also be 
considered, but neither of these factors is conclusive. See id Whether a contract is entire or 
divisible is a question of fact, "to be determined from the structure of the contract combined with 
evidence of the intentions of the parties." Woodger v. AMR Corporation, 106 Idaho 199, 203, 
677 P.2d 512, 516(Ct. App. 1984). 
When an oral contract relates in part to an interest in land and in part to' a subject not 
within the scope of the statute of frauds and the contract is divisible as to the two parts, the 
contract is enforceable as to the parr not within the statue of frauds. See 73 Am Jur. 2d Statute of 
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Frauds § 437 (When the part of the contract relating to the personalty is not so interdependent 
upon the part relating to the realty but that a distinct engagement as to one may be fairly and 
reasonably ex.tracted from the whole. the different parts of such contracts may be deemed so far 
severable and apportionable, or so distinct from and independent of each other, as to be 
enforceable as to the part not within the statute); see for e.g. Landes Construclton Co" Inc, v. 
Royal Bank o/Canada, 833 F,2d 1365. 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding the tenus of the parties' 
oral agreement as to a loan the defendant was to make to the plaintiff were divisible from the 
terms pertaining to the plaintiff's agreement to provide security for the loan); Godefroy v. Hupp, 
93 Wash. 371. 375-76 160 P. 1056, 1059-60 (1916) (holding the portion of the parties' oral 
agreement whereby the plaintiff was to receive a commission for sale of the defendants' stock 
was divisible from the portion whereby the plaintiff was to receive a commission for the sale of 
the defendants' real estate). 
In this case, there is, at a minimum, an issue of material tact as to whether the parties' 
oral agreement for the transfers of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business and premises was divisible. 
While the transfers of the business and property were unquestionably related, they were not 
interdependent. The Plaintiff could receive and operate the business even without receiving the 
real property in addition to the business. Thomas Motors, Inc. could have continued to pay rent 
to the Defendants and to operate on the premises, or the business could have been moved to a 
different premises. That is, the essential purpose of the parties' agreement, the transfer of 
Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff, would not have been defeated without the provision to 
transfer the real property on which Thomas Motors, Inc. was located. Furthenuore. the fact the 
written agreements prepared by the parties include separate contracts for transfer of the business 
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and the premises is circumstantial evidence the parties intended that their agreement for transfer 
of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff could be divisible. 
Because there are factual issues as to the terms of the parties' oral agreement, the 
questions as to what. if any, portion of the parties' agreement is within the statute of frauds and 
as to whether the parties intended their agreement to be divisible are also factual issues, which 
must be presented to the trier of fact. Therefore. the Plaintiffs allegation that the parties' 
agreement included transfer of real property does not provide a basis for granting the 
Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the Plaintiffs breach of oral contract claim. 
• The Defendants are Estopped from Barring the Plaintiff's Breach of Oral 
Contract Claim by Asserting tbe Statute of Frauds 
Finally, as previously explained in the Plaintiffs Memo In Opposition and Supplemental 
Authority In Opposition to Summary Judgmenf, even if the court determines the parties' oral 
agreement is within the statute of frauds, the agreement is not barred by the statute of frauds 
because. under the circumstances in this case, the Defendants are estopped from asserting the 
statute of frauds as a defense. At a minimum, there are material issues of fact as to whether the 
Defendants' statute of frauds defense should be defeated under the doctrines of quasi estoppel 
and equitable estoppel. Therefore, the Defendants should not be granted summary judgment on 
the Plaintiffs breach of oral contract claim even if the court determines the agreement is within 
the statue of frauds. 
8. The Defendants' Prevenpon of Plaintiffs Performance under the Written Contracts 
As demonstrated by the record on summary judgment and argued at length by the 
Plaintiff, there are issues of material fact as to whether the Defendants executed the written 
contracts at issue in this case during September of 2000, when the documents were presented to 
both parties for signature, and. if so, whether the Defendants then misled the Plaintiff into 
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believing they had declined to execute the written agreements. If in fact the Defendants led the 
Plaintiff to believe he was not obligated to perform under the terms of the written contract, such 
an act essentially amounted to a wrongful prevention of the Plaintiffs performance through 
misrepresentation. 
Obviously. the Defendants' entering the written contracts was a precondition to the 
Plaintiffs duty to perform under those contracts. By misrepresenting their position as to their 
entering the written contracts, the Defendants wrongfully interfered with a precondition to the 
Plaintiff's performance. In this respect, the Defendants' conduct amounted to, or at least was 
analogous to, a prevention of contract perfonnance, which is prohibited under Idaho law. See 
Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 742-43, 864 P. 2d 184, 187-88 ("there is generally in a 
contract subject to either an express or an implied condition an implied promise not to prevent or 
hinder perfonnance of the condition") In such cases, when the conduct of the party preventing 
performance is '''wrongful' and ~in excess of their legal rights'" under the contract, the other 
party's performance may be excused. See id. 
If the Defendants executed the written contracts at issue in this case in September of 
2000, as they allege they did, then their right to disregard their contractual obligations was 
governed by those contracts. The Defendants did not pursue termination of the contracts 
according to any procedures set forth therein. The terms of the contracts did not pennit the 
Defendants to employ deception in order to divert the Plaintiff from proceeding according to the 
contractual tenns and then breach the contracts by seIJing Thomas Motors, Inc. and the real 
property on which the business was located to a third party.' 
I The Defendants have been taking the position the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the wrincn contracts 
because he did not take any steps to petfonn under those contracts. Of course, the Defendants cannot escape 
liability OIl that basis if they led !'he Plaintiff to believe they had declined to execute the contracts. The relevant 
point is the Plaintiff executed the contrncts and was prepared to perfonn his legal obligations under the contract, but 
SECOND MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY &. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 
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For these reasons, there are factual and legal questions concerning the parties' conduct 
and rights with respect to the written contracts at issue in this case and those matters must be 
presented to the trier of fact for resolution. 
DATED this 3Td day of October. 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, PA 
lsI Sarah H. Arnett 
Sarah H. Arnett 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2007. I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
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for WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
ImhIW:\Wotk\nThom~, R Drew 21971\Thomas Mo(ors,lndlOO\Pleadlngs\Supp Aulhorily 2 Supporting SJ Opp.OOC 
was then informed by Ron Thomas the Defendants did not want to enter the written agreements after all. Moreover, 
the record On summary judgment establishes requirements under the contracts were already being performed. The 
Plaintiffwas perfonning all management functions for Thomas Motors, Jne., except to the extent Ron Thomas was 
interfering with effective management and insisting upon retaining control of the Thomas Motors, lne. finances. As 
discussed ~bovc, Thomas Motors Was 4lready paying the Defendants a monthly rent. This rent was in excess ofthe 
monthly amount to be paid under the "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement" See Ron Aff., Exhibit S, pp. 
1.2. 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
REPI .. Y RE: PLAINTIFF'S 
RENEWED MOTION TO 
COMPEL ORIGINAL 
DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, pursuant to Rules 20s 
34, and 37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby tiles Reply Re: Plaintiff's Renewed 
Motion to Compel Original Documents for InspeCIion. 
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On September 27, 2007, the Plaintiff tiled Plaintiff's Renewed MOlion 10 Compel 
Original Documents for Testing (,'Motion to Compel"), and on October 2, 2007, the Defendants 
tiled Defendants' Memorandum Response to Plainl!ffs Rmewed Molion 10 Compel Original 
Documents .Ii)r Testing ("Response"). In their response, the Defendants' primary contention 
appears to be that they should not be compelled to turn over the original contract documents at 
issue in this case without the Plaintiff first being required to set forth precisely what types of 
testing is going to be performed on those documents. 
As previously explained in the Plaintiffs communications with counsel and in the 
Motion to Compel, the testing which will be performed on the documents will be non~destructive 
forensic testing. The specitic testing methods will have to be determined by the PlaintiU's 
document expert. Erich Speck in. when he has had an opportunity tu examine the documents. As 
also discussed in the Motion to Compel. under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the fact that 
the testing will be non-destructive is all the information the Plaintiff is required to provide. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff is entitled to have the documents tested by 
whatever non-destructive methods his expert ultimately determines are best to employ,l The 
Defendants cannot dictate what discovery methods the Plaintiff may employ and preclude the 
Plaintiff frum developing his case. Nevertheless, in an effbrt to assist counsel and the court so a 
satisfactory resolution might be achieved through a stipulation between counsel, or with the 
court's assistance, counsel is able to provide the following information concerning the types of 
non-forensic testing the Plaintiff's document expert performed in another case in order to 
estahlish the dates on which Signatures were placed on certain documents. 
I In tact, under the Federal Rules lIf Civil Procedure and, likewi~e, under the Id~ho Rulc$ ofCivi/ Procedure, even 
destructive forensic testing is pc:mlissible under certaill circumstances in some cases such as tho~ invulving 
products liability. 
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Plaintiffs counsel has previously employed Mr. Speckin as an expert in a Canyon 
County case entitled Callahan v. Harold and Simineo Farms, 1m:., CV -04-11676, Judge James 
Maditt presiding. White Peterson represented the Plaintiff' in that case. The case involved 
issues concerning propriety of the transfer of certain assets held in a family fann corporation to 
two individual family members, who were named as Defendants in the case. The authenticity of 
a number of corporate documents as well as documents related to estate planning was a major 
issue in the case. Opposing counsel, the Nampa law tlnn of Hamilton, Michelson, and Hilty 
turned over original documents, which White Peterson attorneys then personally delivered to Mr. 
Speckin at Speckin Forensic Laboratories is located in Okemos, Michigan.2 A copy of Mr. 
Speckin's curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Mr. Speckin specializes in forensic 
analysis of questioned documents and ink dating. In the Callahan v. Harrold, Mr. Speckin 
provided an affidavit setting forth the methods and results of his testing and analysis. The 
affidavit was filed by the Plaintiffs in opposition to the Defendants' motion tor summary 
judgment. Mr. Speckin's delenninations were pivotal to resolution ot' the case, which was 
settled through mediation. 
In Callahan v. Harold, Mr. Speckin performed four ditlerent procedures to determine the 
dates of signatures and text on the original documents provided to him by White Peterson. He 
described the tests he performed as follows; 1) the TLC test (Thin Layer Chromatography test). 
which was used to determine which manufacturer's ink formulation was used for signatures on 
the documents and thereby to determine the dates when the ink was manufactured; 2) the VSL 
2000 (est (infrared test). which was used for ink dating and to determine whether various 
fktore White Peterson transported the original d~umenls to Michigan, copies were made for each pat1y, and the 
parties agreed that during the testing proc~ss, Mr. Spcckin would take an ad<iiti()olll microscopic ink sample from 
each tested document in order for the Defendants to have a sllmple available for testing in the unlikely evem the 
original documents were 10SI before they could be returned to the Defendants. 
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writings were changed or altered (e.g. whether two different ink formulations, which were 
produced during two different time periods, were present in the area of the document allegedly 
altered); 3) the ESDA test (Electrostatic Detection Apparatus test), which was used to determine 
whether writing impressions from one document were impressed on other documents. which 
were purportedly created at later dates; and 4) microscopic analysis of text, which was used to 
determine whether typed printing on a document was created by a typewriter or a computer 
printer and/or what type of computer printer was used. 
Once again, in this case, the Plaintiff is neither in a position to state definitely which 
testing methods Mr. Speckin will employ to determine the dates of the Defendants' signatures on 
the original contract documents at issue nor is the Plaintiff required to do so. However, the 
Defendants can rest assured Mr. Speckin will apply non-destructive testing methods, which may 
include those discussed herein or other similar tests (new technologies may also be available 
which were not available when Mr. Speckin performed the testing in Callahan v. Harold). The 
Plaintiff h()pes this infonnation concerning his counsel's prior experience with forensic 
document testing will alleviate the Defendants' concerns regarding the nature of testing which 
will be performed on the original contract documents. 
DATED this ~ day of October. 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By:~$.~ 
S ah H. Arnett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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·Purdue University at age 15 to study engineering 
-Albion College at age 17 to study biology and pre~medical 
FAX 
-Michigan State University graduated with a degree in Chemistry 
Forensic Training: 
4664405 
-Two year residency with Leonard A. Speckin in the examination of questioned 
documents 
-One year residency with Brunelle Forensic Laboratories in the identification and 
dating of inks 
Over 10 scientific papers authored or co-authored Including: 
-The Obverse-Reverse Intersection of Lines 
-Chemical Removal of Magic Marker on Photocopied Documents 
·An Independent Assessment of Ink Age determination by a Private Examiner 
-The Detection of Mastic on Plastic 
-Interpretation of Ink Age Testing Using Rate and Percent of Extraction 
-Case Study of Accelerated Ink Age Determir'lation 
Invited Speaker: 
-Michigan State University 
-American Trial Lawyers Association 
. international Association of Questioned Document Examiners 
-Medical . ~e9~1 Ccmsultants..- .... -- - ---------
-National Association of Document Examiners 
-Canadian Society of Forensic Sciences 
-American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
·American Society of Questioned Document Examiners 
-Midwestern Association of Forensic Scientists 
""_ ... " .. _" .. 
-Southwestern Association of Forensic Document Examiners 
http://www.4n6.com/eSpecldn.php 
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-Medical Defense Attorneys Meetings 
-Wayne County Nursing Consultants 
,·Various Insurance and Private Investigators Associations 
-Nevada State Bar Association 
FAX 
-Geseilschaft fur Foreosische Schriftuntersl.lchung E.V. (GFS) in Hamburg, Germany 
Testified in cases in federal Cou~, Circuit Court, District Court, Union Arbitrations, 
licensing mattersl depositions, and the State 80ard of CanvasserS in Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Missouri, Georgia, Louisiana, North CarOlina, Oregon, New 
York, Illinois, Indiana, OhiO, New Jersey, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, Washington 
D.C., Virginia, west Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Arizona and Washington. Also 
in Vancouver, British Columbia Supreme Court, Mexico, and Hong Kong. 
I have been appointed by judges in Michigan, California, Maine, florida and 
Australia to pt;rform examinations at the request of the court. 
I have also been retained by the Embassy of Uruguay, Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement; M,chigan Attorney Generals Office, Department of Natural Resources, 
The State Board of Canvassers, Health Care Fraud Division, Federal Defenders 
Office, National Labor Relations Board as well as many local, county, state, and 
federal offices, 
Other clients include General Motors, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler, Honda, 
NationsBank, National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Basketball 
Association, National Hockey League Players Association, as well as many others. 
I have performed examinations in over 1500 cases and presented sworn testimony 
in several states on severa! levels over 100 times; also worked cases from four 
continents and many countries. 
National Media Appearances Including: 
- WaH Street Joumal (front page) 
- America's Most Wanted 
- The Learning Channel {Medical Detectives} 
Professional Memberships: 
-Society of Forensic Ink Analysts (Board of Directors & President) 
-Midwestern ASSOciation of Forensic SCiences 
-American Society of Testing and Materials 
Peer reviewed scientific publications including: 
Technical Report with Case Studies on the Accelerated Aging of Writing Inks, 
1998 International Journal of Forensic Document Examination, 
. Chapter in EncyClopedia of Crime & Punishment,. 2001 Te)(toook 
- Impression by Traced Forgery, 2001 American SocIety of Questioned Document 
Examiners (co-author) 
http://www.4n6.com/eSpeckin.php 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
REPL \' RE: PLAINTIFFtS 
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND 
AFFIDAVIT OF RON THOMAS 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintitl: R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
atlnmeys of record, the law tirm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Rule 56 oithe Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and hereby t'iles his Reply Re: Plaintfff's 
\:IDtian /0 Strike Second Affidavit ~lRon Thomas. 
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On September 10, 2007, the Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Alotion to Strike the Second 
Affidavit of Ron Thomas ("Motion to Strike"), and on September 2\ , 2007, the Defendants filed 
Defendants I Memorandum In OpposiJion to PlaintiO's Motion fo Strike Se,:ond Affid(lVil (~l Ron 
Thomas. The Plaintiff is tiling this Reply in order to address the Defendants' arguments 
concerning admissibility of lay witness opinions of business and real property values. 
In the Second Affidavit of Ronald 0. Thomas ("Second Affidavit"), the Defendant Ronald 
Thomas goes beyond simply clarifying what properties the Bill Buckner investment group 
purchased from the Defendants in March of 2006 and the pflrtion or the purchase price attributed 
to each of those properties (in/<.mnation which is not actually set ti,lrth in the Second Allidavit). 
Instead, Ronald Thomas makes statements concerning the amount of property the Bill Buckner 
grouped wanted to purchase from the Defendants, the amount paid for a piece of property, which 
was not part of the Thomas Motors, Inc. premises, and the Defendants' application of the sale 
proceeds. By his statements, Ronald Thomas attempts to suggest the Thomas Motors. Inc. 
business had no appreciable value at the time it was sold. 
As argued by the Plaintiff in the Motion to Strike, the STaTements contained in the Second 
Affidavit are inadmissible on the basis of either lack of foundation, relevance, and/or hearsay. 
The Plaintiff has also argued the Defendant is not qualified to render an opinion as to the fair 
market value of the Thomas Motors, Inc. business at the time it was sold. In response. the- . 
Defendants argue a judicial rule concerning admiss~bility of a - prop~rty owner' s opinion of 
. . ~. ." 
his/her property's valu.e trumps air foundation and relevancy reqUirements set forth in the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintitf respectfully disagrees with the 
Defendants' interpretation and overly broad application of the judicial rule. 
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• Tbe Idabo Rules of Evidence Require Opinions On Property Values 
To Be Provided By Experts 
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According to the Idaho Supreme Court's 1908 decision Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 
625,99 P. 108 (1908), and its progeny, an owner of a business or real property is competent to 
testify at trial concerning the value of his/her property wirhout qualification beyond the fact of 
his or her being an owner. See Rankin. supra; see also Pocatello AulO C%r V. Auo Coatings. 
Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.Zd 949 (1995) (citing other appellate decisions applying the judicial 
rule set out in Caldwell). Obviously, this judicial rule originated very early in the last century, 
before business and real property valuations became matters generally dealt with by persons with 
special qualifications. Today, however, business and property valuations are undisputedly the 
provinces of experts. Business and real property values are detennined by application of various 
valuation methods, which are generally accepted methods applied by trained, qualified appraisers 
of real properties and businesses. Therefure, under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which prohibit 
unqualitied lay witnesses trom testifying to opinions based upon ;;scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge," only qualified experts may testify as to the appraised market value of 
real property or a business. See Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 701, 702. 
While under Caldwell a property O'Wller may be permitted to give hislher lay opinion as 
to the value of his/her property, under the 1daho Rules of Evidence, a property owner cannot, 
without first establishing his/her quaJit1cations as an expert, give an opinion which purports to be 
an appraisal of a business or real property. For the same reason, an unqualified lay property 
owner is not quaHtied to testify to the relevance ot'various factors, such as the purchase price a 
buyer is willing to pay, to the determination of the market value ofhis/her property. The question 
of what factors are properly considered when valuing property must be addressed by qualified 
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experts. In other words, to the extent Caldwell permits a property owner to testify to his/her lay 
opinion of value at trial, under the Idaho Rules of Ev;dence, lay property owners are nevertheless 
unqualified to value properties. A Jay witnesses' testimony as to the value of hislher property is 
still nothing more than a lay opinion. 
For these reasons, the Caldwell decision and its progeny does not trump the requirements 
of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and on summary judgment, the court cannot consider a lay 
property owner's opinion as ro the value ofhislher property as a proper appraisal, or valuation. 
• The Judicial Rule Cited by the Defendants Applies Only To Admissibility of 
Testimony at Trial Proceedings 
Regardless of an owner's automatic qualification under Caldwell to opine as to the value 
of hislher property during trial testimony, the trier of fact must still detennine what weight, or 
value, is to be given an owner's testimony by assessing the basis for hislher opinion. See Ak.zo, 
supra. Therefore, while the Caldwell rule allows a property owner to testify concerning his/her 
property's value without first providing foundational testimony as to his/her qualit1carion, other 
than the fact slhe is an owner, the weight to be given the testimony is ultimately determined by 
the owner's testimony regarding the basis of hislher opinion. Absent an owner's testimony 
serting forth the basis for hislher opinion of property value, the opinion is nothing more than a 
conclusory statement. 
It lS important to consider that Caldwell, A/czo, and other decisions in which the Caldwell 
rule has been applied concern property owners' testimony provided at tria!. Of course, in that 
context, the opposing party has an opportunity to cross examine the owner as to the basis of 
his/her opinion; When an Owner provides an opinion of value in an affidavit on summary 
judgment, however, the opposing party has no oppurtunity to require the owner to provide the 
basis of his/her opinion. The owner might Simply state his/her opinion of value in the affidavit 
REPLY R..E: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AfFIDA VlT 01-' RON THOMAS· 4 
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without also discussing the basis tor the opinion. Without providing testimony establishing the 
basis for his/her opinion. the owner fails to show hislher opinion can be given any weight at all 
and simply makes a conclusory statement. Thus, an owner's statement of opinion as to property 
value in an affidavit. without additional testimony providing the basis for the opinion, cannot 
properly be considered on summary judgment. For these reasons. the judicial rule discussed in 
Caldwell and Aha is inapplicable to the determination as to whether an owner's opinion may be 
considered by the court on summary judgment. 
liT. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously set forth in the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and those set forth 
herein, except for his testimony staling the items of property the Bill Buckner group purchased 
Il'om the Defendants and the total purchase price paid by the group, Ronald Thomas's testimony 
in his Second Affidavit should be stricken as inadmissible, M, at a minimum. disregarded by the 
court in deciding the Defendants' motion tor summary judgment. 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2007. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By: ~4ti J!'~ 
Sarah H. Arnett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RP.PLY RE; PLAINTifF'S MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RON THOMAS - 5 
rilt. No.?08 10/09 '07 14: ID:WHITE PETERSON FAX PAGE 7/ 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMJZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, 1083701-2582 
11. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box J88 








Facsimile No. 208-3654196 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
WIWorJ;.\Wfhomas, R Drew 219111Thomll.S MOI!)~, Inc.OOOIPlcIl4ingt>\Rc;ply 10 Molla Strike: 2n<l RT Aff.l>OC 
REPLY RE: PLAINTIFf'S MOTION TO STR.IKE SF-CON() AffiDAVIT OF RON THOMAS· 6 00073l 
John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
T dephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR TESTING - 1 
()() r) ..... ",,: l 1.1", 
* * * * * 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff has filed a Renewed Motion to Compel the defendants to produce the 
original contract documents for unspecified testing, which Motion was denied by the Court a year 
ago. While doing so, plaintiff goes to the unfortunate length of making some very accusatory and 
inflammatory statements aimed at the defendants and/or their counsel that are unnecessary and hardly 
deserved. As addressed further below, the questions raised by the defendants regarding the still 
unidentified "testing" of the original written contracts at issue are entirely legitimate and fair 
questions, that deserve answers before such testing is allowed. The questions and concerns raised 
by the plaintitf are also completely consistent with the prior rulings of this Court on the very same 
Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs Motion again seeks to require the defendants to just give them the 
actual originals of the three agreements in question, so they can send them off to someone 
proclaimed to be pre-eminent in his field, for some kind of testing regarding the dating of the 
signatures in these originals. When the Motion was first presented to the Court about a year ago, the 
plaintiff was unwilling to even identify who this expert was, or what he was going to do with the 
originals. The defendants resisted the Motion on these grounds, and the Court agreed with the 
defense and denied the Motion. 
It was not until recently, specifically by letter of September 20, 2007; the plaintiff 
initiated efforts to revisit this same issue. This time around, the plaintiff does identify their chosen 
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expert, and provides written assurance by counsel that the otherwise unidentified testing to be done 
by the expert would be non-destructive in nature, but again does not indicate what specific "testing" 
will be donc. As the letter by counsel indicates, the plaintiff self-imposed a one-week deadline for 
the defendants to respond under threat of a motion to compel. See Affidavit of Sarah Arnett, Exhibit 
"A ". Defense counsel responded that same day with some questions and concerns about the 
unidentified testing to be done by the expert, that were along the very same lines as the questions and 
concerns raised on the first motion to compel a year earlier. More specifically, defense counsel 
raised two basic questions and/or concerns about this requested testing, summarily stated as follows: 
(1) while expressing appreciation for the plaintiff now identifying the expert for the first time, and 
counsel's indicating the testing would be non-destructive in nature, a request for more specificity on 
the actual testing to be done, "including what testing Mr. Speckin intends to conduct on these 
original agreements;" and (2) whether or not it was practical to have such testing conducted where 
the originals are located in Emmett, and, if not, why not. The plaintiff responded to these requests 
with this Motion to Compel. 
On the first subject concerning what actual testing would be done, the brief 
supporting the Motion does not answer the question but instead indicates that the expert will have 
to detennine what test - or tests - will be necessary once he gets the documents. No other 
information is provided on this subject at all. In response, the defendants submit this is not a fair or 
satisfactory answer to a legitimate request and concern. If the plaintiff does not know what kind of 
testing will actually be done, how can the plaintiff assure the testing will be non-destructive? If the 
plaintiff does know, what is the big secret about it and why will they not simply answer the questions 
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One of the primary points raised by the defendants in response to the first motion was 
along these very same lines - that is, they should not have to lose complete custody and control of 
original documents that may have significant evidentiary value without being told precisely what was 
going to be done to these documents. The Court agreed, and this same point is every bit as 
legitimate and true today as it was a year ago. 
Before moving on to the second question raised by the defense here, the defendants 
must tirst pause to respond to the completely unjustified accusation by the plaintiff that they are 
resisting producing these original documents for "embarrassment" reasons of having the supposed 
fraudulent truth revealed. This is frankly offensive, and completely untrue. There is enough 
information in the record at this point to create a factual issue over when the originals were signed, 
hut a factual issue is all it is at the moment. There is witness testimony on both sides of this issue. 
The Court should be aware this includes a non-party witness who has testified under oath that the 
original contracts were delivered to her shortly after they were signed by all parties in September of 
2000, and she specifically looked to see that they were signed before filing them away, and observed 
that all three signatures were on the documents at that time. To be fair, the plaintiff admittedly has 
his own witnesses on this same subject, that again create a factual issue about it. However, the point 
here is there is no good cause under such circumstances as presented here for counsel to accuse the 
defendants or defense counsel of resisting discovery efforts to hide a fraud or subvert the truth. That 
is simply not what is going on here, nor is it even close. Legitimate questions are being raised as to~ 
what kind of "testing" is intended to be done on these original pieces of evidence. There is nothing 
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more to it than that. In fact, the Court in this case has in essence already agreed with the legitimacy 
of the questions being raised by the defendants regarding this otherwise unidentified "testing." There 
is simply no good cause to make such inflammatory accusations that are untrue. 
On the second question raised about whether the testing can be performed at the 
present location of the original contracts in Emmett, the plaintiff once again resorts to the overly 
intlammatory and accusatory, which is entirely unnecessary and hardly deserved. Specifically, the 
plaintiff argues it "should be obvious to the defendant, despite their attempts to feign ignorance, that 
forensic testing in the 21 st century generally takes place in laboratories ... ". (See Plaintiff's Brief 
in Support of Renewed Motion at p. 8). At the risk of sounding trite, the undersigned cannot possibly 
"f~ign" Dl1y ignorance on this subject, the undersigned actually is ignorant on this subject. Defense 
counsel frankly knows nothing whatsoever about experts doing some testing to determine the date 
when signatures were purportedly put on an original document, the now stated purpose of the testing 
~;lved here. After 21 years of practicing law, the undersigned has simply never had to deal with 
any such kind of expert testing. In this state of ignorance, defense counsel thought it might at least 
be a possibili ty that Vv hatever is involved may not require a lot of equipment, which would perhaps 
make it practical for the expert to come here for the testing (e.g. a microscope). If the plaintiff would 
simply respond to the inquiry about what is specifically involved in the type oftesting proposed or 
contemplated, instead of slinging pot-shot type accusations at counsel, then we could know the 
answers. If the type of testing involved here would require the use oflots of equipment that is not 
available here in Idaho, or even one piece of heavy equipment impractical to transport, then this 
particular concern or question is answered and addressed. Here again, it is simply uncalled for the 
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plaintiff to accuse defense counsel of "feigning" ignorance on a subject that is supposedly obvious 
to everyone else living in the 21 st century. It is simply a fact that defense counsel has never 
encountered a request for this type of testing and know absolutely nothing about what is involved. 
If plaintiff s counsel has enough knowledge to assure everyone involved that the testing in question 
is "non-destructive" in nature, then it would seem only fair for plaintiffs counsel to simply respond 
to the inquiry about what is actually involved in this testing, so that everyone involved can make a 
fair ami reasonable evaluation of the issue. ( 
').N(. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this ~ay of October, 2007. 
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
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COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, and pursuant to Rule 56 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order 
granting partial summary judgment which dismisses any claim by the plaintiff that his alleged oral 
agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land. This Motion is made on the 
grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of material fact in establishing that any 
claim involving land is barred by Idaho's Statute of Frauds. 
/ult-. DATED this _1_ day of March, 2008. 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
is 
ys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
) 







RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 










In this action for damages for damages based upon Defendants' alleged breach of an oral 
and/Qr written contract and thecovenanfofgooaTiiilli and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and 
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fraud, Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In addition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court also has before it: (1) Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for 
an Order Compelling Discovery; (2) Plaintiffs Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f); (3) 
Defendants' Motion for an Order Striking portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Striking the Second 
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas. 
The motions came before the Court for argument on October 11, 2007 in Canyon County 
based upon the consent of the parties and the court. Plaintiff was represented by Ms. Sarah 
Arnett and Defendants were represented by Mr. John Janis. The Court made determinations on 
the record with respect to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Compel Discovery and Rule 56(f) 
Motion. Due to the volume of papers submitted on the motions, the fact that the Court permitted 
the parties to argue the motions based upon all papers submitted, and the fact that the Second 
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas does not bear significantly on the Court's determination of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Striking the Second 
Affidavit of Ronald O. Thomas is denied. 
The motions remaining to be determined are: (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment dismissing the complaint and (2) Defendants' Motion for an Order striking certain 
portions of the Affidavit of Drew Thomas submitted in opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Based upon the file and record in this proceeding, the affidavits, evidence, memoranda, 
and arguments submitted on the present m()tiofis~ fogether with the applicable law, Defendants' 
Motion for an Order striking certain portions of the Affidavit of Drew Thomas in opposition to 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' lV{OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 2 -
000740 
the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 
BACKGROUND 
In this action, Plaintiff Drew Thomas alleges that Defendants, his parents, breached a 
1997 oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to Plaintiff by the time Ronald Thomas 
turned age sixty-three (63). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts in his Verified Complaint that Ronald 
Thomas agreed to purchase Johannesen Motors (subsequently renamed Thomas Motors, Inc.) in 
Emmett, Idaho, and to transfer the business to Plaintiff by the time Ronald Thomas turned age 
sixty-three (63) in consideration of Plaintiff agreeing to leave his job as manager of the new and 
used car department at Lanny Berg Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho, and managing Thomas Motors 
"at a greatly reduced salary." As Plaintiffs counsel phrased the alleged agreement at the 
hearing on the motions, Plaintiff agreed to contribute both his labor and deferred compensation, 
in the form of the difference between the market value of his services and what he actually 
received in salary, in consideration of Defendants' promise to transfer the business at a later 
date. l 
I While Plaintiff's counsel referred to the agreement as a "joint venture" at the hearing, the Court takes that 
reference as a rhetorical device and not an actual assertion that the issue here is whether there was, in fact, a joint 
venture, since there has been no allegation of a joint venture in the pleadings or any other papers, as far as the Court 
can find. In addition, if Plaintiff were asserting that the dealership was, in fact, a joint venture, it would contradict 
virtually all of the allegations made up to this point: That Plaintiff had a right to the business when Ronald Thomas 
turned 63 or retired by virtue of their oral contract. 
If this had, in fact, been ajoint venture, Plaintiff would have an interest in the business from the outset. 
Under Idaho law, a joint venture is "analogous to a partnership and is defmed as an association of two or more 
persons to carry ()ut(i single enterprise forpmfrt." Saint Alphonsrt9 Regional Melitcllt Cehfer,liic.v.Krueger, 
Idan05()T, 507 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162, 166 (1978». A joint venture 
includes: a contribution of assets, a common undertaking, joint interest, right of mutual control, an expectation of 
profits, a right to participate in profits, and a limitation of the objective to a single enterprise. Id It may be express 
or implied by conduct, but the intent of the parties controls. Id Sharing of profits and losses is an important 
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The parties agreed that Plaintiff would receive an initial salary of $2,500 per month, 
which was substantially less than Plaintiff was making at Lanny Berg. The parties subsequently 
agreed upon one or more increases in Plaintiffs salary. Plaintiff continued working for Thomas 
Motors until Defendants sold the dealership to a third party in early 2006, without Plaintiffs 
knowledge or consent. 
At Plaintiffs insistence, in the year 2000 Defendants engaged an attorney to prepare an 
Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets, a Commercial Lease and Purchase 
Agreement, and a Management Contract containing extensive terms and conditions regarding 
the sale of the business, including a number of terms not in the alleged 1997 oral agreement 
between the parties. After a number of drafts and changes to the Agreements, Plaintiff signed 
the three Agreements, all of which bear a date of September 1, 2000, on September 19, 2000. 
The Agreements also bear Defendants' signatures and accompanying dates of September 16, 
2000. However, Plaintiff insists that Defendants had signed the documents when he signed 
them on September 19, 2000. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that, after he signed the Agreements, 
Defendants represented that they had not signed the documents and that they did not intend to 
sign the documents, because they did not intend to hold Plaintiff to the terms set forth in the 
written agreements. 
On or about March 15, 2006, Defendants sold Thomas Motors to a third party without 
Plaintiffs prior knowledge or consent. 
c0hslderation, but is not essential. ld. Whether a joint venture exists is primarily a question of fact for the trial 
court. ld. Here, Plaintiff has mad~ no allegation that therewasa mutual right t{)' control tire busrneSsoefuf(i Ronald 
Tllomas retired. ~Infact,many ofPlaintitrs claims revolve around the assertion that Ronald Thomas controlled the 
business during the time Plaintiff was employed there. In addition, Plaintiff has made no claim that he had any 
expectation of right to participate in the profits of the business prior to the transfer of Thomas Motors to him upon 
the retirement of Ronald Thomas. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMl\tIARY JUDGMENT 
-4-
00074v 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDA VIT IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants move for an order striking the portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment that assert: (1) The parties' oral agreement did not require 
Plaintiff to pay Defendants any money in consideration for transfer of Thomas Motors and (2) 
the oral agreement was that Defendants would transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff at the time 
Ronald Thomas turned age sixty-two (62) or sixty-three (63) or when Ronald Thomas retired. 
The basis for Defendants' motion is that such statements directly contradict Plaintiffs prior 
sworn statements and were made solely for the purpose of defeating Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Pursuant to Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot, 124 Idaho 607 (1993) and In re Keevan, 
126 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 1994), in order to strike or disregard an affidavit submitted in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment as improperly interposed solely to avoid 
summary judgment, the court must find that: 
1. The affidavit directly contradicts the affiant's prior sworn testimony; and 
2. The affidavit was interposed as a sham, solely for the purpose of avoiding summary 
judgment. 
Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs Verified Complaint never refers to the retirement 
of Ronald Thomas as the operative date for transfer of the business. In fact, on at least seven 
different occasions, the Verified Complaint asserts that the oral agreement between Plaintiff and 
Ronald Thomas provided for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. to the Plaintiff when Ronald 
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Thomas turned either sixty-two (62) or sixty-three (63). However, in his affidavit in opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states the operative date for transfer of 
the business was the retirement of Ronald Thomas. Defendants seek an order striking this 
portion of Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition on the ground that the reference to a retirement 
contingency contradicts the allegations of the Verified Complaint and is interposed here solely 
to defeat Defendants' assertion that the alleged oral agreement is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. While this discrepancy is certainly a factor for the trier of fact to consider with respect 
to Plaintiffs credibility on this issue, the Court cannot find that it requires striking of Plaintiffs 
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for two reasons. First, at 
least one paragraph of the Verified Complaint, Paragraph 10, asserts that Ronald Thomas agreed 
to transfer the business to Plaintiff"by age 63." Although this allegation does not specifically 
mention the retirement of Ronald Thomas as a contingency for transfer of the business, it is 
consistent with such an assertion. Second, even if the Court were to strike or disregard this 
portion of Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition, Plaintiffs deposition testimony, in which he 
makes a number of references to the retirement contingency as part of the agreement, would still 
be before the court.2 
Defendants also seek an order striking any statement by Plaintiff in his Affidavit in 
Opposition that the parties' alleged oral agreement did not require Plaintiff to pay any monetary 
consideration for transfer of Thomas Motors, Inc. Defendants assert that such statements 
Even if Defendants had moved to also strike all portions of Plaintiffs deposition testimony referring to the 
retirement conting~ncy, it is. not clear that the court could grant sUGh a motion based upon the doctrine serouf iff··· 
l'olmie Farms and Keevan, because both cases concerned affidavits that contradicted deposition testimony, not 
deposition testimony that contradicted prior sworn statements, such as those contained in a verified complaint. In 
this case, it would be difficult for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs deposition testimony, which occurred prior to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, was made solely to defeat the summary judgment motion. 
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contradict Plaintiffs deposition testimony that he expected to pay something for the business 
and are interposed solely for the purpose of defeating Defendants' claim on summary judgment 
that the terms of the alleged agreement are too indefinite to be enforced. Defendants correctly 
point to several instances where Plaintiff indicated in his deposition that he expected to pay 
something for the business. However, the Court cannot find any instance where Plaintiff 
affirmatively stated that the parties' agreement required him to pay something for the business 
as consideration for its transfer. Instead, such statements only conclusively establish some 
subjective belief on Plaintiff s part that he would pay Defendants some amount of money at 
some point at or after transfer of the business. In fact, Plaintiff also testified a number of times 
that the agreement consisted of Defendants' promise to transfer the business to him in 
consideration for him leaving Lanny Berg to work at Thomas Motors. 
In light of the above, the Court finds that it is appropriate to leave the resolution of any 
actual or apparent inconsistencies in Plaintiffs sworn statements in this case to the trier of fact. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In 
det~r'1Jining a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all disputed facts 
liberally in favor of the non-moving party; andfuust draw aIlreasonableiIlferences in favor of 
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the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 
(1991). 
Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made upon personal knowledge, set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. I.R.C.P. 56( e). Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit must be attached or served with the affidavit. 
Jd When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent admissible 
evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in that 
party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial, but must 
set forth specific facts, in admissible form. Id 
The moving party may satisfy his or her initial burden by establishing the absence of 
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. McCorkle v. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554 (2005). The movant may establish such 
lack of evidence either (1) by an affirmative showing based upon the moving party's own 
evidence; or (2) by reviewing all of the nonmoving party's evidence to demonstrate that the 
proof of an essential element is absent. Id Once the moving party does so, the burden again 
shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Id 
II. Count I: Breach of Oral Contract 
A. Lack of Definite Material Terms 
Defendants move for summary judgment· dismissing Count f()t ihe·compiaInt, which 
asserts a claim for breach of the alleged oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors, Inc. to 
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Plaintiff, on the ground that the material terms of the alleged contract were not sufficiently 
definite to permit its enforcement. Among other things, Defendants note the absence of any 
agreed price term in the alleged oral agreement. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts, in 
Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, that the 
essential terms of the agreement were, "I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and 
experience in building Thomas Motors in exchange for his' giving' me the business whenever 
he retired." 
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds. Barry v. 
Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831 (2004). A meeting of the minds is 
evidenced by a manifestation of the parties' intent to contract, which takes the form of an offer 
and acceptance. Id The meeting of the minds must occur on all terms material to the contract. 
Id The material terms of the contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order for the 
contract to be enforceable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 
NA., 119 Idaho 171, 173 (1991). As a general rule, if a contract is so vague and indefinite that 
the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained, it is unenforceable. Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 
173, 178 (1975). The question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to form 
an express agreement is for the trier of fact. R. D. Bischoff v. Quong-Watkins Properties, 113 
Idaho 826, 828 (Ct. App. 1987). The trier of fact's inquiry into an alleged oral agreement is 
three-fold: first, determining whether an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the 
agreement; and third, construing the agreement for its intended legal effect. Id 
Here, the court finds that the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his 
Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff 
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Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of Ronald 
Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary judgment 
dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. 3 Defendants have not established that the price 
or any other term not present in the contract as alleged is material as a matter of law. Cf Barry, 
140 Idaho at 832 ("The scope of the work to be performed is a material term of a construction 
contract."); Black Canyon, 119 Idaho at 174 (Terms such as the principal amount and applicable 
interest rate are essential to a loan contract). 
B. Statute of Frauds 
Defendants also seek summary judgment dismissing the oral contract claim on the 
ground that the alleged oral agreement is invalid, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 9-505, 
because: (1) the agreement, by its terms, was not to performed within a year; and (2) the 
agreement was for the sale of real property or an interest therein. 
1. Contract Not To Be Performed Within a Year 
Plaintiff alleges that he and Ronald Thomas entered into the oral agreement for the 
transfer of Thomas Motors in 1997. As indicated earlier in connection with Defendants' Motion 
to Strike portions of Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition, there is sufficient evidence in the record 
for the jury to find that the oral agreement provided for the transfer of Thomas Motors when 
Defendant Ronald Thomas reached age 62 or 63, or when he retired. Idaho courts construe the 
provisions of Section 9-505 narrowly, permitting enforcement of an oral contract to be 
3 Plaintiff, at various titries,nas also assertedth~tpart of the consideration he provided for Defendants' promise to 
transfer Thomas Motors was his agreement to work at a salary well below what he might have otherwise been paid. 
Since this is not necessary for determination of the existence ofan oral contract here, the Court will leave the 
detemIination as to whether such a term was part of the parties' agreement to the trier of fact. 
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performed upon the occurrence of a stated future event, if it was possible that such event could 
occur within a year. Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008 (Ct. App. 1986). Since it is 
possible that Ronald Thomas could have retired within one year from the time the parties 
allegedly entered into the contract, the contract would not be barred by the statute of frauds, if 
the jury determines that the contract included the retirement contingency. If the jury determines 
that an agreement existed, but did not include the retirement contingency, Defendants may 
renew their motion. 
2. Transfer of Real Property 
Defendants also assert that the alleged oral contract is invalid under the statute of frauds 
because it is for the transfer of real property or an interest therein. However, it does not appear 
from any of Plaintiff's submissions that he has alleged Defendants promised to transfer anything 
other than Thomas Motors. If the jury determines that the contract included a promise to 
transfer real property, Defendants may renew their motion.4 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing Count I of the Verified Complaint should be denied. 
II. Count II: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Defendants also seek summary judgment dismissing Count II of the Verified Complaint 
which asserts a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the 
oral contract which is the subject of Count I. The implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is essentially derivative of the claim fot oreacn6ftne underlying contract, since it calls 
4 Plaintiff asserts that the Court should estop Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. Plaintiff 
may raise such arguments in the event Defendants renew their motions based upon the statute of frauds. 
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for an objective determination of whether the parties acted in good faith in carrying out the 
terms ofthe contract. Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22 (2006). 
In light of the fact that the Court denied Defendants' motion with respect to Count I, Defendants 
have not established entitlement to dismissal of Count II. 
Ill. Count Ill: Quasi-Contract Claim 
In Count III of the Verified Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for relief in quasi-
contract, asserting that, in the event the jury does not find that there was an enforceable contract 
to convey Thomas Motors, Defendants would be unjustly enriched if Plaintiff is not awarded 
damages for the difference between his salary and the market rate for his services, since Plaintiff 
accepted such reduced salary in reliance upon Defendants' promise to transfer the business. 
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this claim on the ground that Plaintiff s 
salary and wages were subject to a separate valid contract between the parties. 5 
A claim for unjust enrichment requires proof that: (l) plaintiff conferred a benefit upon 
the defendant; (2) the defendant accepted the benefit with knowledge; and (3) under the 
circumstances, it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the 
plaintiff the fair value thereof. Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 272 
(Idaho 2007). However, the Court will not employ the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment 
where there is an enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same 
5 DefendantS also asserted that Plait'ltiffcannot prove that Defendants were unjustly enriched by Plaintiff's services 
here. To the extent that assertion is distinct from the issue of whether the unjust enrichment claim is barred by 
another contract between the parties, the Court finds that it involves damage issues which were the subject of 
Plaintiff's Rule 56(1) motion and the Court will not consider them at this time. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 12-
00070~) 
subject matter, because equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right 
to compensation. Id 
Here, Plaintiff essentially seeks additional compensation for the services he performed 
for Thomas Motors while employed there based upon the assertion that, pursuant to another 
agreement, he agreed to accept less compensation for his services. Since the uncontroverted 
evidence establishes that the parties had an express employment agreement pursuant to which 
Plaintiff was paid a salary, including one or more raises during his employment, the Court finds 
that it would be improper to change the terms of that employment agreement by application of 
the doctrine of quasi-contract. 6 Plaintiff's assertion that he agreed to go to work for Thomas 
Motors at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer the business 
should stand or fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count 
Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count III of the 
Verified Complaint asserting a claim based in quasi-contract should be GRANTED. 
IV. Count IV: Breach of Written Contract 
6 As Defendants correctly point out, applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment on these facts would have the 
potentially pernicious effect of permitting parties to change the terms of an otherwise enforceable express contract 
by asserting a claim for unjust enrichment based upon an entirely separate unenforceable promise that supposedly 
altered or modified the terms of the express contract. 
7 The Court's determination might have been different if Plaintiff were either challenging the validity of the 
employment agreement or if Plaintiff were relying on terms of the oral agreement clearly distinct from his 
employment contract with Thomas Motors, such as the plaintiffs in Harbough v. Myron Harbough Motor, Inc., 100 
Idaho 295 (1979). In Harbough, the plaintiffs alleged that they left other careers to take control of their father's 
business in consideration for the father's promis~e to transfer thebusines& totnem: fd at 298:' TheplainriflS also~ 
contended the agreement prOVIded that, in addition to their salaries, they would receive a credit for a portion of the 
net profits of the business which would accrue toward the eventual purchase of the business. Id If there were a 
similar term in Plaintiffs alleged agreement here, clearly separate and distinct from his salary, the court would have 
been more inclined to find that an unjust enrichment claim is proper here. 
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In Count IV of the Verified Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for damages for breach 
of the 2000 written Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA).8 Defendants move for summary 
judgment dismissing this claim on the ground that Plaintiff breached the PSA and failed to 
perform or attempt to perform any of his obligations under the PSA. While the Verified 
Complaint is not clear as to how Defendants aIIegedly breached the PSA, Plaintiff asserts that 
there is a material issue of fact regarding whether Defendants signed the PSA before they sold 
Thomas Motors in March 2006. Plaintiff further asserts that if Defendants signed the PSA 
before seIling Thomas Motors in March 2006, they failed to notify Plaintiff of that fact and 
Plaintiff''was stilI deprived of the benefit of Thomas Motors before he had an opportunity to 
perform his obligations under the contracts. In other words, under those circumstances, Ron 
would have breached the contracts by seIling Thomas Motors." In essence, Plaintiff claims that 
Defendants either: (1) failed to sign the PSA before conveying Thomas Motors in March 2006, 
in which case there was no enforceable written contract between the parties; or (2) signed the 
PSA and breached it by transferring Thomas Motors to a third party in 2006. In the first case, 
since there was no enforceable written contract, Plaintiffs claim for breach of the PSA is not 
properly interposed. In the second case, Defendants could not have breached the PSA in March 
2006, by the express terms of that Agreement. 
Breach of contract occurs when there is an unexcused failure to perform a contractual 
duty. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 160 P.3d 743, 748 (Idaho 2007). The PSA 
provides, in Paragraph 2.1, that the contract was to close on September 1, 2001. There is no 
8 In fact, Plaintiffreiterates in a footnote attached to the caption for Count IV that there was no written contract 
between the parties. While the Court finds that it strains the concept of "pleading in the alternative" to deny 
the existence of a contract and, at the same time, assert a claim for its breach, the Court cannot find a 
basis upon which such a claim is improper, as a matter of law. 
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evidence in the record that the parties agreed to postpone or change that closing date. In fact, 
Plaintiffs own allegations that he was unaware Defendants ever signed the PSA precludes such 
a finding. Pursuant to Paragraph 19.1 of the PSA, Plaintiffwas required, as a condition 
precedent to closing, to obtain an exclusive franchise from Chrysler. Defendants have adduced 
uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff failed to obtain such a franchise. Pursuant to Paragraph 
20.4 of the PSA, the failure to close on September 1,2001, due to the failure ofa condition 
precedent set forth in Paragraph 19 of the PSA terminated the parties' respective obligations 
under the PSA. In light of this, Defendants could not have breached the PSA by transferring 
Thomas Motors to a third party in 2006.9 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count IV of the 
Verified Complaint asserting a claim for damages for breach of the September 2000 PSA is 
granted. 
V. Count V: Fraud 
Count V of the Verified Complaint seeks damages for fraud based upon Defendant 
Ronald Thomas's alleged promise to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff when he turned sixty-
two (62), sixty-three (63), or retired. Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this 
claim based upon the lack of any evidence in the record to support a finding or inference that the 
alleged promise was false when made. 
9 In fact, the specific terms of the PSA appear to have no relevance in this case, except possibly as evidence that the 
parties intended to modifY any alleged prior agreement. However, there is no need for the Court to rule on this issue 
at the present time. 
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A party seeking to recover on a claim of fraud must establish nine different elements by 
clear and convincing evidence: (1) A statement of fact; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that 
the statement was material; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity when made; (5) the 
speaker's intent to induce reliance on the statement; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the statement's 
falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on the statement; (8) the hearer's right to rely on the statement; 
and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Country Cove Dev't, Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 293 
(Idaho 2006). Traditional principles and standards governing summary judgment generally also 
govern the granting of summary judgment on the issue of fraud. Id. Thus, a plaintiff resisting a 
motion for summary judgment on a fraud claim must show sufficient evidence in the record to 
create a material issue of fact on each element. Id. With respect to the requirement that the 
statement at issue be one of fact, generally, a claim for fraud will not lie for statements 
regarding future events. Id. at 294. An exception to the general rule exists for a defendant's 
promise or statement that he or she will undertake an act, if the plaintiff establishes that the 
defendant made the promise with no intent to keep it. Id. Plaintiff apparently relies upon this 
exception in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on his fraud claim. 
The Court has already found, in evaluating Count I of the Verified Complaint, that an 
issue of fact exists as to whether Defendant Ronald Thomas promised to transfer Thomas 
Motors to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record that would 
support a finding that Ronald Thomas did not intend to keep the promise at the time he made it. 
Instead, all of Plaintiff's evidence refers to events that allegedly occurred some time after 
Ronald Thomas made the promise~ his alleged misus~ of funds fof his own benefit, his aHeged 
refusal to invest resources to improve the business, his alleged refusal to enter into a written 
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contract, and his later sale ofthe business to a third party without Plaintiff's knowledge or 
consent. In fact, Plaintiff himself has also adduced significant evidence tending to support a 
finding that Ronald Thomas did intend to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff. For instance, in 
his Affidavit in Opposition, Plaintiff states that between 1997 and 2006, Ronald Thomas 
"repeatedly stated to me, or in my presence, that Thomas Motors would be mine whenever he 
retired." Plaintiff also asserts that, from 1997 through 2005, during family gatherings, Plaintiff, 
Ronald Thomas, Defendant Elaine Thomas, and Plaintiff's brothers spent hours discussing the 
future of Thomas Motors and that all of those discussions "turned on the assumption that 
Thomas Motors would belong to me whenever Ron retired." This assertion is confirmed by the 
affidavits of Monte Thomas and Rick Thomas. In addition, Monte Thomas states, in his 
Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, that, in August 2000, Ronald 
Thomas announced to the staff that "Thomas Motors was going to be Drew's .... " 
In light of this evidence, the Court cannot find that there exists sufficient factual 
evidence for the jury to find that Ronald Thomas did not intend to keep his promise to transfer 
Thomas Motors to Plaintiff at the time he allegedly made the promise. Accordingly, Defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Count V of the Verified Complaint asserting a 
claim for fraud. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing Count I and Count II of the Verified Complaiiitis DENIED; and Plaintiff's Motion 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 17 -
000'756 
for Summary Judgment dismissing Counts III, IV, and V of the Verified Complaint IS 
GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'J ~~~--
Dated this V1't> day of November, 2007. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' l\10TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 18 -
O()075~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
Sarah H. Arnett 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
CfL 
Dated this 42 day of November, 2007. 
SHELL Y GANNON 
Clerk of the Court 
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William A. Morrow 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No.: 2451,6023 
wam@whitepeterson.com 
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, 
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STATE OF IDAHO r 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
AFFIDA VIT OF DENNIS 
WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DENNIS WILKINSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
AFFIDA VIT OF DENNIS WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
0007Gi 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, 
and make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference as if set 
forth in full is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants' First Set of 
Discovery Requests. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this -Z '(' day of April, 2~ __ 
" ~t'----
Dennis Wilkinson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Dennis Wilkinson this ;.4 day of April, 
2008. 
G~yuvVh ,++~ Q 
(SEAL) Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 0 I - {<1 "d-o 13 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 








Facsimile No. 208-365-4196 
WHITE PETERSON, P .A. 
ImhlW:\ W orklT\ Thomas, R Drew 21971 \ Thomas Motors, IndlOO\PleadingslAff of DPW,Response to Partial SJ. doc 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
William A. Morrow 
James M. Vavrek 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No.: 2451, 7256 
wam@whitepeterson.com 
jvavrek@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 




CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his undersigned attorneys 
of record, the law firm of White Peterson" r.A .. and responds to Defendants' First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, as follows: 
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GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff to the 
extent they seek contentions and information which Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to 
develop. Plaintiff has not completed its own discovery and investigation is continuing. 
Accordingly, the responses that follow are based upon the best knowledge, information, and 
belief of Plaintiff at this time and are to be considered preliminary in nature, subject to 
substantial revision as Plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct further research and discovery. 
Plaintiff will make a good faith effort to respond to all discovery requests based on the 
information presently available to him, with the understanding that his responses are not 
necessarily complete and further research may require revision of any and all responses. 
Plaintiff reserves the right to make any further responses if it appears that any omission or error 
has been made in connection with these responses or if more accurate information is or has 
become available. These responses are made without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to use in later 
discovery or to present at hearing such evidence as may later be discovered or evaluated. 
2. These responses are made subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, 
materiality, and admissibility. These responses are subject to all objections that would require 
the exclusions of any statement, material, or information herein provided if the discovery request 
were asked concerning any statement, material, or information made or possessed by witnesses 
present and testifying in court. All such objections are reserved and may be interposed at the 
ti1ll1: uf trial or any hearing in this matter. 
3-. Plaintiff specifically objectS t() tIiesediscovery requests to the extent that they 
seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the 
rules governing the discovery of facts of experts as set forth in Rule 26, Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. Plaintiff has, to the extent possible, construed each request as requesting only 
information and/or documents not subject to any applicable protection. lbis objection is 
intended to apply to all discovery requests that seek such information and will not be repeated 
specifically for each request to which it applies. 
No incidental or implied admissions are intended. The fact that Plaintiff has responded to any 
discovery request or part thereof should not be taken as an admission that Plaintiff accepts that 
the discovery request or the response or objection thereto constitutes admissible evidence. 
Similarly, the fact that Plaintiff has responded to all or part of a request is not intended to and 
shall not be construed to be a waiver by Plaintiff of all or part of any objection to other requests. 
Plaintiff's answers to any discovery requests herein do not constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's right 
to object to any future additional, or supplemental discovery requests regarding the same or 
similar matters. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify each and every individual or person who has or 
purports to have personal knowledge of the facts of this case, whether it relates to the liability 
issues or damages issues, and provide a statement of what personal knowledge you believe they 
have or purport to have. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving such objections, 
discovery i$ ongoing; Plaintiff nas··nof identified every person who may have knowledge 
regarding the facts of this case and, as such, reserves the right to supplement this answer when 
such information is discovered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( e), and/or the 
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Court's scheduling order in this matter. At present, Plaintiff believes the following persons have 
knowledge regarding this action: 
(1) R. Drew Thomas 
CIO White Peterson 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
(2) Ronald O. Thomas 
(3) Elaine K. Thomas 
(4) Monte Thomas 
(5) Rick Thomas 
(6) 1. Robin Wilde 
P.O. Box 985 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
(7) Shirley Youngstrom 
(8) Sandy and Doug Mills 
(9) Jan Ron Flowers 
715 W. Navaho 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
(10) Penny Hulbert 
8620 Dewey Road 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
(11) Katie Peterson 
CIO White Peterson 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
(12) Kyle Thomas 
C/O White Peterson 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
(13) Vaughn Waggoner, Washington Trust Bank 
(14) John Nunley, Chrysler Financial 
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(15) Earling Johannesen 
(16) Don Rogers 
(17) Tracy Lankford - Service Manager, Thomas Motors 
(18) Richard Nunn - Parts Manager, Thomas Motors 
(19) Kari Garner-Secretary, Thomas Motors 
(20) Cory Thomas, Salesman, Thomas Motors 
(21) D. Spillett, Salesman, Thomas Motors 
(22) John Cates, Fonner OwnerlManager, NAPA - Emmett, Idaho 
(23) Heather Strand 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify any and all lay witnesses you intend to can at the 
trial of this action, and describe the substance of their anticipated testimony. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.2: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No.2 on the 
grounds that Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not require a litigant to disclose 
the names and addresses of intended witnesses. Furthennore, Plaintiff has not yet identified 
witnesses to be called to testify in the trial of this matter but will disclose his witnesses pursuant 
to the Court's Rule 16 Order. Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff has not 
yet identified witnesses for trial, but may call any or all of the persons identified in Answer to 
Interrogatory No.1. TIris answer may be supplemented as discovery progresses. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please identify each and every person whom you expect to call as 
an expert witness al trial, and describe the substance of their expected testimony. Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 26{b)( 4), for each expert witness you intend to call at the trial of this case, please 
describe the substance of the opinions to which each such expert is expected to testify, and 
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explain the underlying facts and data upon which each such expert's opinions are based, in 
conformity with Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.3: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 4 to the 
extent it seeks information regarding experts retained but not expected to testify in direct 
violation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to, and without 
waiving this objection, Plaintiff has not retained any experts at this time. To the extent Plaintiff 
retains any experts, this response will be supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify any and all exhibits you intend to use at trial for 
any purpose. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.4: Objection. TIris Interrogatory requires a disclosure 
of material which is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or which is 
work product protected from disclosure by IcJaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Without waiving, 
and subject to these objections, Plaintiff has not yet determined which documents will be used as 
exhibits at the trial of this matter. This answer will be supplemented pursuant to the Rule 16 
Scheduling Order in this matter. Plaintiff also reserve the right to use as exhibits any and all 
documents attached to or referred to in either party's discovery responses, or any documents 
referred to or used as an exhibit to any depositions taken in this matter. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: In your Complaint in this case, you claim there was an agreement 
by the individual defendants to "give" you the business of Thomas Motors, Inc. Regarding this 
allegation, made several times in your Complaint, please identify and explain the details 
surrounding this alleged agreement, inclUding the following: 
(a) The specific date(s) upon any such agreement was purportedly made; 
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(b) Identify each and every individual who participated in any communications 
wherein this such agreement was allegedly reached; 
(c) Identify the location where such agreement was purportedly reached (e.g. by 
phone, or in person, and if so, where); 
(d) Identify and explain each and every term of such agreement, including listing 
each and everything you would have been "given" under this agreement, and each and every 
thing you were requested to do under such agreement; and 
(e) If your response to subparagraph (d) includes any real property you believe you 
would have been "given" in the agreement purportedly reached with your parents, identify with 
specificity the real property you believe would have been included as part of that agreement. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.5: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, this Interrogatory is vague and 
overly broad and burdensome. Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff states 
that beginning in 1997 and continuing up until the few moIiths before Defendants began 
marketing Thomas Motors for sale Ronald O. Thomas repeatedly had discussions with Plaintiff 
indicating that in return for Plaintiff's work, knowledge, and experience at Thomas Motors it was 
Ronald Thomas' intention to give the dealership and real property on which Thomas Motors was 
situated to Plaintiff when he retired. It was in reliance on these conversations, that Plaintiff left 
his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and went to Thomas Motors and it was in reliance on these 
conversations and assurances thathereniainedat Thomas Motors over the course of Defendants' 
ownership of Thomas Motors. Over the years, these conversations took place at various places 
and locales including the Thomas' former residence in Sweet, Idaho, the Thomas Motors 
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dealership, the office at Lot of Cars in Emmett, Idaho, in various automobiles while Defendant 
Ronald Thomas and Plaintiff went on drives to discuss the business, and in various telephone 
conversations throughout the years. These conversations were often in private but persons with ' 
direct knowledge about these conversations as well as Defendant Ronald Thomas' agreement 
with Plaintiff include, but are not limited to: Monte Thomas, Rick Thomas, Shirley Youngstrom, 
Jan Flowers, Elaine Thomas, and Rob Wilde. 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please provide your employment history, including the following: 
(a) IdentitY each of your employers; 
(b) IdentitY the dates of employment; 
(c) IdentitY your position or job title with each employer; 
(d) Identify and explain the job functions you performed for each such employer; 
(e) IdentitY your supervisor or boss at each such place of employment; and 
(f) Identify the compensation terms you had with each such employer, including the 
specific rate of pay, and how much you earned on a weekly, monthly and/or 
annually with each such employer as well as a description of any and all benefits 
at each such employment (other than salary); and 
(g) Describe the reasons you left each such employment. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.6: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, this Interrogatory is vague and 
overly broad and burdensome in that it placesnotiIDe lirilltatlons on what it is requesting. 
Furthennore, given the lack of a time limitation, Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is not 
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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving, and subject to these 
objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: 
(1) From approximately 1984 thought 1989, Plaintiff worked for Morris Roofing in 
Washington State. Plaintiff performed general labor and roofmg work during this period and 
worked for his then father-in-law. While Plaintiff is not exactly sure about the wage he was paid 
during this period, to the best of his recollection he believes he was paid approximately $10.00 
per hour. He left this position to return to the Treasure Valley and take a position selling cars 
with Lanny Berg Chevrolet. 
(2) From approximately 1989 through early 1997 Plaintiff worked at Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho. During this period he rose from a salesman in the new and used 
car division to manager of the new car division. During the majority of this period Plaintiff was 
paid on a commission basis, however, when he was named manager he was assured he was to 
make no less $60,000 per year (which had been his approximate salary as a salesman). Lanny 
Berg was Plaintifr s supervisor while at Lanny Berg Chevrolet. 
(3) From approximately 1997 through 2005 Plaintiff was worked at Thomas Motors 
in Emmett, Idaho. During this period he served as General Manager and was responsible for the 
day-to-day operations of Thomas Motors. During this period, Plaintitrs salary ranged from 
approximately $30,000 a year up to approximately $60,000 - well below market value for his 
position of employment. Plaintiff took this position and salary based on the agreement he had 
with Defendant Ronald Thomas whereby in return for working at this reduced, below-market 
salary he would be given Thomas Mot()rs and the real property it was situated upon when Ronald 
Thomas retired. Plaintifr s employment ended with Thomas Motors when Defendants sold 
Thomas Motors in violation of any and all agreements with Plaintiff. 
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INTERROGATORY NO.7: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an "Agreement for 
Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," which contains signatures for yourself and the individual 
Defendants. In your Complaint in this action, you appear to dispute the validity of this contract, 
where your Verified Complaint states ''that no written contract was ever validly executed 
betwcen the parties." Regarding this allegation, please explain and describe in full and complete 
detail each and every fact upon which you base the claim that this written contract was not 
validly executed between the parties. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.7: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthennore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that 
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to Exhibit "A". 
Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: While Plaintiff 
acknowledges at one point signing Exhibit "A," said agreement was never validly executed by 
Defendants. In particular, circwnstantial evidence demonstrates that the signatures could not and 
were not procured in the manner reflected on the purported agreement Furthermore, evidence 
and testimony indicate that instead of signing the Exhibit "A" when it was presented to him, 
Defendant placed the unsigned agreement into his desk. Furthermore, shortly after being 
presented with Exhibit "A" Defendant Ronald O. Thomas telephoned Plaintiff and indicated that 
he would not be signing Exhibit "A" proclaiming: "Why would I sell you something that I was 
just going to give you?" Plaintiff then believed that the written agreement had not been agreed to 
nor was he ever provided any ·evidence or docwnentatlon to the contrary and the parties 
continued to work under the existing verbal understanding without reference to any conditions 
and/or requirements allegedly contained in Exhibit "A". Furthermore, it is the belief of Plaintiff 
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that the signature of Defendant Elaine Thomas may not be her valid signature and instead her 
signature was affixed to Exhibit "A" by Defendant Ronald O. Thomas well after the date at 
which it was purportedly signed. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: In your Complaint in this matter, you claim that as a result of an 
alleged breach of contract, you have been damaged in an amount to be proven with specificity at 
trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this damages claim, please identify and explain the 
following: 
(a) Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard; 
(b) Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and 
(c) To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, 
please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in 
such amounts. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving these objections, 
Defendants are currently in the process of itemizing the damages they have suffered. When said 
list is completed, Defendants will disclose the same. Damages are expected to include, but may 
not be limited to, the following: 
(1) Loss of right to ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real 
on which Thomas Motors is situated; 
(2} Loss of income based on reliance on agreement and promises with Defendants 
based on his taking a position with Thomas Motors at a substantially below market salary 
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thereby providing Defendants with a substantial benefit for which Plaintiff is now entitled to 
compensation based on Defendant's sale of Thomas Motors to a third party; 
(3) Loss of future income from Thomas Motors as Defendants sold Thomas Motors 
to third party in breach of agreement with Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as more information is obtained 
through the discovery process. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: In Count Two of your Complaint in this action, you claim that as a 
direct result of Defendants' purported breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
you have suffered damages in an amount exceeding $10,000 to be proved with specificity at 
trial. Regarding this claim of damages, please identify, describe, and explain in full and 
complete detail, the following: 
(a) Identity with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard; 
(b) Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and 
(c) To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, 
please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in 
such amounts. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In Count Three of your Complaint in this action, you claim that 
the costs of Defendants' failure to compensate you for the actual value of the benefit you 
conferred upon them, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched in an amount in excess of 
$lOOyOOO to be proved with specificity af triaL Regarding t:IUs claim of damages, please identify, 
describe, and explain in full and complete detail the following: 
(a) Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard; 
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(b) Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and 
(c) To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, 
please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in 
such amounts. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, you claim as a 
result of the Defendants' purported breach of the written agreements, you have been damaged in 
an amount to be proven with specificity at trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this claim 
of damages, please identify, describe, and explain in fun and complete detail the following: 
(a) Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard; 
(b) Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and 
(c) To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, 
please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in 
such amounts. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: In Count Five of your Complaint in this action, you claim that as 
a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' purported fraudulent assertions, you have been 
harmed in an amount to be proven with specificity at trial, but is in excess of$100,000. 
(a) Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard; 
(b) Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and 
(c) To the extent not a1readyaddress in response to sub:pamgraphS (a) and (b) above, 
please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in 
such amounts. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, you claim that 
you reviewed written documents prepared by an attorney, and signed said documents, which 
were then delivered to the Defendant Ronald Thomas, with regard to this assertion at paragraph 
43 of your Verified Complaint, please identify the written documents or agreements being 
referenced in this assertion, and the date that you signed said documents. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Without waiving, and subject to these objections, 
Plaintiff responds by referring you to please see Response to Request for Production Number 10 
and Answer to Interrogatory Number 7. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: In Count Four of your Complaint in this action, referencing 
written agreements between you and the Defendants, you claim at paragraph 45 that the 
Defendants failed to abide by the terms of said agreement and as such have materially breached 
it. Regarding in this assertion, please identify and describe in full and complete detain each and 
every term of said agreement you believe the Defendants failed to abide by, and describe in full 
and complete detain how the Defendants failed to abide by said terms. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that 
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meanitlg andlor signIficance to any alleged 
written agreement. Finally, Plaintiff is still in the process of reviewing these documents and 
determining the extent to which any performance was rendered pursuant to same and, therefore, 
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Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery takes place in this matter. 
Without waiving, and subject to these objections Plaintiff states the following: 
(1) With regard to the alleged "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," 
pursuant to Section 16.3, within ten (to) days of the agreement being entered Defendants were 
required to provide to Plaintiff: (a) a census of Defendants' employees; (b) a written disclosure 
of all benefits made available to Defendants' employees; and (c) access to all personnel files for 
Defendants' employees. 
(2) With regard to the alleged "Management Contract," Plaintiff believes that the 
Defendants failed in the following respects: 
(a) Defendants' failed to loan Thomas Motors $300,000 as required by 
Section 5. 
(b) Defendants failed to turn over responsibility for any and all decisions with 
regard to the operation of Thomas Motors as required by Section 2. 
(c) Defendants' failed to turn over control over the decision making ability 
regarding the expenditure of revenues and working capital as required by Section 2. 
(d) Defendants failed to turn over control of all employment, compensation, 
and termination of all corporate employees to Plaintiff as required by Section 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an "Agreement for 
Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," which contains signatures for yourself and the individual 
Defendants in this action. Please describe and explain in full and complete detain each and every 
effort made by you to comply with the requirements of this Agreement. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis 
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the 
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attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that 
this Interrogatory attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to any alleged 
written agreement. Finally, Plaintiff is still in the process of reviewing these documents and 
determining the extent to which any performance was rendered pursuant to same and, therefore, 
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery takes place in this matter. 
Without waiving, and subject to these objections, Plaintiff states that because this agreement was 
not ever validly executed no performance was required of him and the acts of Defendants, based 
on their failure to either perform required acts and/or inform Plaintiff that the agreement had 
been executed excused any performance that mayor may not have been required. 
RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce copies of any and all exhibits you 
intend to use at the trial of this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please see Answer to Interrogatory 
Number 4. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please attach a copy of the educational and 
professional qualifications of all expert witnesses you will call at trial and also attach copies of 
each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please see Answer to Interrogatory 
Number 3. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce copies of your tax returns for the 
calendar years 1995 through 2005 inclusive: 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please see documents produced 
herewith (Bates Nos. 1-75. Plaintiff will supplement this response as he is able to acquire copies 
of additional returns responsive to this request. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce copies of any and all docwnents 
contained in your personnel file regarding your employment with Lanny Berg Chevrolet. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Objection. This Request for 
Production seeks information that is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
However, subject to, and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff has no responsive docwnents 
in his possession. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce copies of any and all documents 
which have any tendency to prove or relate to the amount of damages you arc claiming in this 
action under each or any of Counts One through Five, inclusive, of your Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: See Answer to Interrogatory 
Nwnber8. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce copies of any and all written 
agreements between you and any or all of the Defendants in this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Plaintiff objects to this Request for 
Production in that it is vague. Furthennore, Plaintiff objects to the extent that this Request 
attaches any validity and legal meaning and/or significance to any purported written agreement. 
However, subject to and without waiving said objection, please see documents produced 
herewith (Bates Nos. 76-117. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce copies of any and all docwnents 
which you believe have any tendency to prove or relate to any alleged oral agreement between 
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you and any of the Defendants to the effect that the Defendants agreed to "give" you the business 
when the Defendant Ron Thomas turned 63 years old. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Plaintiff objects to this Request for 
Production in that it is vague. Plaintiff further objects to this Interrogatory on the basis and to the 
extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the attorney/client and/or 
work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving this objection, Plaintiff is not in 
possession of any documents that are responsive to this request. As discovery in this matter is 
taken, Plaintiffwill supplement its response. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: To the extent not otherwise covered by any other 
Request above, please produce copies of any and all documents which describes, lists, proves, or 
relates to all compensation you earned while working for Lanny Berg Chevrolet. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Plaintiff objects to this Request in 
that it is vague, overly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. Subject to, and without waiving this objection, please see documents 
produced herewith. This response will be supplemented as Plaintiff is able to locate documents 
that are responsive to this request. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a copy of an 
"Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets." Please produce copies of any and all 
documents which have any tendency to evidence, support, or relate to any efforts you made to 
comply with the provisions of this Agreement. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST Fo.R PRODUCTION NO.9: Plaintiff objects to this 
interrogatory in that the Request assumes that the "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business 
Assets" was validly executed between the parties. Further, this Interrogatory seeks information 
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that is protected by the attorney/client and/or work product privilege. Subject to, and without 
waiving this objection, Plaintiff is not possession of any documents that are responsive to this 
request at this time. This response will be supplemented as Plaintiff is able to locate documents 
that are responsive to this request. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all of the written 
documents or agreements referenced in your response to Interrogatory No. 13 above. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: See Response to Interrogatory 
Number 13 and documents produced herewith (Bates Nos. 76-117). 
~ 
DATED this Jff-day of July, 2006. 
WHITE PETERSON, P .A. 
~~:!t.ek~~":========-----=-----­
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
R. DREW THOMAS, being first duly sworn, depose and say that he is the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled matter, hat he has read the foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and 
believes the facts therein stated to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
ti 
DATED this;(f day of April, 2008. 
/ 
SUBSC~P'.~P',~ND SWORN to before me this ;tJ day of April, 2008. 
"" "'.. Hb "'#. " t-. \'I" IC/.r'#. 
f~~~~'\ ~d < t1tJ. t{~ 
~ \ p ",\ (., I j Notary Public for Idaho 
'\ IS' ..... US ••••• .§' l My Commission Expires: 0 I -/<{ ..... J013 
...... "<1 •••••••• Q'" ,,0; 
SW/W:\WOrk\T\Th:~",lHIi9.1~~~~omas Motors, Inc.()OO\DiscoverylResponses to 1st Discovery Requests.doc 
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John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street. Stc. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise. JD 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett. Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
A ttomeys for Defendants 
L[~~~~:~ 
t·;A~ 0 1~"....,...· ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW Tl lOMAS. 
Plaintift: 
VS. 
RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K. 
fHOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. 
fNe., an Idaho Corporation. 
Dctendants~ 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2006-492 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON 
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The plaintiffs response to the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment falls 
far short of being legally or factually sufficient to support the defeat the Motion. In short, there is 
simply no legitimate question about the fact that Idaho's Statute of FratJds bars that part of the 
plaintiff s claim that the alleged oral agreement at issue in this case inclu<ied the future transfer of 
real property. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLIARL Y 
DOES NOT APPLY HERE 
The plaintiffs primary response to the Statute of Frauds argl}Il1ent is, as predicted, to 
claim that the defendants are equitably estopped. The plaintiff makes this argument, however, on 
the basis of a flawed and incorrect interpretation of the elements of such defense, which are 
otherwise very well-established in Idaho. 
The plaintiff argues the "elements of equitable estoppel are not the same as those of 
fraud." A short answer to this is - yes, they are, at least in all material senses that matter here. As 
the Am Jur treatise states: 
In its last analysis, the Doctrine of Estoppel rests upon the principles 
of fraud. Equitable estoppel requires deliberate deception and is 
based on fraud, actual or constructive; without such fraud there can 
be no estoppel. 
28 Am Jur. 2d, "Estoppel and Waiver" § 47. 
More specifically, the plaintiff argues that the difference between the elements of 
fraud and equitable estoppel are that with equitable estoppel "there is nQ requirement that the-
defendants knew or should have known that the statements were materially false when they were 
made as in the case of fraud." (Plain/~fJ's Brief at p. il). There are no citations or legal support of 
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any kind offered for this statement. This is entirely inaccurate, as Idaho l_w makes clear. 
There are no shortage of appellate cases in Idaho addressing the elements of equitable 
estoppel. See, e.g., Youngv. Idaho Dept. o/Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,853 P.2d 615 (1993); 
Medical Services Group. Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310. 126 Idaho 90,878 P.2d 789 (1994); Scott v. 
Castle. 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d /163 (Ct. App. 1983); Record Steel & ColtSt. Inc. v. Martel Const. 
Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 995 (Ct. App. 1996); Bjornstad v. Pery, 92 Idaho 402, 443 P.2d 999 
(1968): Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 531 P.ld 227 (1975); Tiffany v. 
City of Payette. 121 Idaho 396.825 P.2d ';93 (1992); JR. SimplotCo. v. Chemetics Intern, Inc., 126 
Idaho 532,887 P.2d 1039 (1994). Every single one of these cases lists as the first element that the 
party claiming equitable estoppel must prove there was "a false representation or concealment of a 
material fact." 
The most recent appellate decision in Idaho addressing the elements required to 
establish equitable estoppel appears to he Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 141 
Idaho 754, 118 P.3d 86 (2005). There the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
F our elements are required to establish a claim for equitable estoppel: 
(1) there must be a false representation or concealment of!\ material 
fact made with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) the 
party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the 
truth; (3) there was intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon; 
and (4) the party asserting estoppel relied upon the misrepresentation 
or concealment to his or her prejudice. All of the above factors are 
of equal importance and there can be no estoppel absent any of these 
elements. 
Sorensen, supra, 1,J] Idaho at 759 (emphasis addedL The Idah();\ppellate Courts have thus made 
it clear, including in its most recent pronouncement. that in order to establish equitable estoppel, a 
party must prove there was a "false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual 
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or constructive knowledge of the truth." Jd. Otherwise stated, it is clear that the plaintiff needs to 
establish that any statements made by the defendant Ron Thomas back in 1997 when the oral 
agreement was made, was a representation that was false when made with actual or constructive 
knowledge of the truth at that time. This is frankly not a debatable point ofIdaho law. 
It is also not debatable that this required element to establish equitable estoppel tracks 
exactly with the initial elements necessary to establish fraud. It has already been established as the 
law of this case that the plaintiff cannot satisfy this element. The Court has already dismissed the 
plaintiff s fraud claim on the basis that the plaintiff was unable to establish that the defendants made 
any knowingly false statements at the time the alleged oral agreement was reached. As was 
addressed at length in the prior summary judgment proceedings, the best the plaintiff could possibly 
establish, even construmg every doubt in his favor, would be to the effect that the defendants' 
statements about wanting to give the business to the plaintiff at the time the oral agreement was 
reached was true when made, but that the defendant subsequently changed his mind years after the 
fact. See, Order on De/imdants ' Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 16-17. 
As such, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot establish the elements necessary to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel here as a matter oflaw. The Statute of Frauds thus legally bars the 
plaintiffs claim for breach of oral agreement as involving the transfer of any real property. 
It is also worth noting that there would be nothing even remotely unusual about such 
a ruling. The plaintiff is seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel which is well 
recognized to be a doctrine that is not favored in the law and should be applied only in exceptional~ 
circumstances (which are definitely not present here). As stated in the Am Jur treatise: 
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Inasmuch as the doctrine of estoppel operates to prevent showing the 
truth, and is more or less in the nature of a forfeiture, estoppels have 
often been characterized as not favored in the law. They are to be 
applied rarely, only from necessity, and only in extraordinary 
circumstances. The Doctrine of Estoppel must be applied with great 
care and the equity must be strong in its favor. 
* * * 
Estoppel will be sustained only upon clear and convincing evidence. 
The Doctrine of Estoppel when misapplied may be a most effective 
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. 
28 Am Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver. § 3. The Statute of Frauds defense sought to be invoked by the 
defendants here, 011 the other hand, represents a time-honored principle of Idaho law. In fact, the 
section ofIdaho's Statute of Frauds that applies to real property has remained unchanged since the 
Territorial Legislature adopted it in 1881, more than 125 years ago. See, e.g., Lexington Heights v. 
Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276.280.92 P.3d 526 (2004) 
THE PlJHPOn.J'ED AGREEMENT DOES NOT EVEN CONTAIN 
A DESCIUPTION OF TilE REAL PROPERTY TO BE SOLD 
The plaintiff now submits yet another affidavit to the Court changing or otherwise 
adding to the terms of the alleged oral agreement he claims to have reached with the defendants back 
in 1997, compared with his prior deposition testimony or affidavits. Without going into these prior 
inconsistencies, this time the plaintiff affirmatively attests that when the defendants promised him 
the Thomas Motors business when he retired, he now adds: "The business, as I understood it, 
included the real property that Thomas Motors was on." Affidavit (!f R. Drew Thomas at ~ 5 at p. 
2. It is noted of course that the plaintiff does not even claim in this new Affidavit that the defendant 
actually made a specific promise that he would give him real property. Instead, the plaintiff claims 
that the defendants told him he would be getting "the business," and that he understood that such 
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business would include the real property upon which the business was located. The plaintiff is thus 
apparently looking to bind the defendants to an obligation to give him valuable real property, when 
they actually made no specific promise to do so. 
In addition, the only description of the property that the plaintiff"understood" he was 
supposed to get was "the real property that Thomas Motors was on." This hardly amounts to an 
adequate description of the real property, and in fact, is fatally incomplete under Idaho law. 
It has been the law in Idaho for a century that any agreement involving real estate 
must not only be in written form, "but that the agreement must also contain such a description ofthe 
property agreed to be sold that it can be ascertained without resort to parol evidence." See, e.g .. 
Allen v. Kitchen. 16 Idaho 133. 137, 100 P. 1052, (1909); Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 
Idaho 276, 281. 92 P.3d 526 (12004). The Idaho Appellate Courts have strongly adhered to this 
principle, a point illustrated in the Lexington Heights decision made just several years ago. In 
Lexington Heights. the owner/seller of real property owned a 95 acre parcel of property. A 
developer entered into a written contract with the owner/seller purchasing 90 of the 95 acres, with 
the owner/seller retaining 5 acres. Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 278. The written agreement 
specified that the five acres to be kept by the owner/seller were five acres that would include the 
already existing residential dwelling, tennis court, volleyball court and swimming pool. Id 
However, the written agreement did not provide a specific legal description of those five acres. Id 
This turned out to be fatal to the entire purchase and sale agreement. Ada County District Judge 
McLaughlin granted a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that "The agreement wa& 
unenforceable because it did not contain a sufficient legal description of the property being sold." 
Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 280. Despite numerous arguments by the appellant/developer on 
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appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously ruled: "The District did not err in holding that the 
Agreement was invalid because it did not contain a sufficient description of the property to be sold." 
Lexington Heights, J.f.O Idaho at 285. 
In the present case. the description of the real property being offered by the plaintiff 
as supposedly being part of an oral agreement is even less specific than that which was at issue in 
the Lexington Heights case. The plaintifI here is simply offering a self serving conclusion that he 
"understood" the real property was to be included in the oral agreement and was the land "that 
Thomas Motors was on." That is no more specific, of course, than the five acre parcel at issue in the 
Lexington Heights case which identified a five acre parcel that held the residential dwelling, a tennis 
court, a swimming pool and a volleyball court. In fact, in Lexington Heights, there was an existing 
fence surrounding the structures that contained the house, swimming pool, tennis court and 
volleyball court. and the amuunt of land located inside that fence line was very close to being five 
acres in size. Lexington Heights, J.f.() Idaho at 283. The Idaho Supreme Court nevertheless held that 
the agreement was still invalid tor failure to more specifically identify or describe the five acre 
pan'c1 though the agreement was otherwise in a very detailed written agreement. Id. The same 
result should apply here, particularly when this case involves a pure oral agreement that is far less 
specific than the agreement involved in Lexington Heights. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS ANY AGREEMENT INVOLVING 
TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY 
The plaintiff also has a short section of his brief which appears to argue the Statute 
of Frauds is not applicahle to the land part of the oral agreement at issue in this case, because it was 
"incidental" part of the agreement. The plaintiff is seemingly suggesting that an 
agreement involving a transfer of reai property does not have to be in writing and comply with the 
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Statute of Frauds if the land part ofthe deal is somehow "incidental" to the overall agreement. If this 
argument is actually being made here, it is entirely without legal merit. There is no such rule oflaw 
in Idaho, and never has been. 
The only legal authority mentioned at any point in this short section of the plaintiffs 
brief is Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (]995). The Spence decision, however, in 
no way supports the proposition that an agreement involving transfer of land does not have to 
comply with the Statute of Frauds (i.e. be in writing) if it is "incidental" or otherwise just a part of 
a different oral agreement. Far frol11 it, the Spence court made it clear that the oral contract at issue 
in that case did not involve the transfer of land. As stated by the Court: 
The oral contact involved in this case simply does not fall within the 
purview of the Statute of Frauds. It was not an oral contr<wt for the 
sale of land .. , The oral contract was for the formation of a 
partnership for the purpose of developing a Christian retreat ranch. 
Incidental to thi5. oral contract was the transaction involving the land, 
but the initial dgreement did not depend on the transfer of land, 
except for the alleged tax purposes. The land had already been 
purchased and designed for the retreat, prior to the oral contract. 
*** 
The oral contract clearly was for the development of the retreat, and 
not for the sale of land. 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 771 (emphasis added). There is simply no reasonable way the 
Spence decision can be interpreted to mean anything other than what it says. The oral agreement at 
in Spence simply "did not involve the transfer ofreal property or land." In fact, the Court 
indicated the land "had already been purchased ... prior to the oral contract." The Court also made 
it that the oral contract at issue in the case was "clearly for the development of the retreat, and 
not for the sale of land." In dealing with the Statute of Frauds issue, the decision could hardly have 
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made it clearer that a transfer of land was not part of the oral agreement that was sought to be 
enforced by the plaintiff in that case. 
The Spence decision can in no way be said to support the proposition that a party can 
avoid the Statute of Frauds, and have an enforceable oral agreement that involves the transfer of 
land, if they could simply argue the land part of the deal was "incidental" to some other part of the 
deal. As stated above, there is no such rule of law in Idaho, and there never has been. The Idaho 
Statute of Frauds applying to real property has been the law of Idaho for more than 125 years, and 
there has never been an appellate case suggesting one can circumvent this finnly entrenched 
principle of Idaho law so easily, by just claiming the land part of the deal was somehow just an 
"inCIdental" part of a bigger deal. On the contrary, for as long as Idaho has been a state it has been 
the clear and unequivocal rule of law that any agreement "for the sale of real property. or of an 
interest therem" is ab<;olutely "invalid" unless it is in writing. I.e. § Q-503; I.e. § 9-505. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, and based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully request that the 
Court grant the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which would preclude any real property being 
included in the plaintiffs claim for breach of oral contract. 
1Ja. 
DATED this;l 1_ day of April, 2008. 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
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The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise ~gaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this li~ay of April, 2008, he caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis Wilkinson 
WHITE. PETERSON, PA 
5700 E. Franklin Rd .. Ste. 200 
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H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (F~) 
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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CV -2006-492 
In this action, Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged breach by Defendants, his parents, 
of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain or to be determined, in 
consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation oftnat dealership in the interim 
period. 
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In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, Defendants assert a 
number of defenses including two defenses based upon the existence of a written agreement 
between the parties that superseded any oral agreement between the parties. 
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in part on 
the basis that the alleged contract was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable and that Plaintiff 
was barred from adducing evidence of the contract by the statute offrauds. The court filed an 
order on November 26, 2007 denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect 
to Plaintiffs Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Claims (Counts I & II of the Complaint) and granting the motion with respect to the claims based 
upon Quasi Contract, Breach of certain written contracts, and Fraud. 
In denying Defendants' MSJ with respect to the breach of contract claim, the court found: 
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his 
employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building 
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of 
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary 
judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9-10. 
Subsequently, in addressing Defendants' Statute of Frauds argument, the Order states: 
However, it does not appear from any of Plaintiff s submissions that he has alleged 
Defendants promised to transfer anything other than Thomas Motors. If the jury 
determines that the contract included a promise to transfer real property, Defendants may 
renew their motion. (FN) Order, p. 11. 
DEFENDANTS' PRESENT MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment dismissing "any claim by the 
plaintiff that his alleged oral agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land. 
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This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact in establishing that any claim involving land is barred by Idaho's Statute of 
Frauds." 
I. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In 
determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all disputed facts liberally 
in favor of the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). 
Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made upon personal knowledge, set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. I.R.C.P.56(e). Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit must be attached or served with the affidavit. 
Id. When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent admissible 
evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in that 
party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial, but must 
set forth specific facts, in admissible form. Id 
The moving party may satisfy his or her initial burden by establishing the absence of 
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. McCorkle v. 
Northwestern Mutual Lifo Ins: Co:, 141 Idaho 550, 554 (2005). The movant may establish such 
lack of evidence either (1) by an affirmative showing based upon the moving party's own 
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evidence; or (2) by reviewing all of the nonmoving party's evidence to demonstrate that the 
proof of an essential element is absent. Id. Once the moving party does so, the burden again 
shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Id. 
II. Defendants' Motion 
It appears that Defendants made the instant motion because of the court's reservation of 
ruling, in its prior Order, on the statute of frauds issue pending the jury's resolution of whether 
or not the alleged oral agreement for the sale of Thomas Motors included real property. The 
court's intent in reserving ruling on the statute of frauds issue was to account for the possibility 
that Thomas Motors owned the real property alleged to be part of the oral agreement between 
the parties. It was not clear to the court, from the record on the prior motions, whether Thomas 
Motors owned any of the real property at issue. However, the parties established at the hearing 
on the instant motion that Thomas Motors does not, in fact, own the real property at issue. In 
light of this fact, the court finds that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 
dismissing any claim by Plaintiff for breach of an oral agreement to transfer real property should 
be granted. 
A. Evidence of an Agreement 
As noted above, in denying Defendants' prior motion for summary judgment on the 
breach of contract claim, the court found that that there were issues of material fact precluding 
summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to transfer Thomas 
Motors to him in consideration of his agreement to go to work for Thomas Motors. In addition, 
the court found that theaHegedagreemefif;as s() defined~was suffiCiently specific to survive 
Defendants' definiteness challenge on summary judgment. Since the parties have now clarified 
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that Thomas Motors does not, in fact, own any real property, the alleged agreement to transfer 
real property is not within the agreement as defined by the court in its prior Order. In fact, 
Plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence, either on the prior motion or the instant motion, 
for the court to conclude that there exist sufficient issues of material fact regarding the existence 
of an agreement for the transfer of real property to deny Defendants summary judgment on that 
issue. 
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting ofthe minds as evidenced 
by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 
703 (1989). This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. Id In a dispute over 
contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct and common 
understanding between the parties. Id Acceptance of an offer must be unequivocal and 
identical to the offer made. Potts Construction Co. v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho 
678,681 (2005). The parties' minds must meet on as to all the terms before a contract is formed. 
Id Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of 
the agreement and the assent of both parties. Id 
Plaintiffs Affidavit filed on August 13,2007, in opposition to Defendants' prior motion 
for summary judgment does not appear to mention real property at all. For instance, in 
paragraph 3 of that affidavit, Plaintiff states: 
As I also testified, my father repeatedly told me that if I left Lanny Berg to run the new 
car dealership in Emmett, the dealership would be mine whenever he retired .... 
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In paragraph 12 of that affidavit, the portion upon which the court relied in defining the 
agreement, for purposes of surviving summary judgment on the grounds of definiteness, Plaintiff 
states: 
Our agreement was that I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and experience in 
building Thomas Motors in exchange for his "giving" me the business when I retired. 
In fact, a subsequent statement in that same paragraph seems to militate against a conclusion that 
there was a subsidiary agreement for the transfer of real property: 
While I felt it would be fair and wanted to ensure that Ron and my mother received some 
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my receiving the business was 
not contingent upon my paying them retirement income. The retirement income might 
have been in the form of rental payments .... 
(emphasis added). The reference to rental payments seems reasonably to support the conclusion 
that Defendants were to retain ownership of any real property upon which the business was 
located. 
In his Affidavit in Opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff states: 
4. During my conversations with Ron prior to and during the summer of 1997 and 
repeatedly during the years 1997 through 2006, when I was managing and operating 
Thomas Motors, Ron made numerous promises to me that the business would be mine 
when he retired. 
5. That business, as I understood it, included the real property that Thomas Motors 
was on. 
6. At no time during our numerous conversations regarding the transfer of the 
business did Ron ever indicate that the real property was not part of the business that he 
was going to transfer to me upon his retirement. 
Plaintiff also directs the court to his answer~ tQ :Dt!fenrlants.interrogatoriesin which Plaintiff··· 
states, in response to Interrogatory No.8: 
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